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The research focused on two aspects of political involvement among
social workers. The first was the direct political involvement of social
workers on behalf of their clients, and the second, the social workers’
encouragement of their clients’ involvement in political activity. The
main purpose of the research was to identify the factors that explain these
two types of political involvement among social workers. The data were
collected by means of a structured questionnaire from a research sample
of 165 social workers in 50 social services departments in Israel. The
findings indicate that the factors of the community (as opposed to clinical)
field of practice, political self-efficacy, management support, low level of
perceived organizational politics, and work in a rural setting contribute
most to the explanation of political involvement of social workers. The
perception of political involvement as a professional activity did not
explain its prevalence among the social workers. The article discusses
the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
Key Words: social workers, politics, involvement, clients
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Introduction
The political involvement of social workers is essential
because they work in a political arena. The environments
in which social workers operate are characterized by power
struggles and conflicts of interest; therefore, in order to
promote change, they often have to influence the political
system (Domanski, 1998; Patel, 2011; Vick, 2012). The political
involvement of social workers is based on fundamental values
of the profession such as commitment to social justice, equal
rights, and fair division of resources and power (Rush &
Keenan, 2014). Their task is to work within the political system
to promote disadvantaged people and serve as their personal
and collective advocates (DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2009;
Reisch & Jani, 2012). In their different positions, social workers
are expected to function in the political system as mediators,
agents of change, advocates, and lobbyists (Domanski, 1998).
In addition to direct political involvement, social workers
are also expected to encourage their clients to participate in
political activity. The aim of client involvement in the political
process is to allow them to play a role in decision-making
processes that affect their lives (Ohmer, 2007; Postle & Beresford,
2005). Social workers also need to encourage clients to engage
in politics because of the changes the clients are expected to
undergo as a result of social work intervention programs,
which are often associated with political processes (Saleebey,
1997). Encouraging the political involvement of clients may also
be a means of raising public awareness of their suffering and
transforming their cases into general social issues that warrant
social-community solutions (Mendes, 2007).
The ability of clients to influence the political system reflects a
process of personal and community empowerment. It contributes
to the ability of clients to progress from a condition of helplessness
to one in which they have an impact on their own living conditions.
Empowerment by means of political involvement contributes a
shift from the margins to the center of society, where the clients
have a voice, take initiative, and work on behalf of themselves and
the collective. Political involvement empowers clients by bringing
them together with others in the same situation, raising their
critical awareness of institutions, and increasing their self-efficacy
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regarding the generation of change (Author’s own; East & Roll,
2015; Song, 2013; Wu, 2010).
The present research examined the degree to which social
workers participate directly in political systems and the degree
to which they support their clients’ political involvement. The
main purpose of the research was to investigate the factors that
contribute to both these aspects of political involvement. As
a first study on this subject, it encompassed a comprehensive
examination of several personal characteristics (political selfefficacy, perception of political involvement as a professional
activity, and clinical or community field of social work practice),
as well as several organizational-administrative characteristics
(management support for political activity and the perceived
organizational politics of the social services department) related
to the political sphere. The research examined the relationships
and relative contribution of each of these characteristics to the
involvement of social workers in the political system and their
encouragement of their clients’ political involvement.

Theoretical Background
Political Involvement
Political involvement is defined in terms of the power
that citizens have to influence the conditions of their lives. It
refers to a redistribution of the power that enables the have-not
citizens to play a role in economic and political processes, so
that they can participate in and influence the political system.
Verba and others (1995) argued that political participation, that
is, activities conducted by ordinary citizens in order to affect
political outcomes, is the most important means by which
citizens can make their interests and preferences known.
Political involvement includes presenting the government
with an agenda and obtaining a response to the relevant
issues. The participants become players whose position must
be considered (Cebolla-Boado & Ortiz, 2014; Verba, Lehman,
& Brady, 1995). Political involvement also refers to activity by
which the interests, aspirations, and demands of citizens have
an effect on key figures in the government and on the decisions
they make (Fennema & Tillie, 2001; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004;
Kerrissey & Schofer, 2013).

6
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The definition of the political involvement of social workers
is similar, concentrating on the effort to influence the political
system in order to promote the rights of disadvantaged social
groups (DeFilippis et al., 2009; Domanski, 1998; Haynes &
Mickelson, 2006; Reisch & Jani, 2012). The political involvement
of social workers and their clients is aimed at improving
their access to information, influencing policy, affecting the
distribution of funds, implementing programs, and developing
and introducing services. Social workers use different means to
achieve these goals, such as advocacy, lobbying, negotiations,
persuasion, disseminating information, and public protest
(Chui & Gray, 2004; Domanski, 1998; Ritter, 2008). As noted, in
this research we examined the direct political involvement of
social workers on behalf of their clients and the degree to which
they supported their clients’ political involvement.
The perception of political involvement as a professional activity
As discussed in the introduction, there is much support
for the political involvement of social workers, and there is
also evidence that social workers are active in this respect
(Domanski, 1998; Patel, 2011; Vick, 2012). However, in many
cases, social workers view social and political activism as
inappropriate for their professional practice. Some may view
the political system as foreign and contradictory to the values
of the social work profession. Social workers often see political
involvement as an activity that is not objective, which involves
unfair exploitation of the foci of power and is thus liable to
distract them from the systematic work the profession requires.
In fact, “politics” is often considered a dirty word, evoking
an image of aggressiveness that clashes with the professional
image of sharing and acceptance (Haynes & Mickelson, 2006;
Mendes, 2007). Accordingly, many social workers avoid the
centers of power in the community and prefer to focus on
clinical therapy (Almog-Bar, Weiss-Gal, & Gal, 2015; Mendes,
2007), the development of intervention methods, and research,
all detached from the political arena (Reisch & Jani, 2012).
A noteworthy aspect of this view is the objection of social
workers to adopting intervention methods that they view as
contradicting their perception of the profession (Lee-Treweek,
1997), particularly when the methods seem to jeopardize the
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professional process or values (Baines, 2004). In some cases, such
resistance intensifies to the point of considering resignation
(Abramovitz, 2005; Baines, 2008). Accordingly, social workers’
perceptions regarding the professional nature (or lack thereof)
of political involvement are likely to lead to different levels of
involvement.
Accordingly, it can be expected that those involved in
community practices will be more likely, compared with those
involved in private-clinical practice, to participate in political
activity and to encourage their clients to be involved politically.
In community practice it is particularly important to understand
the politics of the community and the broader environment;
to become acquainted with stakeholders, who in many cases
have different and conflicting aims, goals, and interests; and to
work for changes in the political system (Checkoway, 1995; Das,
O’Neill, & Pinkerton, 2015; Rubin & Rubin, 2008; Twelvetrees,
1991; Weil, 1996). In this respect, community practice is not
limited to intellectual and technical activities, such as analysis,
consideration, and evaluation of information, but also—in fact,
mainly—includes activities of persuasion, negotiation, and
dissemination of information (Author’s own).
Political Self-Efficacy
The concept of self-efficacy is based on social cognitive and
social learning theories. Self-efficacy refers to the individual’s
evaluation of his or her ability to perform the actions required
in order to deal with future situations (Bandura, 1986, 1997).
Research on this subject has shown that self-efficacy contributes
significantly to a wide variety of tasks, level of performance,
persistence, attainment of aims and goals, and actions that
involve challenges beyond common tasks (Dull, Schleifer, &
McMillan, 2015; Wang & Zhang, 2016). However, it is important
to note that a person’s general self-efficacy may vary across
situations, and it is not an all-encompassing quality (Bandura &
Jourdan, 1991). Self-efficacy is specific to each task or situation
(Pintrich & Schunk, 1995). Therefore, in the present research,
we examined political self-efficacy—people’s faith in their
ability to influence the political system, perform political tasks,
participate in politics, and generate change. Political self-efficacy
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has been found to be one of the factors that affects the level of
involvement in politics (Ritter, 2008; Verba et al., 1995).
Management Support
Management support of employees is critical to their
motivation. Research has shown the importance and influence
of the managers in organizations (Buick, Blackman, O’Donnell,
O’Flynn, & West, 2015; Schult, Galway, Awosika, Schmunk, &
Hodgson, 2013), particularly on the introduction of changes in
the organization and its services (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002); the
development of the organizational culture (Schein, 1992); and
the mediation and coordination of conflicting requirements that
arise from the external and internal environments (Fleming &
Spicer, 2004). This also holds for the influence of managers in
welfare organizations, who are likely to play a central role in
shaping values and norms regarding political activity. Social
workers employed in the social services are affected by the
overall view of the management (Author’s own; Postle &
Beresford, 2005).
Organizational Politics
Organizational politics is a unique aspect of the study of
interpersonal relations in the workplace, and has been discussed
extensively in literature on the motivation of employees (Author’s
own; Vigoda-Gadot & Talmud, 2010). Organizational politics
refers to terms such as “power” and “influence,” and to people’s
ability to influence matters in favor of their goals (Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1977). Organizational politics involves the promotion
of personal interests that conflict with the interests of the
organization or of other employees (Meisler & Vigoda-Gadot,
2014). Organizations characterized by organizational politics are
guided less by professional, technical, or scientific considerations,
and more by interactions of negotiation and persuasion (Gummer,
1990). Organizational politics are expressed when members of an
organization identify foci of power and exploit them to obtain
personal support or to realize programs or policies that they see
as desirable (Author’s own, 2011; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989).
When organizational politics are prominent in a social services
department, the social workers are more likely to participate actively
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in the political system in order to achieve their professional tasks;
in order to achieve their goals, they need to focus their actions on
influence and negotiation; for the same reason, they are likely to
encourage their clients to take an active part in the political system.
Hypotheses
The theoretical literature gives rise to the following
hypotheses:
•

A positive correlation will be found between
the perception of political involvement as 		
professional and: (a) the political involvement
of social workers (as part of their professional
role) and (b) social workers’ encouragement of
the political involvement of their clients.

•

Involvement in community (rather than clinical) 		
social work practice will contribute to: (a) the political
involvement of social workers and (b) social workers’
encouragement of the political involvement of
their clients.

•

A positive correlation will be found between political
self-efficacy of social workers, as well as: (a) their 		
political involvement and (b) their encouragement of
their clients’ political involvement.

•

A positive correlation will be found between 		
management support of political involvement and 		
(a) the political involvement of social workers and (b)
the social workers’ encouragement of their clients’ 		
political involvement.

•

A positive correlation will be found between perceived
organizational politics and (a) the political involvement
of social workers and (b) their encouragement of their
clients’ political involvement.

10
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Method
Sample
The research was conducted among social workers employed in
social services departments in Israel. About 50 of the country’s 123
departments of social services were randomly sampled. The sample
included 165 social workers. Two hundred and sixty questionnaires
were sent randomly to the departments, depending on the size of
each department (2 to 7 social workers in each); 165 were returned
(63.46% response rate). The majority of respondents was born in
Israel (90.3%), and most were women (84.2%). The average age of the
respondents was 37.12 (between 24 and 54 years). More than half of
the respondents held bachelor’s degrees in social work (63%), and
the rest (37%) held master’s degrees (in Israel, a bachelor’s degree
in social work is the minimum qualification for employment in the
field). The majority of respondents were employed in the clinical
field of practice (69.1%), and the others engaged in macro social
work, that is, community or administrative work (30.9%). The mean
length of time in the social work profession was approximately
11.28 years (ranging from 1 to 36 years). Most of the respondents
were employed in urban social services departments (61%) and the
others in local or regional council departments (rural areas) (39%).
Research Instruments
Political involvement scale. The measure of political involvement
was based on the earlier work of Verba et al. (1995) and its translation
by Gilboa (2000). The scale includes 14 items representing political
activities. In correspondence with the research goals, two aspects
of political involvement were examined. Regarding the first, the
political involvement of social workers, the respondents were
asked to note the degree of their political involvement as part
of their professional work in each item presented. Regarding the
second aspect, the social workers’ encouragement of the political
involvement of their clients, the respondents were asked to mark
the degree to which they encouraged their clients’ involvement
in the activities represented by the respective items. In both sets
of items, the ranking was graded on a five-point scale, where 1 =
not at all, 2 = slightly, 3 = moderately, 4 = to a great degree, and 5
= to a very great degree.
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Scale of perception of political involvement as part of the social
work profession. The scale measuring the perception of political
involvement was based on earlier research on social workers’
involvement in the recruitment of resources (Author’s own,
2006), which was adapted for the present research. The scale
includes 11 statements. The items represent two opposing views
of political involvement: negative (it is not professional), such
as “political involvement is an activity that dirties the hands
of social workers,” “it’s an appropriate activity for politicians
or other groups, but not for social workers” (reverse), and a
positive (professional) view of political involvement as part of
the profession, represented by statements such as: “politics is
an activity based on professional knowledge in social work.”
The respondents were asked to mark the degree to which they
agreed with each of the statements regarding the political
involvement of social workers as part of their professional
work, on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly
disagree). The reliability of the scale was α = 0.89.
Political self-efficacy scale. The measure of political selfefficacy was based on the work of Verba et al. (1995), which
was translated to Hebrew (Gilboa, 2000). The scale reflects the
respondent’s inner belief in his or her ability to understand and
influence political processes. The respondents were asked to
rank their agreement with the items on a scale ranging from
1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). The reliability of the
scale was α = 0.80.
Management support for political involvement scale. The scale
was based on an earlier measure developed to assess the
general support of organizational directors (Zeitz, Johannesson,
& Ritchie, 1997), which was adapted for the support for
political involvement. The scale included 7 items, such as “the
management guides the employees to participate in politics,”
and “the management encourages employees to participate in
activities related to political systems.” The respondents were
asked to mark the degree to which each of the items was true
for the management of their social services department (the
department manager, team leader, or others who directed their
departments), on a scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5
(strongly agree). The reliability of the scale was α = 0.81.
Scale of perceived organizational politics. The POPS questionnaire,
based on earlier research (Ferris et al., 1989; Kacmar & Carlson,
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1994), was translated to Hebrew (Vigoda, 2000) and used to assess
the organizational politics of the respondents’ departments.
Organizational politics was defined as the degree to which
members of the organization perceive the organizational
environment as political, unfair, and directed to promote the
goals of the strong and influential. The respondents were asked
to rank their agreement with each of 9 items on a scale ranging
from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). The reliability of
the scale was α = 0.80.
Questionnaire on personal details. The questionnaire was
designed to collect the variables of personal and professional
background, such as age, gender, marital status, education,
professional experience, field of practice (clinical or community
work), and location of the department (urban or rural).
Procedure
After obtaining permission from the Ministry of Social
Services and Social Affairs to conduct the research, a request was
submitted to the managers of the social services department. All
the managers agreed to participate in the research. Two master’s
degree students of social work distributed the questionnaire in
the departments. The questionnaire included a consent form to
be signed by the social workers; among other things, it stated
that they were not required to complete the questionnaire and
that they could stop answering it at any point.

Findings
The Descriptive Variables
The data presented in Table 1 indicate that the reliability
of the dependent research variables, according to Cronbach’s
alpha, ranged from α = 0.80 to α = 0.95. The mean of the variable
of encouragement of political involvement by clients was higher
than that of the social workers’ own political involvement (see
Table 1).
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Table 1: Reliability coefficients, means and standard deviations of
the research variables (N = 165)
Standard
Deviation

Variability

Reliability Mean

The social worker’s political
involvement

0.92

1.84

0.80

Encouragement of clients’
political involvement

0.95

2.35

0.99

Management support

0.81

1.94

0.73

Political self-efficacy

0.80

3.38

0.86

View of political involvement

0.89

3.56

0.74

Perceived organizational
politics

0.80

3.00

0.70

To examine the contribution of the independent variables
to the explanation of the dependent variables, we performed
multivariate analysis. Two regressions were performed for
each of the dependent variables (encouragement of the political
involvement of clients, and the social worker’s political
involvement). The background variables of education, length
of time in the profession, type of social services department
(urban or rural) were entered as control variables. In addition,
the independent variables of main field of practice, political
self-efficacy, perception of political involvement as professional,
management support, and perceived organizational politics
were also entered into the regression.
The background variables of gender and country of birth
were not included, as there were not enough men or immigrants,
and the t tests did not reveal any significant differences. The
age of the social workers was not examined, because the
Pearson’s correlation in the pre-test did not indicate a significant
correlation (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Multiple regression analysis of the relationship between the
independent variables and the social worker’s political involvement
Direct political
involvement of the
social worker

Support for political
involvement by clients

t

β

B

t

β

B

Education

.528

.036

.058

-.790

.057

-.114

Years in profession

-1.642 -.112

-.013

-.629

-.045

-.006

.608

4.072*** .306

.763

Main field of practice 4.248

.304

Rural or urban
social services
department

-1.882 -.129

-.204

-2.222* -.160

-.316

Political self-efficacy

2.188* .158

.142

2.233*

.169

.189

Professional view of
political involvement

.312

.021

.022

-.056

-.004

-.005

Management support 4.016** .279

.297

2.038*

.149

.197

Perceived
-2.464* -.168
organizational politics

-.182

-2.348* -.168

R2

.32

.25

Adjusted R2

29.

21

F

9.08

6.48

-.227

* p < .05, ** p < .01***, p < .001

The regression model of social workers’ political involvement
was found to be significant (p < 0.001, F = 9.08), and to explain 29%
of the variance. Field of practice provided the most significant
explanation of variance in the social worker’s political involvement,
followed by management support, perceived organizational
politics (in a negative direction), and political self-efficacy.
The regression model of social workers’ encouragement of
the political involvement of clients was found to be significant
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(F = 6.48, p < 0.001) and to explain 21% of the variance. Field
of practice, that being involved in community practice, as
compared with individual case work practice, provided the
most significant explanation of variance in the social worker’s
encouragement of clients to participate in politics, followed
by perceived organizational politics (negatively), political selfefficacy, type of social services department (rural or urban), and
management support.

Discussion
In this research we examined the factors that promote and
deter the political involvement of social workers and their
encouragement of the political involvement of clients. The
research findings show that social workers encouraged their
clients to be politically involved (according to their responses
to the questionnaire) to more than a slight degree but less than
a moderate degree, and that they personally participated in
politics to less than a slight degree. One explanation for the
finding that the social workers tended to encourage their clients’
involvement slightly more than they participated directly in
politics might be associated with the generally accepted methods
of social work, which focus on client involvement (Croft &
Beresford, 2008; Seden & Ross, 2007) and client empowerment
(Author’s own; East & Roll, 2015; Song, 2015; Wu, 2010).
The research findings regarding the minimal political
involvement of social workers are consistent with earlier
research that showed little involvement of social workers on the
social-political level, and more concentration of involvement on
the clinical level (Almog-Bar et al., 2015; Haynes & Mickelson,
2006; Mendes, 2007). These findings, along with those of earlier
studies, underscore the importance of identifying the factors
that contribute to the political involvement of social workers
and their encouragement of clients to participate in politics.
The Perception of Political Involvement as a Professional Activity
The research findings show that, contrary to our hypothesis,
the perception of political involvement as part of the social work
profession did not explain the political involvement of the social
workers or their support for their clients’ political involvement.

16

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

These findings contradict earlier research that indicated a
correlation between professional perceptions and activity
associated with the respective views (Baines, 2008; Lee-Treweek,
1997). Perhaps the nature of the social worker’s role, which
focuses on clinical activity, as well as the need to receive clients
for individual therapy (Almog-Bar et al., 2015) prevents social
workers from fulfilling their commitment to political activity.
These findings might also be explained by the dual loyalty
of social workers in their organizations of employment. On the
one hand, they are loyal to the profession and the code of ethics,
values, and ideology of the profession, but on the other hand,
they are loyal to the organization that employs them, in this
case, the local government (Author’s own; Gal & Weiss-Gal,
2013). Perhaps the social workers’ organizational affiliation, the
demands and expectations of the organization, and the social
workers’ loyalty to the local authorities hinders them from
becoming politically active. Social workers in social service
departments are employed by and are subordinate to the local
authority or municipality, and are thus obligated to maintain
the political stability of the system. In light of this situation, it
would be interesting to conduct further research to examine
the relationship of loyalty to the organization, on the one hand,
and to the profession, on the other hand, with the political
involvement of social workers and their support for their clients’
political involvement.
Another explanation of the findings may be that those
social workers who expressed a favorable view of political
involvement, and particularly those with a very favorable view,
might consider minimal political activity (especially due to
discouragement by the organization) as inadequate, compared
with those social workers who perceived political involvement
as unfavorable.
Working in Community Practice
According to the research findings, work in the field of
community practice explained the political involvement of
social workers, as well as their support for their clients’ political
involvement, more than any other factor examined did. These
findings are not surprising.
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Social workers who work on the community level, compared
with those working on the individual and family levels, are
more involved in politics as part of their jobs. Community
workers direct their activity towards change in the overall
system, including the community power structure, and this
requires them to negotiate with the political system (Checkoway,
1995; Das et al., 2015; Rubin & Rubin, 2008; Twelvetrees, 1991;
Weil, 1996). It is also noteworthy that the findings show that
community practice contributed not only to the personal and
professional involvement of the social workers, but also to their
encouragement of clients to participate in political activity.
Political Self-Efficacy
The research findings indicated a contribution of political
self-efficacy to the explanation of the social workers’ political
involvement and their encouragement of the political involvement
of their clients. These findings are consistent with cognitive-social
theory, according to which self-efficacy affects people’s choices and
the degree of effort they are willing to invest in given situations
(Bandura, 1991), as well as their decisions regarding their degree
of involvement in a given activity. Political involvement involves
concrete political experience and familiarization with the complex
political map, and it requires reciprocity and appropriate reactions
to a variety of stakeholders. Political self-efficacy evidently
contributes to the involvement of social workers in coping with
complex tasks (Dull et al., 2015; Wang & Zhang, 2016).
Another possible explanation of the contribution of selfefficacy to political involvement is related to the perception of
politics as an activity that is foreign and not an unequivocally
integral part of the field of social work. In this case, personal
self-efficacy contributes to involvement in political tasks, even
though they are not perceived as an integral to the profession.
Management Support
The findings show that management support helped
explain the political involvement of social workers and their
encouragement of their clients’ political involvement. These
findings are consistent with those of other studies that have
highlighted the crucial importance of the manager in motivating
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employees of an organization (Buick et al., 2015; Schult et al.,
2013). Similarly, social workers in social service departments
are influenced by the overall view of management (Postle &
Beresford, 2005). The findings might also be explained by the
structure in which the research participants worked: such
social workers are subordinate to local government authorities,
which are led by influential elected officials, and they need the
support of their managers to gain the legitimation of the leaders
of the local governments.
It should be noted that although the significance of the
manager’s support was significant in explaining the degree to
which social workers encourage their clients to participate in
politics, this factor explained the direct political involvement of
the social workers to a greater degree. Apparently, the social
workers needed greater support from their managers in order
to act directly. It appears that the social workers perceived the
political involvement of clients (with their encouragement) as
less threatening compared with their own direct involvement.
Perceived Organizational Politics
as a Barrier to Political Involvement
The findings of the present research reveal an opposite
trend to that described in the research hypotheses, namely, that
perceived organizational politics would be correlated with more
extensive political involvement. That hypothesis was based on
the reasoning that social workers in social services departments
characterized by strong organizational politics would be more
likely to take active roles in the political arena in order to
achieve their professional tasks. However, it emerges that the
perception of strong organizational politics actually hindered
the political involvement of the social workers, as well as their
encouragement of the political involvement of their clients.
Apparently, it is necessary to differentiate between a perception
of organizational politics that reflect a tendency towards political
action in order to achieve organizational and personal goals,
and organizational politics that represent an inclination to
engage in politics in order to achieve professional goals. In the
present research, the perceived organizational politics reflected
an organizational system aimed at gaining personal power for
the social workers (and not professional power or power for the
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benefit of the clients), while the political involvement of the social
workers (as examined in this research) reflected a professional goal
of benefiting the clients.
Work in a Rural Area as Strengthening Political Involvement
In addition to the issues covered by the research hypotheses,
the research findings also indicated that the social workers in rural
areas were more supportive of their clients’ political involvement
(but did not participate much in political activity themselves).
One possible explanation of this finding may be the much
greater proximity and access of citizens to the sources of power
in the smaller rural communities. It seems that the access of
the citizens in rural areas to the sources of power provided the
social workers with a more secure foundation for supporting
their clients’ political involvement. The proximity to the sources
of power in rural communities is reflected in more social capital
in rural compared with urban communities (Beaudoin &
Thorson, 2004; Krishna & Shrader, 1999). The emphasis here is
especially on linking social capital, based on the relationship
of community members or clients with organizations that have
power and influence beyond the community system (Aldrich &
Meyer, 2015; Putnam, 2000).
Perhaps the social workers prefer to rely upon existing
political ties to initiating and developing new political systems. It
would be interesting to examine this subject in further research.
Limitations of the Research
Alongside the advantages of this research, some limitations
should be considered. First, the research sample consisted of
social workers in social service departments (the largest group
of social workers in Israel) and did not include other professional
groups. It would be interesting to expand the research on this
issue to additional organizations and populations. It is also
important to investigate the awareness of political involvement
and political activism among national-level decision makers
and the academic faculty members who train social workers.
In addition, this research was conducted in Israel, and
should be expanded to include additional countries, where the
organizational and professional cultures relate differently to the
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issues examined here. There are similarities and differences in
the characteristics of political involvement in Israel and the U.S..
Israel and the United States are both democratic countries, but
their respective political scenes are not the same. For example,
the political activities in the two countries are motivated by
different views regarding the welfare state. In the U.S., there is a
clear neoliberal outlook, which focuses on the democratic value
of the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they wish, with
minimal intervention of society and the state. According to this
view, individuals and groups in society should be allowed to act
freely, based on their interests. Therefore, the intervention of the
state in economic activity for the sake of the welfare of its citizens
and realization of socioeconomic rights should be very limited.
With regard to social workers in this context, it is important to
note that state intervention focuses only on those who are weak
and needy, who are unable to manage themselves or with the help
of their immediate society without government intervention.
In comparison, although Israel no longer represents the
view of social democracy (the opposite of the view of the U.S.), it
still bears some characteristics of that perspective. Accordingly,
the political arena attributes great importance to the protection
and realization of socioeconomic rights and to increasing social
and economic equality by the state. The narrowing of economic
and social disparity in society and promotion of social justice
are given higher priority in Israel than in the U.S. Although
there has been some retreat from this view in Israel in recent
years, it is still stronger than in the U.S., in both the local and
the national arenas.
Differences can be found in the political cultures of the
two countries. For example, a critical culture in the democratic
political arena in the U.S. sees the individual, not the regime, as
sovereign. The element of individualism in Israel is weaker in
comparison, and there is a constant expectation of citizens that
the state will take care of them. In these respects and others, it is
important to study the differences among countries regarding
the topic of this research.
It would also be interesting to expand the research to groups
that supply resources to organizations and, especially, to clients
who receive social services. Finally, it should be noted that the
research was exposed to common method bias and common
source bias.
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Tracing the Evolution of the
Tarasoff Duty in California
Benjamin A. Swerdlow

University of California—Berkeley

Since the first Tarasoff decision in 1974, the question of mental health
professionals’ “duty to protect” third-parties has been a topic of vigorous
debate. The ensuing forty-three years witnessed considerable shifts in
the statutory and legal landscape in the United States, including several
significant changes in California state law over the past decade alone.
In this historical review, I trace the evolution of the Tarasoff duty with
a specific focus on the state in which that duty originated, California,
with the intention of elucidating the major policy, ethical, and practical
questions that have followed in the wake of the Tarasoff decision.
Key Words: Tarasoff, duty to protect, duty to warn

Since the era of deinstitutionalization in the 1960s, imminent
danger to self (i.e., suicide) or others (i.e., homicide) has emerged
as one of the standard criteria for mandatory psychiatric intervention in the United States (Ward, 2014). Whereas the duties of
mental health professionals in California to suicidal clients have
remained substantively unchanged since the 1967 passage of the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which mandated prompt risk assessment and, if necessary, involuntary commitment, the question of
the duties of mental health professionals to potential victims of
violence other than their clients has been the source of considerable back-and-forth in state courts and legislatures. In fact, prior to
the mid-twentieth century, it was not at all clear that clinicians in
California had any (legal) obligation to individuals other than their
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare • June 2018 • Volume XLV • Number 2
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clients. For reference, the first mandatory child abuse reporting
law in California, which applied only to physicians, was enacted
in 1963 (Rady Children’s Hospital San Diego, 2012).
Due in part to an ever shifting statutory and legal landscape,
as well as considerable inter-state variability, the duties of clinicians to potential victims continue to be a source of considerable
confusion and an ethically contested subject. With these facts in
mind, I seek to trace the historical evolution of the so-called “duty
to protect” with a specific focus on the state in which that duty
originated, California, and to elucidate the relevant policy, ethical, and practical questions that attend this duty.
In 1969, Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student at the University
of California, Berkeley, confided to his therapist that he intended
to kill a woman he had previously dated, Tatiana Tarasoff. Poddar’s psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, warned campus police
that Poddar was experiencing an acute psychotic episode and
recommended that Poddar be involuntarily committed on the
grounds of being a danger to others. Poddar was briefly detained
by campus police, but was released shortly thereafter and subsequently desisted from treatment. Several months later, on October 27, 1969, Poddar carried out his plan, stabbing and killing
Tatiana Tarasoff (for a more detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding Tarasoff v. Regents, refer to Buckner & Firestone, 2000).
Following her death, Tarasoff’s parents sued Poddar’s therapists, campus police, and the Regents of the University of California for, among other claims made by the plaintiffs, failing to
warn their daughter that she was in danger. In 1974, in a decision now commonly referred to as Tarasoff I (Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California, 1974), the California Supreme
Court held that psychotherapists had a duty of care not only to
their clients, but also to individuals who might be harmed by
their clients. Specifically, Tarasoff I held that therapists were obligated to warn potential victims of dangers posed to them by the
therapists’ psychotherapy clients. Failing to warn such victims
would render therapists liable to civil judgment.
Judge Mathew Tobriner, writing for the majority in Tarasoff I, concluded that “public policy favoring protection of the
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist relationships
must yield in instances in which disclosure is essential to avert
danger to others; the protective privilege ends where the public
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peril begins” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
1974, section 2, paragraph 17). This statement encapsulates the
central values tension at the heart of Tarasoff: at what point does
a therapist’s professional and ethical obligation to maintain a client’s confidentiality come into conflict with a compelling interest to promote public safety, and, more to the point, how ought
such conflicts be resolved?
Survey data collected by Givelber, Bowers, and Blitch (1984)
highlight this conflict: out of the 2785 mental health professionals
that they surveyed nearly ten years after Tarasoff I, 45% of clinicians who had breached confidentiality to communicate with
a potential victim felt that they had violated their own clinical
judgment by breaching confidentiality. This finding resonates
with the widely held belief that confidentiality is essential to
the practice of therapy (e.g., American Psychiatric Association,
2013). Nevertheless, respondents overwhelmingly endorsed a responsibility to potential victims as a matter of professional and
personal ethics. This speaks to the deep bind in which clinicians
sometimes find themselves when working with dangerous clients. In Tarasoff I, however, the court erred firmly on the side of
public safety by clearly establishing a “duty to warn.”
Prior to Tarasoff I, no court anywhere in the nation had recognized such a legal duty to warn the potential victims of a patient
(Cohn, 1983). In the wake of Tarasoff I, individual practitioners
and professional organizations raised numerous objections to
the court’s ruling, arguing that the duty to warn would jeopardize the practice of psychotherapy by eroding the essential
precept of confidentiality and contending that therapists could
not reliably assess the likelihood of future violent acts by their
patients (Quinn, 1984). Based on these and other objections, including concerns about civil liability, the American Psychiatric
Association, the Northern California Psychiatric Society, and
other professional organizations filed an amicus curiae brief to
challenge the court’s 1974 decision. In response, the California
Supreme Court took the unusual step of agreeing to rehear the
case, resulting in a second decision, known as Tarasoff II (Tarasoff v. University of California Regents, 1976), being handed
down in 1976.
In keeping with the spirit of Tarasoff I, the 1976 decision imposed upon psychotherapists in California a legal duty to protect
third parties from harmful acts perpetrated by their patients,
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even if doing so required the therapist to breach the patient’s
confidentiality. Indeed, the court held that it was precisely because of the “special relationship” between therapists and clients that the therapists have “a duty to control the conduct” of
their clients in cases in which third parties may be “foreseeably
endangered” by their client’s conduct (Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, 1976, section 2, para. 5).
However, contrary to Tarasoff I, the court ruled that discharging this duty to protect third parties did not necessarily require
warning potential victims:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim
against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require
the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending
upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn
the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps
are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. (emphasis added; Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
1976, para. 4).

Having moved from a highly specific ‘duty to warn’ to a more
general ‘duty to protect,’ the decision in Tarasoff II allowed for
increased flexibility on the part of the clinician. At the same
time, the 1976 decision also increased the ambiguity with which
clinicians now had to contend by providing only vague guidelines as to how clinicians were expected to discharge the newly
imposed ‘duty to protect’ (Mills, Sullivan, & Eth, 1987).
Moreover, a provision in the 1976 decision specifically found
that therapists could be held personally liable if they “should
have” known that a patient was dangerous prior to that patient
committing a violent act. Yet the court left unspecified the extent
or content of the knowledge that the therapist would have needed
to possess to subsequently be held liable or the steps that therapists would need to have taken to protect themselves from liability (section 2, para. 14). This ambiguity resulted in civil actions in
which therapists were held liable for situations in which it would
have been nearly impossible for the therapist to anticipate the
specific injury or to have protected the injured third parties, such
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as substance-related car accidents that occurred months after the
driver was seen by a therapist (Pettis & Gutheil, 1993).
At the same time, the initial concerns about breach of confidentiality and the ramifications of such breaches for the practice
of psychotherapy persisted in the wake of the 1976 decision. In a
dissenting opinion in Tarasoff II, Judge William Clark highlighted these concerns when he wrote that:
Given the importance of confidentiality to the practice of
psychiatry, it becomes clear the duty to warn imposed
by the majority will cripple the use and effectiveness of
psychiatry. Many people, potentially violent—yet susceptible to treatment—will be deterred from seeking it;
those seeking it will be inhibited from making revelations necessary to effective treatment; and forcing the
psychiatrist to violate the patient’s trust will destroy the
interpersonal relationship by which treatment is effected.
(Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 1976,
J. Clark dissent, paragraph 28)
Clark, channeling the concerns of many practitioners, was anxious that by codifying an exception to patient-client confidentiality, the court’s decision would have the unintended consequence of dissuading potentially dangerous individuals from
availing themselves of psychotherapy or from disclosing homicidal thoughts and plans.
Clark’s sentiments were widely echoed by prominent mental
health professionals, including by the presidents of the American Psychiatric Association (Stone, 1976) and the American
Psychological Association (Siegel, 1979). Max Siegel, then the
president of the American Psychological Association, wrote of
Tarasoff, “This was a day in court for the law and not for the mental health professions. If the psychologist had accepted the view
of absolute, inviolate confidentiality, he might have been able to
have kept Poddar in treatment, saved the life of Tatiana Tarasoff,
and avoided what was to become the Tarasoff decision” (Siegel,
1979, p. 253). Siegel’s statement speaks not only to the abiding
respect for the precept of confidentiality, but also to one of the
tremendous difficulties in adjudicating Tarasoff cases: namely,
that it is invariably possible to argue and nearly impossible to
refute the counterfactual in which some set of actions taken or
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not taken by a clinician (as opposed to the actions they actually
took) might have saved a victim’s life.
It should also be noted that although the court’s decisions in
Tarasoff I and II applied only to California, the effects of those
decisions reverberated nationally. As of 2012, a duty to warn or
protect had been codified by legislative statute in twenty-three
states and was present in the common law supported by judicial
precedent in an additional ten states (Johnson, Persad, & Sisti,
2014). Although a review of statutes and common law precedents
in states other than California is beyond the scope of this article,
it is certainly interesting to reflect on the extent of state-by-state
variability, particularly as it relates to the challenge of adequately training and educating clinicians (refer to Johnson et al., 2014
for a review of inter-state variability).
This challenge is undoubtedly magnified by the ever-changing and often conflicting legal landscape, even within a given
state. A mere four years after Tarasoff II, in a case involving the
decision to parole a juvenile offender who had threatened to kill
a neighborhood child upon his release, the California Supreme
Court held that Alameda County “had no affirmative duty to
warn Plaintiffs, the police, the mother of the juvenile offender,
or other local parents” (a decision which Judge Tobriner dissented) (Thompson v. County of Alameda, 1980). Meanwhile, in
1983, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, whose appellate jurisdiction includes California, went precisely the other direction and
broadened the foreseeability criteria laid out in Tarasoff in Jablonski by Pahls v. United States (1983) (refer to Walcott, Cerundolo, &
Beck, 2001 for a discussion of Jablonski).
In 1986, in response to concerns about ambiguity and liability that followed in the wake of the 1976 Tarasoff II decision, the
California state legislature passed a statute that limited therapists’ duty to protect and attendant liability to situations in
which the patient communicated to the therapist an imminent
threat to an identifiable victim, thereby clarifying that therapists
could not be held liable for any and all future harmful actions
committed by their current or former clients. Simultaneously, the
1986 statute shielded therapists from any potential civil action
that might arise due to breach of confidentiality, as long as they
did so within the narrow confines of discharging their duty to
protect as defined by the statute.
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Ironically, however, the 1986 statute introduced fresh ambiguity by referring to a “duty to warn and protect” (Cal. Civ.
Code § 43.92, 1986), rendering unclear whether the legislature intended to reintroduce a specific duty to warn akin to that which
had been outlined in Tarasoff I. Two years prior to the passage
of the 1986 statute, Givelber and colleagues (1984) had found
that over 90% of California clinicians believed that they were
legally obligated to warn potential victims as a result of Tarasoff,
so it is not difficult to imagine that the inclusion of the phrase
“duty to warn” in the 1986 statute confirmed and reinforced this
mistaken belief. That a misunderstanding of the court’s ruling
in Tarasoff II was so pervasive in California at the time speaks to
the need for clear communication of policy to stakeholders, especially in a case such as Tarasoff, in which the waters had been
muddied by the court’s decision to rehear the case and amend
their decision a mere two years after their initial, controversial
(and therefore widely circulated) ruling.
Fast forward seventeen years, and the ambiguity inherent in
the 1986 statute was explicitly interpreted and codified as a duty
to warn in the 2003 issuance of the simplified civil jury instructions (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, No.
503A and 503B, 2014), meaning that juries were being explicitly instructed to apply a ‘duty to warn’ criterion in determining
whether a clinician could be held liable in a Tarasoff cause of
action (Weinstock, Vari, Leong, & Silva, 2006). At around the
same time in 2004, a pair of appellate court decisions, Ewing v.
Northridge Hospital Medical Center and Ewing v. Goldstein, held
that a specific duty to warn existed based on the ambiguous
wording of the 1986 statute. In the Ewing decisions, the court held
that therapists could be held liable if a serious threat to an identifiable victim was communicated to the therapist by the client
or by one of the client’s immediate family members and the therapist failed to warn the victim regardless of other protective actions
taken by the therapist, such as alerting the police. The combined
effect of these appellate decisions and the revised jury instructions was that, for a period of several years in California more
than twenty-five years after Tarasoff II, failure to meet the duty to
warn was presumptive proof of negligence.
In 2007, in response to the decisions in Ewing and Ewing, the
state legislature was prompted to revisit the 1986 immunity statute. Although the legislature did insert language clarifying that
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warning a potential victim was merely one of a set of actions by
which the duty to protect could be satisfied, they elected to retain
the phrase “duty to warn and protect” (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92,
2007). In light of past confusions, it is perhaps unsurprising that
this attempt at clarification proved insufficient: in 2013, the state
legislature updated the statute yet again, this time removing the
phrase “duty to warn” altogether (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92, 2013).
As part of the 2013 revision, and in order to forestall additional
misinterpretation, the legislature felt moved to explicitly lay out
their intent: “It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments made by the act adding this subdivision only change the
name of the duty referenced in this section from a duty to warn
and protect to a duty to protect” (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(d), 2013).
Alongside these legislative actions, the California Judicial
Council revised the civil jury instructions in 2007 and again in
2014 to clarify that therapists were not necessarily obligated to
warn potential victims to discharge their duty to protect. The cumulative effect of these changes to the immunity statute and the
jury instructions is that if a therapist chooses not to warn, but instead pursues an alternative course of action, their actions must
be affirmatively proven to have been negligent for the therapist to
be held personally liable. Still, there remains considerable room
for interpretation by judges, juries, and clinicians in the current
statute. As one example, what precisely constitutes a “serious
threat” of physical violence as opposed to an unserious threat?
It is within this shifting and ambiguous landscape that the
legacy of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California continues
to be contested to this day. Alan Stone, the former president of
the American Psychiatric Association who had lambasted Tarasoff II in 1976, conceded in 1984 that the duty to warn was “not
as unmitigated a disaster for the enterprise of psychotherapy as
it once seemed to critics like myself” (Stone, 1984, p. 181). Yet as
recently as 2014, Donald Bersoff, himself a former president of the
American Psychological Association, described Tarasoff as “perhaps the most notorious case in mental health law” (Bersoff, 2014,
p. 461). In insisting that Tarasoff was “bad law, bad social science,
and bad social policy,” Bersoff emphasized, as previous critics
had, that the legal obligations imposed by Tarasoff, particularly
obligations to warn third parties, might have the consequence
of reducing the likelihood that patients would disclose violent
urges and increasing the likelihood of desistance from therapy,
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thereby “making it impossible to work through the threat of violence” (Bersoff, 2014, p. 461).
Douglas Mossman (2009) has offered a parallel critique of
the Tarasoff doctrine as “a legal mechanism whereby society assigns mental health professionals the duty of reducing the risk of
violence, with the threat of tort liability representing the professionals’ incentive to accede to the duty” and has argued that violence prevention through effective psychotherapy, as opposed to
violence prediction, should be the focus of mental health professionals (p. 112). Whereas Givelber and colleagues (1984) found
that clinicians were startlingly confident in their own ability
to predict violence, there is ample empirical evidence that clinicians’ judgment in this domain is suspect (Large & Nielssen,
2017; Mossman, 2009). One aspect of Mossman’s (2009) critique
of Tarasoff that is particularly striking, yet directly in line with
the court’s reasoning in Tarasoff that therapists have a ‘duty to
control,’ is that the duty to protect positions mental health professionals squarely as agents for social control, which may come
into conflict with social justice values (see also Gurevitz, 1977).
What about the functional consequences of Tarasoff? To date,
no empirical analyses have specifically addressed whether
acutely homicidal clients who receive and remain engaged in
therapy are, in fact, less likely to act on their homicidal intentions than similar clients who desist from therapy. It does appear to be the case, however, that psychosocial interventions
for violence and aggression can be effective, which supports
the broader notion that reducing barriers to adequate treatment
receipt and keeping violent clients engaged in therapy are important therapeutic goals (McGuire, 2008; O’Brien & Daffern,
2015; Sher & Rice, 2015). This would seem, in turn, to substantiate Bersoff’s concerns about violent clients avoiding or desisting from therapy because of Tarasoff-related concerns. Unfortunately, there is minimal empirical evidence to assess whether
Tarasoff has actually affected clients’ engagement in therapy in
this way.
In a recent analysis, Edwards (2010) suggested that duty to
warn laws may actually increase the rate of homicides, which
Edwards attributes to mental health professionals being more
reluctant to provide services to potentially violent clients as a result of duty to warn obligations and to clients being less willing
to disclose after becoming aware of the limits to confidentiality.

34

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

This contention is not in line with Givelber and colleagues’
(1984) finding that clinicians who viewed themselves as bound
by the court’s holding in Tarasoff did not report being less willing to treat dangerous patients or being more willing to terminate treatment. Moreover, clinicians who viewed themselves
as legally bound by Tarasoff were considerably more likely to
report having taken concrete steps, such as warning potential
victims and notifying the police, when they deemed their clients
to be at serious risk of harming another person than clinicians
who viewed themselves as ethically, but not legally, obligated to
protect potential victims, suggesting that Tarasoff was having its
intended effect of binding clinicians to a duty to protect (Givelber et al., 1984).
Although the moral-ethical question of whether an increased
willingness to warn is desirable is ultimately beyond the scope
of this review, it is interesting to note that, in at least some cases,
Tarasoff warnings may unintentionally be leading directly to the
criminal prosecution of individuals with mental illness in California. Issuing violent threats is a criminal offense in California,
and police may opt to pursue criminal charges if such threats
are brought to their attention (Weiner, 2003). Violence risk assessments conducted by mental health professionals have also
come to play an increasingly prominent role in multiple aspects
of the workings of the criminal justice system since the Tarasoff decisions were handed down (Buchanan et al., 2012) (for more
on the ethics of violence risk assessment as it relates to Tarasoff,
refer to Mossman, 2006). Such cases highlight the delicate and
occasionally perilous balance that clinicians are forced to strike
between confidentiality and their obligations to their clients on
the one hand and their duty to protect on the other, as well as
the intersection between mental health professionals and law
enforcement officers in applying Tarasoff.
In a similar vein, a survey of police desk sergeants conducted by Huber and colleagues (2000) in Michigan and South Carolina, both of which have duty to warn statutes, found that fewer than a quarter of the police stations in question had specific
policies related to Tarasoff warnings and hardly any of the desk
sergeants personally had knowledge about the Tarasoff case, although nearly half reported that their station had received at
least one such warning from a mental health professional. Huber
and colleagues also observed considerable variability in desk
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sergeants’ responses to hypothetical questions (e.g., if a warning
was received, would the potential victim be notified?), suggesting that not only clinicians, but also law enforcement agencies
ought to be formulating responses to and raising awareness
about Tarasoff (Huber et al., 2000).
Forty-plus years after Tarasoff I, if there is one thing on which
Tarasoff’s proponents and critics agree, it is on the far-ranging impact that Tarasoff has had on mental health policy. To wit, Douglas
Mossman (2006) declared that “no court ruling has had a broader
or more enduring impact on day-to-day mental health practice… .
Thirty years after its promulgation, Tarasoff remains, to mental
health professionals, the most influential ruling in mental disability law” (pp. 524-526). As evidence of its far-reaching effects
on mental health policy, one need only consider the fact that Tarasoff not only motivated corresponding legal action and legislation
in states across the country, but also shaped thinking about other
contexts in which health professionals may have a duty to protect
third parties, such as the controversy surrounding whether physicians ought to warn the partners of HIV positive patients (for
a detailed discussion, refer to Burke, 2015). Simultaneously, Tarasoff prompted numerous and vigorous discussions of the ethical
obligations of mental health professionals and reflections on the
importance of confidentiality as a central tenet of clinical work.
With respect to the actual practice and provision of mental
healthcare in the state of California, Tarasoff, as most recently codified by California Civil Code § 43.92 (2013), has established that
mental health professionals do have an affirmative obligation
to take reasonable steps to protect third parties from a patient’s
violence behavior, at least in cases in which the patient “has
communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims”
(Cal Civ Code § 43.92(a), 2013). Although this obligation need not
necessarily entail warning the intended victim, therapists who
fail to discharge their duty to protect may be held personally
liable. On the other hand, if, in discharging their duty to protect,
the therapist does elect to communicate the threat to the victim
or to a law enforcement agency, they are shielded from liability
that might otherwise result from the breach of confidentiality.
This is the status of the Tarasoff duty in California today;
yet, given the number of alterations, both small and large, that
have been made to the duty to protect in California over the last
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forty-three years by the courts and the state legislature, it seems
almost certain that mental health policy in this arena will continue to evolve over time, necessitating ongoing engagement by
and education for mental health professionals practicing in the
state of California, as well as consumers and law enforcement
agencies.
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There are approximately 11.3 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States (U.S.), representing about 3.5%
of the total U.S. population (Krogstad & Passel, 2015; Passel,
Cohn, Krogstad, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2014). About eight million undocumented immigrants are part of the U.S. work force,
making up about 5.1% of the work force in the year 2010 (Krogstad & Passel, 2015). Although the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. has been stable over the past seven years,
politicians and the media continue to portray the U.S. as being
overrun and overwhelmed by undocumented immigrants who
are criminals, take jobs away from “real” Americans, and are a
drain on the U.S. economy (Becerra, Androff, Ayón, & Castillo,
2012; Chavez, 2013).
The combination of an increase in fear and distrust of immigrants after September 11, 2001, as well as the Great Recession,
has led to immigrants being used as scapegoats and blamed for
causing the economic problems in the U.S., as well as a loss of
traditional American culture (Chavez, 2013). As a result of this
anti-immigrant rhetoric and fear of immigrants, numerous anti-immigration policies and enforcement strategies have been
enacted. During President Obama’s Administration, a greater
emphasis was placed on border enforcement than removals of
undocumented immigrants from the interior of the U.S. As a
result, a record number of removals occurred under the Obama
Administration, while the number of overall deportations decreased compared to previous administrations (Chishti, Pierce,
& Bolter, 2017; Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2014). The increase
in immigration enforcement strategies at the federal level, as
well as the implementation of restrictive immigration policies
in several states, have negatively impacted immigrant communities in the U.S. (Arbona et el., 2010; Capps, Castaneda, Chaudry, & Santos, 2007; Hacker et al., 2011).
Americans perceive Latinos as often being subjected to discrimination. Previous studies have found that perceived and
experienced discrimination are related to negative health outcomes including stress, anxiety, and depression (Edwards &
Romero, 2008; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014).
The current Trump administration’s immigration policies may
serve to exacerbate the negative impact immigration policies
and enforcement strategies have on Latino immigrant communities. As a result, Latino immigrants who viewed immigration

Chapter Title
Perceived
Discrimination Among Latinos

41

policies and enforcement strategies as discriminatory during
the Obama Administration (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, & Motel,
2011) may continue to view Trump’s policies as discriminatory
as well.
Immigrants come to the U.S. with great optimism in search
of increased freedoms and economic opportunities in order to
provide better lives for themselves and their families (Raleigh
& Kao, 2010). Unfortunately, Latinos, especially undocumented
Latinos, may experience discrimination once in the U.S. because
of the negative social and political discourse surrounding Latino immigrants. Immigration policies and enforcement strategies, which many perceive to discriminate against Latinos, may
also negatively impact the hope and optimism of Latino immigrants living in the U.S. (Becerra, Androff, Cimino, Wagaman,
& Blanchard, 2013).
Although anti-immigrant sentiment exists throughout the
country, for over 15 years, Arizona has been at the center of restrictive immigration policies and enforcement strategies that
specifically target Latino immigrants. Arizona has a population of 6.9 million residents with over 2.1 million Latinos (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2016). Given the increased focus on immigrants
and immigration enforcement by the Trump administration,
as well as Arizona’s long history of anti-immigrant policies, it
is important to examine the impact of immigration policies on
Latino immigrants. The purpose of this study is to contribute to
the knowledge base and existing literature by examining how
perceived discrimination in the context of the recent immigration policies and enforcement strategies impacts participants’
lives and their confidence in a better future.

Theoretical Framework
This study utilizes the legal violence theoretical framework
(Menjivar & Abrego, 2012). Violence is often defined as action
motivated by the intent to cause harm (Jackman, 2002). However, violence can also have non-physical impacts such as loss
of earnings, imprisonment, stigmatization, and exclusion, as
well as negative psychological outcomes such as fear, anxiety,
shame, and low self-esteem (Jackman, 2002). Structural violence
describes how social structures can cause harm and negative
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outcomes to certain populations, such as poverty and inequality
(Farmer, 2003).
Legal violence builds upon the definitions of violence and
structural violence to examine the impacts of laws and policies,
which themselves are violent in their intention to cause legal
harm with their immediate and long-term consequences. As
Menjivar and Abrego (2012) argue, current federal, state, and
local immigration policies, “…seek to punish the behaviors of
undocumented immigrants but at the same time pushes them
to spaces outside of the law” which makes undocumented immigrants accountable to the laws in the U.S., without legal protections or rights (p. 1385). Therefore, using the legal violence
framework in this study enables the examination of the impact
of restrictive immigration policies and enforcement strategies
on Latino immigrants.

Anti-Immigrant Policies
The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, introduced as Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB1070), was
signed into law on April 23, 2010 (Arizona State Legislature
[ASL], 2010). It is considered one of the most punitive immigration policies enacted by any state in recent history (Archibold,
2010). It effectively criminalized undocumented immigrants,
making it a state crime (a misdemeanor) to not carry proof of
legal residence and requiring law enforcement to detain anyone they “reasonably suspect” to be undocumented and ask for
proof of legal immigrant status. It also allows any resident of
the state to sue authorities if they fail to enforce the law (ASL,
2010). It further contained provisions penalizing state trespassing and human smuggling, as well as the hiring, harboring or
transporting of undocumented immigrants (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2014).
SB1070 created a great deal national and international controversy. Nevertheless, SB1070 had an impact on immigration
legislation all over the country, as many other states adopted
similar strategies to address the issue of immigration within
their jurisdictions (NCSL, 2014). Since 2010, policies modeled after SB1070 were considered by the legislatures of about a dozen
states, but only 5 states enacted them into laws: Alabama’s HB
56, Georgia’s HB 87, Indiana’s SB 590, South Carolina’s SB 20 and
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Utah’s HB 497 (NCSL, 2014). Since their passage, each of these
laws has been contested in court and several of their provisions
have been partially or totally blocked (NCSL, 2012).
Although those restrictive state immigration policies were
blocked by the courts, President Trump was elected in large
part for his anti-immigration rhetoric. Once elected, President
Trump signed an executive order to begin construction of a
border wall between the U.S. and Mexico, punish sanctuary
cities, and speed up the deportation process of undocumented
immigrants, all of which may contribute to increased fear and
anxiety in Latino immigrant communities. President Trump’s
focus on immigration enforcement and deportations has led to
community raids, immigration detentions, and deportations. In
February 2017, U.S. immigration officials raided homes across
six states and arrested hundreds of immigrants, many with no
criminal records (Rein, Hauslohner, & Somashekhar, 2017). The
first few months of the Trump administration have led to an
almost 33% increase in immigration arrests (Sands, 2017).

Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric
Anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies to regulate immigration have been a part of American politics and public discourse
since the first waves of immigrants arrived in the 19th century (Katel, 2005). American attitudes towards immigrants, both
authorized and undocumented, have been inconsistent over
time, sometimes welcoming the contribution of immigrants to
society, and at other times fearing that immigrant communities could have a negative impact on the country (Androff et
al., 2011). Negative attitudes towards immigrants often revolved
around fears that these groups would not assimilate to American society, which would erode the traditional cultural heritage
of the country, or cause divisiveness and social conflict (Huntington, 2004). Historically, anti-immigrant rhetoric often took
overtly racist undertones that emphasized a fear that newcomers might change American culture for the worse (Massey &
Pren, 2012a).
Political groups that lobby against illegal immigration justify
their position on the perceived negative consequences that undocumented immigration brings to this country. Although empirical
research has shown these positions to be largely incorrect, one of
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their most common concerns is that undocumented immigrants
hurt the economy by taking away jobs from American citizens or
by accepting lower wages, thereby increasing unemployment levels or decreasing household incomes, particularly among Americans who work in the low wage sectors of the economy (Becerra
et al., 2012; Federation for American Immigration Reform [FAIR],
2013a). Moreover, anti-immigrant politicians and activists incorrectly claim that the cost of providing public services (e.g., education, emergency healthcare, or housing) to undocumented immigrant families is a significant drain on government budgets and
diminishes the quality of the services provided to legal residents
(Camarota, 2004; Congressional Budget Office, 2007; FAIR, 2013b;
McDowell & Provine, 2013).
Other anti-immigrant politicians and activists claim that
undocumented immigration is inherently wrong because it is
illegal and constitutes a crime (Androff et al., 2011). Some go
even further, arguing that undocumented immigration is tied
with other forms of illegal activity and organized crime, such
as drug and sex trafficking, which eventually results in higher crime rates on American soil (Civitas Institute, 2014; Katel,
2005). Hence, they view the increase of undocumented immigrants as a threat to public safety. Indeed, in its most extreme
forms, anti-immigrant rhetoric “demonizes and dehumanizes” immigrants, promoting public animosity against them
(Anti-Defamation League [ADL], 2014).

Consequences of Anti-Immigrant
Policies and Rhetoric
How Policies and Rhetoric Impact Perceived Discrimination
Undocumented immigrants are already marginalized from
mainstream society due to their immigration status (Massey &
Pren, 2012b). They live in social environments where they are
often stigmatized, portrayed as deviant, and used as scapegoats
to be blamed for numerous social problems (Sullivan & Rehm,
2005). They may be called derogatory names (Southern Poverty
Law Center [SPLC], 2007), sexually harassed (Fussell, 2011) or
physically assaulted (SPLC, 2007).
Discrimination may also manifest itself in unfair or abusive
treatment, as employers and others may exploit the immigrants’
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legal status to violate their civil, labor or human rights (Fussell,
2011; SPLC, 2010; Sullivan & Rehm, 2005). In addition, awareness
of anti-immigrant policies such as SB1070 has been found to be
positively related to perceived discrimination from law enforcement authorities, and this relationship was not moderated by immigrant generation (Santos, Menjívar, & Godfrey, 2013).
Anti-immigrant rhetoric inevitably affects the socio-political climate in the communities where undocumented families
reside (Trujillo & Paluck, 2012), exacerbating the stigmatization
and discrimination that affect the lives of undocumented immigrants (Ayón & Becerra, 2013; Capps et al., 2007). Even when anti-immigrant laws are not enforced or when they are redundant
to existing laws, “the symbolism in the passage of these laws is
potent enough to influence behaviors, perceptions, and a sense
of self among those affected (directly and indirectly)” (Santos
et al., 2013, p. 81). Moreover, those affected by anti-immigrant
climates are not limited to undocumented immigrants themselves. Family members and friends, both documented and undocumented, often experience the fear of having a loved one
deported (Santos et al., 2013).

Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Latinos
Adult Physical and Mental Health
The relationship between discrimination and health is well
documented in the research literature. In a meta-analysis of
studies that assessed the relationship between perceived discrimination and health outcomes, discrimination was associated with negative physical and mental health outcomes among
diverse ethnic groups (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). In epidemiological studies with nationally representative samples of
Latino adults, higher levels of perceived discrimination have
been associated with deleterious mental health consequences,
including higher incidence of depressive symptoms (Leung,
LaChapelle, Scinta, & Olvera, 2014); substance abuse (Otiniano
Verissimo, Gee, Ford, & Iguchi, 2014); PTSD (Pole, Best, Metsler,
& Marmar, 2005); and suicidal ideation and suicide attempts
(Perez-Rodriguez et al., 2014).
In a national study of adults, greater perceptions of discrimination were related to 12-month and lifetime anxiety and
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depressive disorders, whereas lower perceptions of discrimination were related to lower risk of lifetime substance-related disorders (Leong, Park, & Kalibatseva, 2013). Among Latino immigrant parents, discrimination was associated with a
higher number of depressive symptoms, even after adjusting
for social support and immigration-related stressors (Ornelas
& Pereira, 2011). Moreover, discrimination may be one of the
mechanisms that explains the increased relationship between
time in the U.S. and risk of psychiatric disorders among Latino immigrants (Cook, Alegria, Lin, & Guo, 2009). Among Latina immigrants, higher levels of discrimination were related to
lower self-esteem (Panchanadeswaran & Dawson, 2011), greater
acculturation stress (Bekteshi & van Hook, 2015), and lower use
of healthcare services (Sanchez-Birkhead, Kennedy, Callister, &
Miyamoto, 2010).
Discrimination has also been related to negative physical
health outcomes, such as a higher incidence of chronic conditions (Molina & Simon, 2013); pregnancy distress; lower infant
birth weight (Earnshaw et al., 2013); lower self-rated physical health (Molina, Alegría, & Mahalingam, 2013), and worse
health-related quality of life (Otiniano & Gee, 2011). Moreover,
discrimination-related stress experienced by Latino immigrants has been found to be associated with disease risk factors,
including elevated systolic blood pressure, reduced immune
function (McClure et al., 2010), obesity, and higher fasting glucose levels (McClure et al., 2009).
Children, Youth and Families
In a systematic review of the literature of the impact of
discrimination on children and youth, perceived racism was
associated with negative mental health outcomes in most of
the studies reviewed (Priest et al., 2013). Among Latino youth,
perceived discrimination is associated with lower self-esteem
(Smokowski, Rose, & Bacallao, 2009), as well as a higher incidence of negative mental health outcomes, including substance
use (Unger, Schwartz, Huh, Soto, & Baezconde-Garbanati, 2014),
depressive symptoms (Chithambo, Huey, & Cespedes-Knadle,
2014), and problem behaviors (Bogart et al., 2013). Discrimination also increased Latino adolescents’ risk of suffering PTSD,

Chapter Title
Perceived
Discrimination Among Latinos

47

even after adjusting for exposure to traumatic events (Perreira
& Ornelas, 2013).
The current social and political climate regarding Latino immigrants, as well as the new wave of immigration policies and enforcement strategies, both nationally and in Arizona, warrant further examination of the impact of perceived discrimination among
Latinos in the context of the current anti-immigrant climate.

Methods
Sample
After gaining approval from the institutional review board
of the authors’ university, data for this study were collected in
the summer and fall of 2014 from a sample of 213 adult Latino immigrant respondents living in Arizona (See Table 1). Participants
were recruited through social service agencies, churches, and
faith-based organizations throughout Maricopa County. Participants completed questionnaires in English or Spanish, depending on their language preference. There were 72 (33.8%) males,
and 141 (66.2%) females. The mean age was 38; over 58% of the
participants had less than a high school diploma/GED; and 53.1%
reported their current financial situation as “average.”
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Table 1: Demographics
Variability

N

Percent (%)

Age (years)
18–25
26–30
31–35
36–45
46–55
56 and older

48
24
25
65
28
23

22.5
11.3
11.7
30.5
13.2
10.3

Gender
Female
Male

141
72

66.2
33.8

Socioeconomic Status
Very Bad
Bad
Average
Good
Very Good

12
47
113
36
5

5.6
22.1
53.1
16.9
2.3

Education
None
Some Elementary School
Elementary School
Some Middle School
Middle School
Some High School
High School
More than High School

3
15
24
17
43
22
50
39

1.4
7.0
11.3
8.0
20.2
10.3
23.5
18.3

Years in the U.S.
Less than 5 years
6–10
11–15
16–25
More than 26 years

11
22
59
93
28

5.2
10.3
27.7
43.7
13.1
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Measures
Independent variables. The participants self-reported their
gender, age, socioeconomic status, highest level of education,
and years living in the U.S.. Perceived discrimination was measured using the Perceived Discrimination in the U.S. (PDIUS)
scale, a 6-item scale that has been used in previous studies with
Latino populations and has demonstrated good psychometric
properties (Becerra, 2012; Becerra, Gurrola, & Wagaman, 2015).
The PDIUS uses Likert responses (1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Agree, 4= Strongly Agree) (See Table 2). The scale is
composed of questions such as “Mexican immigrants are treated badly by people in the U.S.”; “Laws in the U.S. discriminate
against Mexican immigrants”; and “Businesses in the U.S. discriminate against Mexican immigrants.” Scores for the scale
could range from 6 to 24, with higher scores indicating higher
levels of perceived discrimination in the U.S. The Cronbach’s
alpha for the PDIUS in the current study was .81, with a mean
score of 17.10 (SD = 4.20).
A principal components analysis (varimax rotation) was
conducted to explore content validity. The analysis revealed
that all 6 items emerged on one component with an eigenvalue
of 1.0 or greater, which accounted for 57.04% of the standardized
variance. Component loadings ranged from .70 to .87, and the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy
was .81. Rotation was not possible given that only one component was identified.
Dependent variables. Participants were asked to respond to
four statements regarding the impact of immigration policies on
their lives. The statements they were asked to respond to were,
“As a result of the current immigration policies: 1) I avoid immigration officials; 2) My family has suffered; 3) My friends have
suffered.” The response options were 1 = Strongly Disagree to
5 = Strongly Agree. In addition, the participants were asked to
respond to four questions regarding the impact of immigration
policies on their confidence in a better future. Participants were
asked to respond to the following questions: “As a result of the
current immigration policies how much confidence do you have
in a 1) better future for yourself?, 2) better future for your family?, 3) better future for you children?, and 4) better future for the
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children of today?” The response options were 1 = Very little
confidence to 4 = A great deal of confidence.
Analysis
This study analyzed how recent immigration policies impact participants’ perceptions of discrimination, as well as the
impact on their lives and their confidence in a better future.
Specifically, seven sets of ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression models were run to examine the relationship between
perceived discrimination in the context of recent immigration
policies and: (1) participants avoiding immigration officials; (2)
suffering of the family; (3) suffering of friends; (4) confidence in
a better future for themselves; (5) confidence their families will
have a better future; (6) confidence their children will have a
better future; and (7) confidence in a better future for the children of today. All models control for gender, age, socioeconomic
status (SES), highest level of education, and years in the U.S.

Results
As seen in Table 2, model 1 [χ2(6, n = 207)= 31.199, p < .001],
the participants were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result of the current immigration policies I avoid
immigration officials.” The response options were 1 = Strongly
Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The results indicated a significant and negative relationship between higher socioeconomic
status (SES) levels and reporting avoiding immigration officials
(B = -.033, CI(95%) = -.066, -.001, p < .05). In addition, participants
with greater perceived discrimination reported avoiding immigration officials (B = .162, CI(95%) = .128, .197, p < .001).
In model 2 [χ2(6, n = 207)= 22.913, p < .001], the participants
were asked to respond to the following statement “As a result of
the current immigration policies my family has suffered.” The
results indicated a significant and positive relationship between
greater perceived discrimination and participants reporting
that their families have suffered (B = .403, CI(95%) = .251, .556, p <
.001). In model 3 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 22.862, p < .001], the participants
were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result of
the current immigration policies my friends have suffered.” The
results indicated a significant and positive relationship between
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a greater perceived discrimination and participants reporting
that their friends have suffered (B = .404, CI(95%) = .252, .556, p
< .001).
Table 2
As a result
of recent
immigration
policies…

I Avoid Immigration
Officials
B

CI (95%)

My Family Has Suffered

B

CI (95%)

My Friends Have
Suffered
B

CI (95%)

Gender

.026
(.099)

-.170

.222

.025
(.093)

-.159

.208

-.025
(.093)

-.159

.208

Age

-.009
(.057)

-.121

.103

-.018
(.053)

-.121

.086

-.018
(.053)

-.122

.086

SES

-.033*
(.017)

-.066

.000

.021
(.016)

-.010

.052

.020
(.016)

-.011

.050

Education

-.020
.066

-.150

.110

.050
(.062)

-.072

.172

.052
(.062)

-.076

.174

Year in US

.084
(.070)

-.055

.222

-.085
(.066)

-.045

.215

.089
(.066)

-.040

.219

Perceived
Discrimination

.162*
(.082)

.128

.197

.403***
(.077)

.251

.555

.404***
(.077)

.252

.556

R²

.570

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Standard errors in parenthesis
Gender (male = 0, female = 1)

.490

.489

As seen in Table 3, model 1 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 25.741 p < .001],
the participants were asked to respond to the following question: “As a result of the current immigration policies, how much
confidence do you have in a better future for yourself?” The response options were 1 = Very little confidence to 4 = A great deal
of confidence. The results indicated a significant and positive relationship between being female (B = 1.023, CI(95%) = .791, 1.254,
p < .001), having a higher SES (B = .565, CI(95%) = .136, .994, p <
.01), and a greater number of years in the U.S. (B = .867, CI(95%) =
.636, 1.097, p < .001), with reporting greater confidence in a better
future. In addition, participants with greater perceived discrimination reported having significantly less confidence in a better
future for themselves (B = -.668 CI(95%) = -.962, -.374, p < .001).
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In model 2 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 38.876, p < .001], the participants were
asked to respond to the following question: “As a result of the
current immigration policies, how much confidence do you
have that your family will have a better future?” The results
indicated a significant and positive relationship between being
female (B = 6.716, CI(95%) = 3.697, 9.734, p < .001), and having a
greater number of years in the U.S. (B = .558, CI(95%) = .356, .759,
p < .001). In addition, the results indicated that participants with
greater perceived discrimination were significantly less likely
to express confidence that their families will have better futures
(B = -.901, CI(95%) = -1.158, -.644, p < .001).
In model 3 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 10.813, p > .001], the participants
were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result of
the current immigration policies, how much confidence do you
have that your children will have a better future?” The results
indicated that female participants (B = 7.485, CI(95%) = 3.247,
11.724, p < .001) and participants who had a greater number of
years in the U.S. (B = .647, CI(95%) = .364, .930, p < .01) were significantly more likely to express confidence that their children
will have better futures. Participants who reported greater perceived discrimination were significantly less likely to express
confidence that their children will have better futures (B = -.712,
CI(95%) = -1.073, .351, p < .001).
In model 4 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 21.057, p > .001], the participants
were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result
of the current immigration policies, how much confidence do
you have that the children of today will have a better future?”
The results indicated that females (B = 4.857, CI(95%) = 1.331,
8.383, p < .01), older participants, (B = .295, CI(95%) = .100, .490,
p < .01), participants with higher levels of education, (B = 1.511,
CI(95%) = .526, 2.496, p < .01), and participants with more years
living in the U.S. (B = .370, CI(95%) = .134, .605, p < .01) were
significantly more likely to express confidence that the children
of today will have a better future. Participants with greater perceived discrimination were significantly less likely to express
confidence that the children of today will have better futures (B
= -1.329, CI(95%) = -1.629, -1.028, p < .001).

.565**
(.218)

-.443
.491

.867***
(.117)

-.668***
(.150)

SES

Education

Year in US

Perceived
Discrimination

.519

-.962

.636

-1.401

.136

-.232

-.374

1.097

.521

.994

.150

1.254

CI (95%)

.791

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Standard errors in parenthesis
Gender (male = 0, female = 1)

R²

-.041
(.097)

1.023***
(.117)

B

In a Better Future for
Yourself

Age

Gender

How much
confidence do
you have

Table
Table 3 3

-.901***
(.131)

.558***
(.103)

.176
(.429)

.098
(.191)

.035
(.085)

6.716***
(1.535)

B

.620

-1.158

.356

-.667

-.277

-.132

3.697

-.644

.759

1.020

.403

.202

9.734

CI (95%)

In a Better Future for
Your Family

-.712***
(.184)

.647**
(.144)

.232
(.602)

.441
(.268)

-.055
(.119)

7.485***
(2.156)

B

.145

-1.073

.364

-.952

-.086

-.289

3.247

-.351

.930

1.417

.968

.180

11.724

CI (95%)

In a Better Future for Your
Children

-1.329***
(.153)

.370**
(.120)

1.511**
(.501)

-.340
(.223)

.295**
(.099)

4.857**
(1.793)

B

.249

-1.629

.134

.526

-.779

.100

1.331

-1.028

.605

2.496

.098

.490

8.383

CI (95%)

In a Better Future for
the Children of Today
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Discussion
The results of this study contribute to the understanding of
the relationship between recent immigration policies and perceptions of discrimination among Latino immigrants. Although
this study had a relatively small sample size, the sample is of a
hard-to-reach population; since many of the harsh immigration
policies and enforcement strategies originate in Arizona, examining the impact of increased immigration enforcement is especially important.
The results of this study align with the legal violence framework (Menjivar & Abrego, 2012) because this study examined
the impacts of immigration laws and policies, and found that
these laws are violent in that they intentionally cause legal
harm with their immediate and long-term consequences. This
study found that reporting higher levels of perceived discrimination was significantly related with avoidance of immigration
officials as well as with higher levels of perceived suffering of
family members and friends. In addition, the results indicated
a significant relationship between participants with higher levels of perceived discrimination and lower confidence in a better future for the individual participants, for their families, for
their children, and for the children of the future. These findings
support previous research findings on the harmful effects of
discrimination on Latino communities, including: a weakened
sense of identity; increased levels of stress; worsened physical
and mental health; socioeconomic difficulties; isolation from
police; and withdrawal from communities, as a result of recent
immigration policies (Capps et al., 2007; Chaudry et al., 2010;
Hacker et al., 2011; Roehling, Hernandez Jarvis, Sprik, & Campbell, 2010; Santos et al., 2013; Theodore & Habans, 2016).
Consistent with prior studies, Latino immigrants with greater perceived discrimination reported avoiding immigration officials, which may indicate that there is a lack of trust between
immigration and law enforcement agencies and Latino immigrant communities (Barreto & Segura, 2011; Messing, Becerra,
Ward-Lasher, & Androff, 2015). The high-profile case of Guadalupe Garcia de Rayos, who checked in with immigration officials
as she had for over 20 years, but was detained and ultimately
deported, may cause Latino immigrants to further avoid immigration officials. Such avoidance and distrust has not only led to
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a fear and unwillingness to report crimes and share information
with policing agencies, but there is also the potential negative
impact on law enforcement officers’ ability to properly perform
their duties if effective police-community relations cannot be established (Barreto & Segura, 2011; Becerra, Wagaman, Androff,
Messing, & Castillo, 2017; Theodore & Habans, 2016).
Furthermore, a sense of safety is diminished if a victim of
crime, regardless of immigration status, is unwilling to report
the crime for fear that they or their loved ones will be targeted as
a result of their immigration status. For example, women who are
victims of domestic violence have dropped their cases or failed
to appear in court for fear of detention and deportation (Glenn,
2017). Instead of the desired effect of feeling safer with increased
law enforcement involvement in communities, individuals feel
less safe (Hardy et al., 2012; Theodore & Habans, 2016).
This study also found that reporting greater perceived discrimination was significantly related to having lower confidence in a better future for the individual, for their family, for
their children, and for the children of today. These findings are
important to consider, because immigrants come to the U.S.
with great optimism in search of increased freedoms and economic opportunities in order to provide better lives for themselves and their families (Raleigh & Kao, 2010), and losing hope
and optimism for the future can have negative implications.
Lower levels of hope and optimism have been found to have
negative health implications (Bryant & Cvengros 2004; Yarcheski, Scoloveno, & Mahon, 1994). These negative health outcomes
are exacerbated when a loss of hope and optimism are combined with higher levels of perceived discrimination and a fear
of deportation due to immigration status (Finch & Vega, 2003).
The current anti-immigration policies and increased immigration enforcement strategies, including raids, detentions, and deportations, may create further mental health issues for Latinos
living in the United States.
Considering the heterogeneity existing among Latino immigrants, this study included several control variables that have received limited attention in the literature examining perceptions
of discrimination among Latino immigrants (Araújo & Borrell,
2006; McClure et al., 2010; Molina & Simon, 201X; Otiniano et al.,
2014). In one model, having a higher socioeconomic status was
related to a lesser likelihood of avoiding immigration officials,
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and in another model, being female was related to greater belief
in a better future. In regard to the former, higher socioeconomic
status and avoiding immigration officials, despite the prevailing social and political rhetoric that Latino immigrants and
their children do not acculturate to the U.S., the results of this
study support the notion that a growing proportion of Latino
immigrants are achieving traditional American indicators of
middle class status, such as incomes above the median, homeownership and employment in higher-paying occupations,
which then leads to more positive outlooks on the future. In this
sense, with increased social, political, economic, legal, and cultural capital, Latino immigrants of higher socioeconomic status
may be less fearful of avoiding immigration officials.
Being female and having more positive outlooks for a better
future may indicate that the gender roles and power structures
of Latino immigrants may shift once in the U.S. The effects of
this empowerment can create a ripple effect, influencing greater personal autonomy and independence that enhances their
spatial mobility and access to valuable social and economic resources that can increase their confidence in theirs and their
children’s immediate and future health and wellbeing (Pessar,
2003). These results confirm the complexities that other studies
have noted when investigating the relationship between discrimination and health while accounting for the mechanisms of
socioeconomic status (Araújo & Borrell, 2006; Molina & Simon,
201) and gender (McClure et al., 2010; Otiniano et al., 2014). Given these findings, as well as the heterogeneity that exists among
Latino immigrants, future research should examine the various
characteristics and differences that exist between Latino immigrants and their perceptions of recent immigration policies, discrimination, and confidence in a better future.
Limitations
In this study, there are several notable limitations that need
to be acknowledged. Participants were only recruited from the
state of Arizona; therefore, the results cannot be generalized
to the larger Latino immigrant population beyond this sample. Thus, findings should be interpreted in the context of this
study. The findings from this study were based on self-reported
data, which restricts the ability to establish causal relationships.
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Self-reported data also only included reports on perceptions of
discrimination and confidence for a better future, but not actual behaviors. The present study included asking questions that
were not specific in differentiating aspects of a better future.
Further studies examining the relationship between perceived
discrimination in the context of recent immigration policies
should gather more information on what is meant by a better
future in addition to strengthening design methods that can go
beyond perceptions to measures that capture behaviors.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The intersectionality between individual wellbeing and
community engagement must be taken into account when developing effective interventions to serve those affected by recent
immigration laws. Findings from this study, along with past literature, indicate the need for social workers to intervene with
and on behalf of Latino immigrants and communities in the
U.S. (Leong et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2013). Given the established
literature on the effects of discrimination on individuals, families, groups, and communities, it is crucial that social workers
and policy makers stand against policies that are discriminatory. An inclusive environment can start with adopting cultural
and institutional norms, policies and practices that are welcoming and protect immigrants. Evaluating and understanding the
impact of current immigration policies is pertinent for social
workers working with Latino immigrants on an individual level and also at a systemic level.
The racial and discriminatory undertones of immigration
policies perpetuate institutional systems of oppression and
work against the core values of social work. Thus, social work
professionals should continue to be vehemently engaged with
communities on the ground level, as well as be involved with
debates at the policy level. Social workers should collaborate
with advocacy groups, think tanks, healthcare professionals,
law enforcement, politicians, and other stakeholders to create
immigration policy solutions that are grounded in social justice
and human rights values. Instead of promoting legislation such
as SB1070, more emphasis should be placed on policies like the
DREAM Act.
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While working toward immigration policy solutions is valid, social workers should also educate members of the community on the harmful impacts of existing immigration policies
and/or the development and implementation of economically
viable and politically feasible immigration policies. Social workers should partner with immigration attorneys or other organizations in assisting individuals in understanding their rights,
especially in encounters with law enforcement and the criminal
justice system.
Social workers can also play an important role in training
health and human service personnel and law enforcement personnel in working with Latino immigrants to improve community-police relations. Doing so will not only empower individuals to seek help if they become victims of crime, but also
improve the safety in communities by protecting the ability
to report criminal activity. The aim of this study was to contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the impact recent
immigration policies have on perception of discrimination and
confidence in a better future among a sample of adult Latino
immigrants in Arizona. We hope the findings from this study
can serve as a foundation for future studies as well as a call to
action for social workers, policymakers, health and human service personnel, and law enforcement personnel to stand against
discriminatory immigration policies.
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Age Stereotypes and Attitudes
Towards Welfare State Arrangements
for the Old: A Multilevel Analysis
Across Twenty-Nine Countries
Ferry Koster
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This study investigates whether and how support for welfare state arrangements for the old relate to the stereotypes of the young and the old
within society. It is hypothesized that the social status that these groups
have in society affect these attitudes through different mechanisms, relating to the deservingness criteria that citizens apply. An empirical
analysis of Round 4 of the European Social Survey (including 50,009 individuals from 29 European countries) shows that: (1) the social esteem
of people over 70 predicts support for welfare state arrangements for the
old; and (2) the social esteem of people in their 20s has a moderate effect
on support for these arrangements. Hence, there is little support for a
generational conflict.
Key words: population aging, welfare state arrangements for the old, age
stereotypes, international comparison
Most countries experience population aging (Lutz, Sanderson, & Scherbov, 2008). This demographic development can
have societal consequences, and many have argued that the
changing age composition of countries will have an impact
on the welfare state in the near future (Castles, 2004; Galasso,
2006). Oftentimes, this expectation focuses on the financial basis of the welfare state, since funding welfare state provisions
becomes more difficult as the share of the population that depends on it increases, while the relative number of contributors
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decreases. Whereas the issues concerning the financial basis are
highly relevant for the sustainability of the welfare state, population aging may also have social and political consequences,
as it can ignite a potential conflict between different generations
(Walker, 1990), which may be particularly the case if social provisions are unequally distributed across age groups (Ozawa &
Lee, 2011).
This conflict between the young and the old may not only
affect the ability of citizens to support each other, which is
part of the financial sustainability of the welfare state, but also
their willingness to do that, which reflects the social and political support required to sustain the welfare state (De Beer &
Koster, 2009). If aging really intensifies the generational conflict,
it should be particularly visible with regard to age-related welfare state arrangements benefiting either the young or the old.
Given that it is likely that the process of aging implies that a
larger share of the population becomes dependent on such arrangements, from a welfare state sustainability point of view it
is particularly interesting to investigate welfare state arrangements for the old. The present study addresses this issue.
The question of whether and why people support certain
welfare state arrangements has been extensively studied in the
field of welfare state attitudes (Svallfors, 2012). Although a lot
of these studies focus on attitudes towards the welfare state
in general, these mechanisms and conditions also provide answers to the question why individuals would be in favor of specific provisions, such as arrangements for the old. The different
perspectives that these studies have on welfare state attitudes
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and in many cases they
complement each other, leading to the following insights.
First, there are theories that mainly emphasize characteristics
of the benefactor by investigating how individual factors such as
self-interest, altruism, and people’s ideological positions relate
to welfare state attitudes (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors,
1997; Van Oorschot, 2002). The second set of theories focuses
on the characteristics of the beneficiaries by looking at the impact
of factors such as deservingness criteria, beliefs about neediness, and perceived levels of misuse of welfare state provisions
on attitudes towards welfare state arrangements (Gilens, 1995,
1999; Halleröd, 2004; Van Oorschot, 2006). A third approach explains welfare state attitudes by taking the relationship between
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citizens and the government into account, for example by focusing
on levels of institutional trust and legitimacy in relation to welfare state attitudes (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; Edlund, 2006; Levi
& Stoker, 2000; Pettersen, 2002). And, a fourth set of theories
examines how conditions in the social context, such as welfare
state regimes, social structures, and national level conditions
affect welfare state attitudes and solidarity (Andress & Heien,
2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1993; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003;
Blomberg & Kroll, 1999; Jæger, 2006; Janmaat & Braun, 2009;
Koster & Kaminska, 2012; Larsen, 2008; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom, 2003; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009).
Based on these prior studies, an explanation of people’s attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old includes
factors such as the age of respondents (reflecting self-interest
explanations), the opinion about elderly people (reflecting deservingness criteria), the extent to which people believe that
the government can overcome generational conflicts (reflecting
institutional trust), and the age composition of the country (reflecting relative positions of the young and the old). Together,
these explanations provide a relatively complete picture of the
conditions influencing attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old.
Nevertheless, there is one part of the explanation that received very little attention in the literature on welfare state attitudes. Taking into account that contributions to welfare state
arrangements produce a collective good (Hart & Cowhey, 1977;
Olson, 1971), the question is how support for such goods depends on the relationship between the benefactors (the contributors). The literature about collective action acknowledges that
the willingness to contribute to a collective good is related to
the interdependence of the actors involved (e.g., Oliver, 1984)
and this notion may be relevant for the explanation of welfare
state attitudes, as well.
Before theorizing how interdependence among benefactors
affects attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old,
one conceptual difference between the two research traditions
should be clarified. Studies of collective action tend to concentrate on goods that benefit the whole group, meaning that they
focus on situations of two-sided solidarity where benefactors
and beneficiaries are not necessarily clearly distinguished (De
Beer & Koster, 2009; Hechter, 1987). Welfare states, however,
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also provide arrangements that do distinguish benefactors
from beneficiaries, especially if those provisions benefit specific
groups. This means that both one-sided and two-sided solidarity are important in the production of such a collective good.
What is more, welfare state provisions can be conceptualized as
a combination of solidarity between different groups, namely
(1) solidarity between the benefactors and the beneficiaries and
(2) solidarity among the benefactors that produce the collective
good (De Swaan, 1988).
Since the issue concerning solidarity between benefactors
and beneficiaries has been addressed extensively in previous
studies, the focus in the present study is on the second issue:
the level of solidarity among the benefactors. It does so by advancing and testing a model that is closely related to the one
presented by Rothstein (2001). In Rothstein’s model, support for
the welfare state is conceived of as a combination of two social
dilemma situations that the individual citizen faces, namely
one dilemma concerning the trustworthiness of the government (revolving around the question: “will the state deliver
what it promised?”), and one concerning the trustworthiness of
all other citizens (where the individual tries to answer the question: “will fellow citizens contribute and not misuse the provisions?”) (p. 222). The model presented in this study argues that
the second dilemma in fact consists of two separate dilemma
situations by making a distinction between groups of benefactors and beneficiaries. In research about welfare state attitudes,
this particular aspect of welfare state arrangements remained
largely implicit.
This analysis aims at extending the existing literature on
welfare state attitudes, both theoretically and empirically. The
first section develops a social esteem theory of solidarity to understand attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the
old. This theory is grounded in theories of collective action,
assuming bounded rational actors that do not make their decision in isolation but are influenced by the choices of others.
These individuals are, for example, affected by social structural
conditions such as norms, customs, and information (Ostrom,
1998). The following two propositions underlie this theory: (1)
individuals are willing to contribute to a collective good if they
believe that others are willing to contribute as well; and (2) the
perceived social esteem of a group benefiting from the collective
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good provides information about the willingness of others to
contribute to that collective good. The first proposition is based
on the theory of contingent consent (Levi, 1997). While contingent consent theory usually concentrates on levels of trust in
fellow citizens and the state, the model proposed here focuses on a different mechanism that is formulated in the second
proposition, namely the social esteem that citizens believe that
fellow citizens assign to the group of beneficiaries. Hence, the
emphasis is not on the trustworthiness of other citizens but on
the informational cues that individuals receive concerning the
likelihood that their fellow citizens will support a welfare state
arrangement benefiting a specific group.
Applying these propositions to the topic of people’s attitudes
towards welfare state arrangements for the old leads to the prediction that individuals are more in favor of such arrangements
if they believe that fellow citizens assign a higher status to elderly people. This prediction is empirically examined by investigating how status perceptions about two age groups (people
in their twenties and people of seventy and older) is related to
people’s attitudes towards welfare state arrangements securing
a reasonable standard of living for the old. The empirical data
are taken from Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS,
2008) and include information about 50,009 individuals in 29
European countries.

Attitudes Towards Welfare State
Arrangements for the Old
Attitudes Towards the Welfare State
Welfare state attitudes reflect the opinions that citizens have
towards welfare state arrangements. Two defining characteristics
of these arrangements are that: (1) they are collective means to
cover individual risks, requiring individual contributions; (2) the
government organizes both the collection and the distribution
of the financial resources. Hence, welfare state arrangements
consist of formal institutional mechanisms to secure the rights
and obligations of citizens regarding who pays what and who
receives what. These two core characteristics distinguish welfare
state arrangements from other means of risk management such
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as private insurances (e.g., the market) and social support within
communities or families (Bowles & Gintis, 1996). While private
insurances consist of voluntary contributions from individuals
using the market mechanism, welfare state arrangements rely
on obligatory contributions that are collected through the tax
system. And, while the organization of community and family
support is to a large extent voluntary and informal, welfare state
arrangements are formal institutions.
The market, communities, and the government provide
means to cover individual risks, as each of them produces a
certain level of social protection. From a policy perspective,
covering individual risks through the government is preferred
if it leads to comparatively better outcomes compared to the
market or the community (Koster, 2009; Lindbeck, 2006; Williamson, 1981). Once set in motion, the resulting policies can
become path-dependent and self-sustaining over the course
of time (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rothstein, 1998). In addition
to the macro explanation of why governments try to correct
market and community failures, the literature on welfare state
attitudes takes a micro perspective by investigating to what extent and why citizens prefer government intervention to assist
others rather than (or in addition to) using market or community mechanisms, hence emphasizing the role of public opinion
in the process of legitimizing social policies (Brooks & Manza,
2006; Burstein, 1998).
With regard to welfare state legitimacy, it is useful to make
a distinction between universal and targeted arrangements.
While the first kind of welfare state system relies on comparatively generous entitlements that are available for everyone,
the latter consists of restricted arrangements that benefit specific groups (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Lewin & Stier, 2002). Based
on a self-interest explanation of welfare state support, it may
be assumed that a universal welfare state receives more public
support than targeted arrangements as it satisfies the needs of
more individuals.
Nevertheless, public support can diminish both in universal and in targeted welfare states, but for different reasons.
Since universal provisions are more extensive, they are more
costly and may therefore be harder to sustain. What is more,
since they are based on a system providing support to a relatively large share of the population, some groups can benefit
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from them, even if citizens are not in favor of it. Thus, if these
arrangements (also) benefit groups that are regarded as undeserving, public support for the universal welfare state may decline (Bay & Pedersen, 2006).
In contrast, welfare state arrangements that are targeted at
specific groups can create a stronger division between contributors and beneficiaries. Also, for targeted arrangements it holds
that if the beneficiaries are regarded as deserving, the public
will be in favor of such provisions. Nevertheless, since fewer
citizens benefit from the provisions, overall support may be
lower compared to universal provisions and needs to be more
strongly based on other motivations than self-interest, as these
provisions depend more strongly on the willingness of citizens
to pay for provisions from which they do not directly benefit
from themselves. As a result, public support for targeted welfare state provisions can diminish if the distance between these
two groups becomes too big.
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
Clearly, welfare state arrangements for the old are neither
universal nor targeted as such. These arrangements can be organized as universal provisions (meaning that every citizen
above a certain age receives benefits) or can consist of targeted
provisions (only the elderly poor receive benefits). Nevertheless,
in both cases they are selective in the sense that they benefit
one particular group in society at a certain point in time (“the
old”), while they are paid for by another group (“the young”).
Of course, when the welfare state arrangements are universal,
chances are higher that the group of benefactors is entitled to
receive the benefits as they pass a certain age limit, compared to
the situation in which these provisions are only targeted at the
elderly poor.
Even though this holds true, receiving these benefits in the
future is not guaranteed for at least two reasons. First, it is not
sure whether the benefactors will reach the required age. And,
second, even if they do reach that age, it is not certain whether the same provisions will still be available. Both uncertainties
mean that benefactors may contribute to a universal welfare state
arrangement from which they do not necessarily benefit themselves. This means that welfare state arrangements for the old
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imply that there is a distinction between benefactors and beneficiaries, at least at the present point in time. And, the question
that follows from this observation is why the benefactors would
be willing to support the beneficiaries, given this distinction.
As was outlined in the introduction, there are several ways of
theorizing the willingness of benefactors to support the welfare
state. Most of the existing approaches focus on the benefactor,
or include factors such as characteristics of the beneficiaries, the
government, or the wider social context. Adding these factors to
the explanation makes the model more detailed, but it still does
not fully account for the theoretical idea that the contributions
of benefactors may be interdependent (Levi, 1997; Rothstein,
2001; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). To do that, it is necessary to include
and investigate the assumption that the willingness of citizens
to support a certain group depends on the willingness of fellow
citizens to support that group. This theoretical notion leads to an
additional explanation of welfare state attitudes.
Instead of arguing that the welfare state requires solidarity
between benefactors and beneficiaries, such a theoretical model states that solidarity among benefactors is also needed. As
such, this conceptualization reflects the core of collective action
theories, assuming that individuals do not make their decision
in complete isolation. Instead, these theories show that the preparedness of individuals to contribute to a collective good depends on the (perception of) behavior and attitudes of others,
for example, by emphasizing the role of interdependent choices
(Granovetter, 1978, 1980; Oliver, 1984; Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985), conditional cooperation (Fisbacher, Gächter, & Fehr,
2001; Frey & Meier, 2004), norm conformity (Ostrom, 1998, 2000),
fairness (Arneson, 1982; Elster, 1989; Gould, 1993), and trust between individuals (Scholz & Lubell, 1998).
Social Esteem and Solidarity
These collective action theories focus on the social structural conditions under which individuals are willing to contribute
to a collective good. Usually, this applies to goods from which
the contributors can benefit themselves once they are produced.
This means that situations in which individuals are faced with
the question whether or not to contribute may run the risk that
others may free-ride on their contributions. As a result, in such
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a situation individuals are interested in gathering information
about the behavior and attitudes of others; for example, they
may try to monitor the actual contribution to the collective good
of other individuals or find out whether others are trustworthy
(Dawes, 1980).
The situation is slightly different when regarding welfare
state arrangements for the old as a collective good that is produced by one group in society while benefiting another group.
The question that the individual contributors face in this situation is not so much whether the other contributors are trustworthy individuals, but it may be much more informative to
know the opinions of other individuals about the group of
beneficiaries. Therefore, if a person believes that fellow citizens
have a positive image of the other group and believe that they
are viewed as deserving, they may be expected to be more willing to contribute to that collective good. As such, it is assumed
that the collective good problem among the contributors can be
solved indirectly; namely, individuals are willing to contribute
if they believe that others will contribute as well. The social esteem of the group of recipients provides an informational cue
for individual citizens about the likelihood that others will contribute, and hence decreases the influence of concerns about
those who are perceived as free-riders. In addition, the reputation of the beneficiaries may be upheld by norms of reciprocity
and fairness that further increase the likelihood that each benefactor is willing to contribute.
From this theoretical argument, it follows that individual
support for arrangements that benefit others is affected by the
perception of benefactors about the esteem that others assign
to the beneficiaries. The social esteem of the group reflects the
reputation that a group has within society and provides information about the likelihood that fellow citizens will be willing
to support provisions from which that group benefits. These
theoretical considerations lead us to the first hypothesis about
support for welfare state arrangements for the old. The higher
the perceived social esteem of older age groups, the more support for
welfare state arrangements for the old (Hypothesis 1).
The first hypothesis states a direct relationship between
the social esteem of the elderly and support for welfare state
arrangements for the old. An additional hypothesis is derived
from the theoretical model. Apart from assuming that a positive
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perception about the social esteem of the old leads to stronger
support for welfare state provisions for the old, it may also be
expected that the esteem of other age groups should not be related to support for welfare state arrangements for the old. According to the theory proposed in this article, support for these
arrangements is related to perceptions about the old, and not
about the esteem of the young. What is more, it can even be
expected that there is negative relationship between the social
esteem of younger age groups and support for welfare state arrangement for the old.
Given that the budget of governments is restricted, they will
not have the means to offer extensive provisions to all age groups
in society. This means that governments need to make choices
about how to allocate their budget, and as a consequence, if the
budget for the provisions of one age group increases, the budget for another group decreases. Therefore, the benefactors may
face a choice regarding their support for welfare state provisions
for different age groups. This argument can be regarded as an
extension of the median voter model applied to the provision
of old age arrangements (Galasso, 2006; Hollanders & Koster,
2011). According to this model, government spending on welfare state arrangements for the old increases as the population
ages. While this could mean that the overall level of government
spending increases, this is often not the case. If it is not possible
for governments to spend more, they need to reduce spending
in other domains. This is not to say that the young cannot enjoy
these provisions, but that they have to wait until they belong to
the older age group. In that sense, the distribution of age-related government provisions can also be seen as the outcome of
a potential conflict between generations. Now, if the social esteem of younger age groups is high, the model predicts that the
benefactors are willing to support welfare state arrangements
favoring this age group. As it is not possible to support all age
groups in society evenly, given budget restrictions, stronger
support for the welfare state arrangements for the young results
in less support for provision for the old. Hence, according to this
model, more social esteem for the young should result in less
support for welfare state arrangements for the old. The following hypothesis reflects this expectation. The higher the perceived
social esteem of younger age groups, the less support for welfare state
arrangements for the old (Hypothesis 2).
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Methods
Data
Data for this study come from the European Social Survey
(ESS, 2008), which has been conducted every two years since
2000. Round 4 of this international comparative survey contains information that allows us to test the hypotheses. The total dataset investigated here includes the responses of 50,009
individuals in 29 European countries.
Measures
The dependent variable of this study, support for welfare state
arrangements for the old, is measured by asking respondents about
their opinion concerning the following question: “How much
responsibility do you think governments should have to ensure
a reasonable standard of living for the old?” The answer categories range from 0 (meaning that the respondents indicate that it
should not be the governments’ responsibility) to 10 (indicating
that it should be entirely governments’ responsibility according
to the respondent). Hence, a higher score reflects more support
for welfare state arrangements for the old.
The dependent variables in this study measure the respondent’s perceptions of the perceived social esteem of people in their
twenties (“the young”) and people over seventy (“the old”). These
variables are measured as follows. Respondents are asked to
what extent they think that most people in their country view
members of the two age groups “as friendly,” “having high
moral standards,” and “with respect.” These questions do not
ask about the opinion that respondents have about these two
groups, but instead measure how they think that their fellow citizens see people in their twenties and those over seventy. Each
of these questions is measured on a four-point scale, ranging
from 1 (not at all likely to be viewed that way) to 4 (very likely
to be viewed that way). As shown in Table 1, the six items can be
reduced to two dimensions, namely one concerning the social
esteem of people in their twenties and one measuring the social
esteem of people over seventy. Two variables are constructed,
one measuring perceptions about the social esteem of people in
their twenties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79) and one measuring the
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social esteem of people over seventy (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73). The
difference in social esteem is computed by subtracting the score
on the first variable from the latter, hence indicating how much
more esteem someone believes that those over seventy have
compared to those in their twenties.
Table 1. Factor Analysis of Social Esteem Items
			

Item				

1

Social esteem of people in their 20s		
Most people view those in their 20s as friendly
0.768
Most people view those in their 20s as having
0.863
high moral standards				
Most people view those in their 20s with respect
0.843
Social esteem of people over 70		
Most people view those over 70 as friendly		
Most people view those over 70 as having		
high moral standards
Most people view those over 70 with respect		

2
0.178
0.051
0.103

0.193
0.023

0.744
0.836

0.109

0.798

Eigenvalue						2.539
Proportion of variance accounted for		
42.312
Cronbach's alpha						
0.78

1.492
24.861
0.72

Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Varimax rotation. Factor loadings > 0.30 in bold.

To take into account that people’s attitudes towards welfare
state arrangements for the old may be influenced by other
factors, the analyses controlled for the following background
variables: gender (0 = male; 1 = female), the respondent’s age (in
years), years of education, and the main activity of the respondent
(a variable measuring whether the respondent is in paid work,
education, unemployed and looking for work, unemployed and
not looking for work, permanently sick or disabled, retired,
community or military service, housework, looking after children, or other). Furthermore, ideological position is controlled
for by including a variable measuring left-right self-placement (0
= left; 10 = right). Finally, since perceptions of social esteem may
be related to people’s own views about the two age groups, two
control variables were added measuring feelings about people in
their 20s and feelings about people over seventy. These variables are
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measured by asking respondents the question: “Overall, how
negative or positive do you feel towards people in their 20s/over
70?” (0 = extremely negative; 10 = extremely positive).
Method
The empirical analysis takes into account that the data have
a nested structure (individuals are nested in countries). To provide as much insight as possible, the data are analyzed with
two different methods. First, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is conducted. In this analysis, country dummy
variables are included to take into account that the measures of
individuals in one country are not independent. These dummies are included in the analysis, but are not reported in the
tables to save space. Second, the data are analyzed using multilevel modeling (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). While this method can
be used to investigate whether contextual effects at the national
level explain individual support for welfare state arrangements
(e.g. Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jæger, 2006; Koster, 2010),
it is also a means to take the nested structure of the data into
account without explicitly focusing on these contextual effects.
Because the present analysis aims at understanding how individual perceptions affect support for welfare state arrangements, and not whether these national circumstances matter,
no contextual effects were added to the model. Instead, by conducting a multilevel analysis, it is acknowledged that responses
from individuals living in the same country are not independent from each other, without explicitly adding explanatory
variables at the national level. A random intercept model was
estimated using the MLwiN software package. MLwiN is specifically designed to perform multilevel analyses. It enables researchers to fit different kinds of multilevel models. The Centre
for Multilevel Modeling at the University of Bristol developed
this software package. For the present analyses, version 2.24
was used (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser, 2005).
In both regressions analyses, four models are estimated. An
empty model is calculated that serves as a baseline to which the
next model is compared (Model 0). This next model includes
the control variables (Model 1). Then two models are calculated
that include the variables testing the two hypotheses. In the
OLS regression analyses, the adjusted R2 is used to assess the
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explained variance of the variable. In multilevel models, it is not
possible to calculate the explained variance. Instead, for each
model the -2 log likelihood is estimated. The deviance (the difference between the -2 log likelihood of two models) indicates
to what extent the fit of the model improves after including the
variables. Because the dataset is very large, the significance levels may be inflated. To deal with this, the significance level is set
at p < 0.0001.

Results
Descriptive Results
Table 2 provides an overview of the mean scores on support
for welfare state arrangements for the old, the perceived social esteem of people in their twenties, and the perceived social esteem
of people over seventy per country. What is particularly noteworthy is that the mean level of support for government responsibility for the old is relatively high (m = 8.49). This shows that, on
average, people are in favor of the government taking action to
secure the standard of living of the old. For each country in the
sample, the average score on this variable is above the theoretical
mean of the scale. The lowest levels of support for welfare state
arrangement for the old are found in Switzerland (m = 7.23) and
Germany (m = 7.60) and the respondents in Latvia (m = 9.29) and
Ukraine (m = 9.39) are most in favor of the idea that the government ensures a reasonable standard of living for the old.
Comparing the average scores on the scales measuring the
perceived social esteem of people in their twenties and social
esteem perceptions about people over seventy, Table 2 shows
that the social esteem of the older age group is perceived to be
higher than the status of the younger age group (m = 2.20 for
people in their twenties and m = 3.06 for people over seventy). This difference is consistently found for all countries in the
sample. Furthermore, the average perceived social esteem of the
two groups varies across countries. The mean perceived esteem
of people in their twenties is the lowest in the UK (m = 1.74)
and the highest in Israel (m = 2.64). In Slovakia, perceived social
esteem of people over seventy has the lowest value (m = 2.81),
while in Hungary the perceived social esteem of this group has
the highest value (m = 3.36).
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Table 2. Country Means of Support for Welfare State Arrangements
for the Old, Perceived Esteem of People in their Twenties, and
Perceived Esteem of People over Seventy
Country
Russian Federation

Belgium			
Bulgaria			
Switzerland		
Cyprus			
Czech Republic		
Germany		
Denmark		
Estonia			
Spain			
Finland			
France			
Great Britain		
Greece			
Croatia			
Hungary			
Ireland			
Israel			
Latvia			
Netherlands		
Norway			
Poland			
Portugal			
Romania			
Russian Federation
Sweden			
Slovenia			
Slovakia			
Turkey			
Ukraine			
Mean			

Support for welfare
state arrangements
or the old(a)

7.87		
9.13		
7.23		
8.94		
8.22		
7.60		
8.31		
8.66		
8.84		
8.43		
7.94		
8.53		
8.92		
8.70		
8.79		
8.47		
8.93		
9.29		
7.73		
8.66		
8.60		
8.85		
8.04		
9.22		
8.49		
8.34		
8.37		
8.22		
9.39		
8.49		

Perceived social
esteem of people
in their twenties(b)

Perceived social
esteem of people
over seventy(b)

2.14		
2.02		
2.08		
2.56		
2.27		
1.91		
2.17		
1.97		
2.43		
2.27		
2.26		
1.74		
2.52		
2.32		
2.00		
2.23		
2.64		
2.37		
1.98		
2.19		
2.25		
2.55		
2.14		
1.84		
2.21		
2.41		
2.06		
2.48		
1.90		
2.20		

Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
(a) Item: “How much responsibility do you think governments
should have to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?”;
ranging from 0 (should not be the government’s responsibility) to 10
(should be entirely governments responsibility).
(b) Scale score; ranging from 1 to 4.

2.95
3.02
2.85
3.19
2.82
2.92
3.07
3.04
3.28
3.20
2.95
3.07
3.25
2.91
3.36
3.35
3.09
3.05
3.14
3.20
3.05
3.16
2.82
2.86
3.13
3.08
2.81
3.15
3.07
3.06
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Regression Results
The results of the OLS regression are reported in Table 3,
and Table 4 contains the results of the multilevel regression.
As Table 4 shows, 8 percent of the variation in support for welfare state arrangements for the old is due to differences across
countries (Intraclass correlation = 0. 079). This means that country-level characteristics may play a role in understanding support for these arrangements, but most of the variance is due to
variance within countries. The first models reported in Table 3
and 4 investigate the effects of the individual-level control variables. The two analyses yield similar results. The size of the parameters differs only slightly (the only real difference appears
in the model with the esteem variables; in the OLS regression,
feelings about people in their 20s becomes significant, while it
remains not significant in the multilevel regression). The OLS
regression shows that about 6 percent of variation in attitudes
towards welfare state arrangements for the old is explained by
the control variables. The multilevel analysis shows that adding these variables improves the fit of the model (Deviance =
2,030.478; p < 0.0001). Both models show that support for welfare state arrangements for the old is higher among women,
older people, those who are lower educated, and people who
are permanently sick or disabled. People placing themselves
on the right side of the political scale are less in favor of government responsibility. These outcomes are in line with previous research findings of general support for the welfare state
(Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Gërxhani & Koster, 2012). Furthermore, support for welfare state arrangements for the old
is positively related to the feelings towards people over 70; the
more positive feeling people have, the higher the support for
these arrangements.
The second models reported in Table 3 and Table 4 test the
two hypotheses. These models investigate how support for welfare state arrangements for the old relate to the perceived social
esteem of people in their twenties and to perceived social esteem of people over seventy. The results from the OLS regression show that these two variables explain an extra percent of
variance in welfare state attitudes towards provisions for the
old (which is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level). The
multilevel model (Table 4) shows that the fit of the regression
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Table 3. OLS Regression Analysis of Support for
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
		
		

(1)		
b

(2)
(s.e.)

b

(s.e.)

Female
0.100 **
(0.017)
0.110 **
(0.017)
Age
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Years of education	  -0.022 **
(0.002)	  -0.021 **
(0.002)
Main activity 					
Paid work
0.005
(0.066)	  -0.004
(0.066)
Education	  -0.110
(0.073)	  -0.114
(0.072)
Unemployed looking for work
0.148
(0.077)
0.133
(0.076)
Unemployed not looking for work
0.152
(0.091)
0.156
(0.091)
Permanently sick or disabled
0.268
(0.085)
0.256
(0.084)
Retired
0.074
(0.070)
0.079
(0.070)
Community or military service
0.227
(0.206)
0.223
(0.204)
Housework, looking after children	  -0.102
(0.071)	  -0.112
(0.071)
Other
--(---)
--(---)
Left-right self-placement 	  -0.034 **
(0.004)	   -0.036 **
(0.004)
Feelings about people in their 20s
0.019
(0.005)
0.027 **
(0.005)
Feelings about people of 70
0.199 **
(0.005)
0.165 **
(0.005)
and older					
Perceived status people in their 20s 			  -0.046 **
(0.011)
Perceived status people of 70			
0.285 **
(0.013)
and older					
Intercept
6.715
(0.091)
6.899
(0.130)
						
Adjusted R2
0.060		
0.071		
R2 change			
0.011		
F Change
   190.011 **
256.878 **		
		
		
		
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Unstandardized coefficients are reported
The models include country dummies (not reported)
*p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001
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Table 4. Multilevel Analysis of Support for
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
(1)			
b		 (s.e.)

(2)
b		 (s.e.)

Female
0.065 **		(0.017)
0.074 **		(0.017)
Age 		
0.001		(0.001)
0.001		(0.001)
Years of education
-0.021 **		(0.002)
-0.020 **		(0.002)
Main activity 						
Paid work
0.002		(0.074)
-0.009		(0.072)
Education
-0.090		(0.080)
-0.088		(0.078)
Unemployed looking for work
0.100		(0.084)
0.093		(0.082)
Unemployed not looking for work
0.081		(0.098)
0.092		(0.095)
Permanently sick or disabled
0.261		(0.091)
0.255		(0.089)
Retired
0.064		(0.079)
0.067		(0.076)
Community or military service
-0.043		(0.211)
-0.029		(0.203)
Housework, looking after children
-0.022		(0.069)
0.023		(0.076)
Other
--- 		 (---)
---		 (---)
Left-right self-placement
-0.043 **		(0.004)
-0.045 **		(0.004)
Feelings about people in their 20s
0.005		(0.005)
0.016		(0.005)
Feelings about people of 70 and older
0.186 **		(0.005)
0.155 **		(0.005)
						
Perceived status people in their 20s
-0.064 **		(0.011)
Perceived status people of 70 and older
0.264 **		(0.013)
						
Intercept
7.352		(0.128)
6.829		(0.130)
						
Deviance
2030.478 **		
433.970 **		
Variance country level
0.221			
0.213		
Variance individual level
2.718			
2.691		
Intraclass correlation
0.075			
0.073		
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Empty model: -2log likelihood = 166277.870; Intraclass correlation = 0.079
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.001
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model significantly increases after adding these two variables
(Deviance = 433.970; p < 0.0001). Perceived social esteem of people in their twenties is negatively related to support for welfare
state arrangements for the old (b = - 0.046; p < 0.0001 and b =
-0.064; p < 0.0001, respectively) and perceived social esteem of
people over seventy is positively related to this welfare state attitude (b = 0.285; p < 0.0001; b = 0.264; p < 0.0001). These findings
support the two hypotheses derived from the social esteem theory of solidarity. First, support for welfare state arrangements
for the old is positively related to perceived social esteem of the
elderly. Secondly, levels of support are negatively related to the
perceived social esteem of the young.

Discussion and Conclusion
The present study extends previous investigations of public
attitudes towards welfare state arrangements. Besides the existing explanations that focus on characteristics of the benefactor,
characteristics of the beneficiaries, the relationship between citizens and the government, and the social context of individuals,
the study presented here shows that the relationship between
beneficiaries matters. The theoretical approach and empirical
outcomes have a number of theoretical and practical implications that may be further expanded in future research.
Theoretically, the proposed model has the following implications. First, it shows that the welfare state can be thought of
as a number of collective action problems that need to be solved
to generate support. While this has been previously noted, for
example in the literature about contingent consent (Levi, 1997;
Rothstein, 2001), the approach taken here differs from these earlier accounts in one respect. The main addition to the previous
work is that the collective action problem among citizens can be
further elaborated by distinguishing the group of benefactors
from the group of beneficiaries. As a consequence, the attention
shifts from the social dilemma involving all citizens to the dilemma faced by the contributors to the collective good.
A second addition and extension concerns the approach of
the relationships between citizens. While earlier accounts emphasize generalized trust, the model investigated in this study
focuses on more specific information about the attitudes that
fellow citizens have toward the group of beneficiaries. Instead
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of concentrating on the deservingness criteria that citizens
themselves apply (Van Oorschot, 2006), people also seem to take
into account the criteria that their fellow citizens apply. At least,
this is what may be derived from the social esteem model.
The empirical findings imply that future research on welfare state attitudes (and attitudes towards government policies
in general) need to be more specific about who is willing to contribute to what and how informational cues can explain such
solidarity. With regard to the existence of multiple social dilemmas, a further extension of Rothstein’s (2001) model may be required to fully capture the relevant relationships. Distinguishing between the government, benefactors, and beneficiaries also
means that it is not only the question whether the benefactors
view the government as a trustworthy actor, but also raises the
question of under what conditions the beneficiaries believe that
the government will act in their best interest. Taken together, it
is suggested that future work should investigate these different
social dilemmas, as well as qualitative and informational aspects of the relationships between the different actors.
There are several issues that could not be examined in the
present study and that need to be addressed in future studies.
One of the main assumptions of the model is that social esteem
perceptions serve as informational cues to solve collective action problems. Although this is also suggested in previous research, other (additional or alternative) mechanisms play a role.
For example, while the information argument holds that the
costs for contributing decrease, this rational approach to solidarity can be complemented by arguments concerning imitation or the customs that citizens follow within society.
What is more, additional research can examine whether information, imitations, and customs provide the basis for norms
and sanctions that can further strengthen the willingness to
contribute to a collective good. Determining which of these
mechanisms explains the willingness to support welfare state
arrangements requires other data than what was investigated
here. These data can be gathered using a survey across countries like the one investigated here, but it is worthwhile to consider other data-gathering techniques, such as (vignette) experiments to distinguish the different mechanisms and investigate
their relative importance.
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This study started with the question of how to explain attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old. The investigation shows that, apart from the existing explanations,
the social esteem of the elderly explains these attitudes. The
practical implication of this finding is that, from the perspective
of social policy, governments may have the means to generate
support for provisions aimed at securing the living conditions
of the old. While a common strategy would be to generate such
support by emphasizing the value and importance of such provisions, governments can also choose to focus on mechanisms
that help to overcome social dilemmas. The feasibility of such a
strategy is cannot be answered with the present study and requires additional research examining the effectiveness of such
interventions. From a social research perspective on welfare
state arrangements for the old, the present study shows that the
future of such provision not only depends on whether it serves
the best interest of individuals, whether the elderly are viewed
as deserving, and whether the governments is regarded legitimate, but also on the social esteem of the elderly.
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Educational Attainment in Young
Adulthood, Depressive Symptoms, and
Race-ethnicity: The Long-reach of
Parenting Styles in Adolescence
Brittany N. Hearne
Vanderbilt University

C. André Christie-Mizell
Vanderbilt University

Utilizing four parenting styles (authoritative, authoritarian, uninvolved,
and permissive) and two types of educational achievement (years of education completed and completion of a college degree), we investigated
whether mental health (i.e., depressive symptoms) mediates the relationship between parenting styles in adolescence and the educational attainment of young adults. We further assessed whether the relationships
among parenting styles and educational attainment vary by race and
ethnicity for African Americans, Hispanics, and whites. Compared to
youth with authoritative parenting, those who experienced uninvolved
or authoritarian parenting were more likely to experience depressive affect, and these symptoms of depression partially mediated the relationship between parenting and educational attainment. In terms of racial
and ethnic differences, African Americans and Hispanics with authoritarian or uninvolved parents earn more years of education than whites.
Authoritarian parenting made it much less likely for whites to complete
college compared to their African American and Hispanic counterparts.
Key words:  educational attainment, parenting styles, depressive symptoms, race and ethnicity
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High quality parent-child interactions are important to the
educational progress of children (Israel, Beaulieu, & Hartless,
2001). Parenting styles or strategies that include warmth and
emotional support have been shown to boost educational goals
and achievement among youth (Davis-Kean, 2005; Dornbusch,
Ritter, Leiderman, Roberts, & Fraleigh, 1987; Steinberg, Elmen,
& Mounts, 1989). However, less is known about the specific social psychological mechanisms that connect parenting styles to
educational outcomes. On the one hand, quality parenting may
directly impact educational achievement by encouraging the internalization of positive goal orientation and resilience in the face
of educational difficulty (Davis-Kean, 2005). On the other hand,
parent-child relationships may shape educational outcomes
indirectly. For example, uninvolved parenting—characterized
by little communication, indifference, and neglect—may leave
a child feeling distressed and may lead to mental health problems (Radziszewska, Richardson, Dent, & Flay, 1996; Widom,
DuMont, & Czaja, 2007). In turn, poor psychological adjustment
or mental health may impede the ability of the individual to
achieve educationally.
In this research, we consider whether the impact of parenting during middle and late adolescence is directly connected
to educational attainment in young adulthood or whether the
influence of parenting is better understood as indirectly affecting educational progress through mental health—specifically,
depressive symptomatology. This investigation adds to the research literature in two important ways. First, with the use of
nationally representative, longitudinal data, we are able to trace
the direct and indirect (through depressive symptoms) impact
of adolescent parenting styles on educational attainment in
young adulthood. We utilize data spanning nine years to allow
for a careful evaluation of whether parenting styles during adolescence reach into young adulthood and to assess the relationship between parenting styles and educational outcomes for
three racial groups: African Americans, Hispanics, and whites.
Second, we focus on depressive symptoms as a potential
intervening mechanism between adolescent parenting and the
educational achievement of young adults. This assessment adds
specificity to the research literature seeking to understand the
multiple pathways through which the parent-child relationship
shapes youth’s immediate and future outcomes. In the period of
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study—adolescence into early adulthood—under consideration
here, the incidence of depressive symptoms dramatically increases (Arnett, 2007). The result is that young adulthood can be
one of the most stressful periods in the life course, with likely
implications for all types of achievement, including educational attainment (Aquilino, 1999; Aquilino & Supple, 2001; Arnett,
2000, 2007). Nevertheless, few studies have explored the extent
to which parenting styles in adolescence increase or decrease
depressive symptomatology and whether these symptoms impact educational progress.

Literature Review
Theoretical Framework
Family social capital theory guides this study. Coleman
(1990) defined family social capital as the relationships among
social actors that “inhere in family relations and in community organization and that are useful for the cognitive and social
development of [youth]” (p. 300). Social capital facilitates interaction among individuals within networks, such as families, as
well as the exchange of informal resources such as knowledge,
social support, and obligations (Coleman, 1988, 1990). In the research literature, family social capital is typically operationalized as the strength of ties between family members and the
quality of the relationship between parent(s) and children (Parcel & Dufur, 2001).
Family social capital creates parent-child bonds that allow
parents to effectively convey appropriate social norms to their
children. In turn, children internalize the appropriate social
norms and behaviors, which lead to more positive outcomes
(Christie-Mizell, 2004; Christie-Mizell, Keil, Laske, & Stewart,
2011). Furthermore, family social capital has been most associated with authoritative parenting—i.e., a style that includes
warmth, responsiveness, bidirectional communication, and
firm control (Sandefur, Meier, & Campbell, 2006; Spera, 2005; see
also Yang & McLoyd, 2015). This investment in the well-being of
youth pays immediate returns (e.g., fewer behavior problems),
but also includes later dividends as youth mature—including
fewer depressive symptoms and greater academic success
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(Christie-Mizell, 2004; Garber, Robinson, & Valentiner, 1997;
Parcel & Menaghan, 1994).
Coleman (1988, 1990) outlined two additional forms of capital—financial and human capital—that are necessary for the
development and deployment of family social capital. Financial
capital encompasses economic resources such as income and
wealth, while human capital is represented by parents’ education and cognitive ability. These two forms of capital allow parents to build social capital within the family (Brooks-Gunn &
Duncan, 1997; Teachman, Paasch, & Carver, 1997). For example,
parents who are well educated tend to have more stable incomes
and experience fewer stressors in life, allowing them the opportunity to spend time with their children to build social capital.
Children of parents with low financial and human capital have
limited access to resources like health care, housing, and the
provision of cognitively stimulating materials and experiences
(Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). In turn, these parents are less likely
to be able to invest in building social capital within the family
(Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Coleman, 1988, 1990).
Parenting Styles and Family Social Capital
Authoritative parenting. The four parenting styles considered
in this research are authoritative, uninvolved, permissive, and
authoritarian. Authoritative parenting includes setting clear
limits, engaging children in reasoning, and being responsive
to their emotional needs (Baumrind, 1991; Maccoby & Martin,
1983; Spera, 2005). This type of parenting is thought to best encourage and engage family social capital to the extent that it
creates positive parent-child interactions (Coleman, 1988, 1990;
Parcel & Menaghan, 1993, 1994). In fact, a number of research
studies have found a positive relationship between authoritative parenting styles and higher student achievement (e.g.,
Gonzalez, Doan Holbein, & Quilter, 2002). Moreover, parental
practices in line with authoritative parenting reduce the risk of
depressive symptoms among youth by curbing involvement in
non-normative behavior (Bolkan, Sano, De Costa, Acock, & Day,
2010; Bulanda & Majumdar, 2009; Milevsky, Schlechter, Netter,
& Keehn, 2007). Consequently, the absence of depressive affect
may increase adolescents’ educational achievement (see e.g.,
McLeod & Fettes, 2007).
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Uninvolved parenting. Uninvolved parenting (or indulgent
parenting) is characterized by a lack of responsiveness to a
child’s needs and emotional distance (Maccoby & Martin, 1983).
Whereas authoritative parents will engage in conversations with
their children regarding rules and expectations, uninvolved
parents do not impose rules and expectations on their children
(Baumrind, 1991; Maccoby & Martin, 1983). As a result of lax
supervision and expectations, parents who are uninvolved create less family social capital. In turn, children of uninvolved
parents respond to their parents’ lack of warmth and attention
with depressed affect and may become defiant in an attempt to
elicit parental attention and involvement (Ge, Best, Conger, &
Simons, 1996). These issues can intensify over time, leading to
even poorer mental health and lower academic achievement.
Permissive parenting. Unlike authoritative parents, permissive
parents are less likely to interact with their children, and when
they do communicate with their children, they are more likely to allow their child to dominate the interaction (Baumrind,
1989, 1991). Because of a lack of demands and expectations for
the child, this style of parenting leads to a poor parent-child social ties and creation of lower levels of family social capital. Although permissive parents provide emotional support, they are
less likely to impose strict rules, preferring instead to promote
independent decision-making and self-regulation of emotions,
with avoidance of confrontation and discipline (Baumrind,
1991). Permissive parenting has been associated with higher depressive symptoms tied to lower self-regulation among youth
(Maccoby, 1992; Radziszewska et al., 1996). Further, children
of permissive parents often reject outside authority, which can
lead to poor performance in school (Dornbusch et al., 1987).
Authoritarian parenting. Baumrind (1989) described authoritarian parents as neither warm nor responsive to their children.
Authoritarian parents are strict, demanding, and tend to communicate demands and expectations through rules and orders
(Baumrind, 1991). The lack of negotiation and explanations of
rationale for rules may lead to fear and decreased family social capital (see Bolkan et al., 2010). Ozer and colleagues (2013)
found that the strict control of authoritarian parents is related
to higher levels of depressive symptoms. Moreover, the harsh
parenting and control associated with an authoritarian style
may harm academic achievement by building resentment and
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inhibiting youth from taking ownership in school work (Baumrind, 1991; Ozer, Flores, Tschann, & Pasch, 2013).
Racial variations. Despite a fairly large body of literature reporting the advantages of authoritative parenting compared to
other styles of parenting, these impacts have not been found to
be uniform across race-ethnicity. For instance, some research
shows that authoritarian parenting may not be as harmful to
minority children compared to their white counterparts (Dornbusch et al., 1987; Jarrett, 1995; Radziszewska et al., 1996). The
contexts in which racial and ethnic minorities are reared vary
greatly compared to whites. Minorities are more likely to rear
children in environments where single parenting is more common, housing is more likely to be in dangerous or higher crime
areas, the family is more likely to face discrimination, and economic resources are lower (Christie-Mizell, Pryor, & Grossman,
2008; McLeod & Shanahan, 1993; Quillian, 2012, 2014; Sampson,
Sharkey, & Raudenbush, 2008; Wight, Chau, & Aratani, 2011).
These contexts and stressors may shape the impact of parenting styles. Minority children, especially those who are economically disadvantaged, may require more direction and firmness
to keep them safe (Lareau, 2002; McLoyd, 1990). Therefore, the
current research will add to the growing body of literature
seeking to show how parent-child relationships vary in impact
on outcomes by race-ethnicity.
Other important factors. Beyond race-ethnicity, the extant
literature around parenting, depressive symptoms, and educational attainment identify several other relevant factors, including gender, family structure, region of residence, and religion.
Females are more likely to experience psychological distress.
Indeed, studies have found that, beginning in puberty, symptoms of depression, major depressive disorder, and dysthymia
are twice as common in women as men (e.g., Leibenluft, 1999).
Family structure, such as family size and living arrangements, may also have an impact on children’s well-being. Increased family size has been shown to have a negative impact
on children’s educational attainment, due to the depletion of
resources within the family unit (Downey, 1995). Resources
within the family are spread thin when there are more children in the family, which may lead to weaker ties and increased
depressive symptoms. Single parents are more likely to have
fewer resources to share with their children, which may lead

Chapter
Title of Parenting Styles in Adolescence
The
Long-reach

97

to negative outcomes for children, such as poor mental health
and decreased educational attainment (Amato, 1994; McLanahan, 1997; McLanahan & Sandefur, 2009). Although children may
struggle when adjusting to a stepparent, there are benefits to
having two parents in the home, such as financial and social
resources (McLanahan & Sandefur, 2009).
Religiosity and one’s geographic region of residence have
been shown to impact depressive symptoms for youth (Christie-Mizell et al., 2008; Petts & Jolliff, 2008) and educational attainment (Muller & Ellison, 2001; Parcel & Dufur, 2009). Religious
settings may offer social support and a resource for coping for
youth and their parents, leading to decreased levels of depression (Kosmin, 2011). People that live in the South attend church
more frequently than people in other regions of the country
(Kosmin, 2011). Finally, regional and religious differences could
affect the incentive to invest in education (Muller, 2001; Sander,
1992).
Figure 1: Hypothesized relationships between central variables
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Summary and Hypotheses
In this paper, we considered the relationships among parenting styles, depressive symptoms, and educational attainment
as youth age from adolescence into young adulthood. Figure
1 further illustrates the relationships tested here. There were
three objectives for this study. The first objective was to determine the relationship between parenting styles and depressive
symptoms. The second objective was to establish whether parenting styles and depressive symptoms are related to educational attainment for young adults. Finally, the third objective was
to investigate whether race moderates the relationship between
the parenting styles and educational attainment. These objectives resulted in the development of the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a-c: Compared to authoritative parenting, there is
a positive relationship between (a) uninvolved, (b) permissive,
and (c) authoritarian parenting and depressive symptoms.
Hypothesis 2a-c: Compared to authoritative parenting, there is
a negative relationship between (a) uninvolved, (b) permissive,
and (c) authoritarian parenting and educational attainment.
Hypothesis 3a-c: Depressive symptoms mediate the relationship between (a) uninvolved, (b) permissive, and (c) authoritarian parenting and educational attainment (with authoritative parenting as the comparison group).

The purpose of these hypotheses is to examine whether mental health—depressive symptoms, in this case—is one
mechanism that links earlier parenting styles to educational
attainment in young adulthood. To test these hypotheses, we
assess both years of educational attainment as well as whether
the respondent has earned a college degree.
Our fourth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4a-b: Authoritarian parenting is less harmful to
the educational attainment of a) African American and b)
Hispanic youth, compared to whites.

In this hypothesis, we focus on authoritative versus authoritarian parenting and whether the impact of these two styles
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varies by race-ethnicity. Existing research (see e.g., Christie-Mizell et al., 2008) suggests that African American and Hispanic parents may be more likely to take the stricter stances associated with authoritarian parenting. Therefore, with respect
to educational attainment, we examine whether authoritarian
parenting may not be as harmful for African Americans and
Hispanics, compared to whites.

Data and Methods
Data
Data for this investigation were drawn from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort (NLSY97), a longitudinal study of the educational and labor market experiences
of youth in the United States. The youth sampled were born between 1980 and 1984 and ranged in age from 12 to 16 by December 31, 1996. Data collection began in 1997 and the most recent
round of interviews for the NLSY97 was done in 2013. The full
NLSY97 sample consists of a nationally representative group
of youth that have been interviewed annually since 1997, with
over-sampling for poor and minority youth.
Measures
Measures for this study were taken from the first (1997,
baseline), sixth (2002), and tenth (2006) waves of the data. This
pattern allows for our mediator (depressive symptoms, 2002) to
occur subsequent to the independent variable (adolescent parenting style, 1997), but prior to the dependent variables (educational attainment, 2006). Over these three waves of data (i.e.,
1997 to 2006) collection, 317 respondents were missing on one
or more of our study variables. In supplementary analyses, we
utilized multiple imputation to recapture these respondents.
The findings using multiple imputation did not differ significantly from a complete cases analysis. Therefore, we present the
complete cases analyses in the models below. Our final sample
consists of 4,078 young adults, who were 21 to 25 years old in
the tenth wave. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for all
study variables in the total sample. All analyses were weighted
to correct for the oversampling of poor and minority youth.
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Table 1. Weighted Means, Percentages, and Standard
Deviations for All Study
Variables				Mean /Proportions

SD

Dependent variables 		
Education (years)					
Earned College Degree (1=yes)			
Depressive Symptoms: 1 (low) to 5 (high)		

13.65		
.26		
1.97		

2.55
.64

Parenting Styles		
Authoritative 					
Uninvolved					
Permissive					
Authoritarian 					

.42		
.10		
.36		
.12		

-

Race-ethnicity, sex, age, and post high school 		
Black (1=yes)					
.12		
Hispanic (1=yes)					
.11		
Female (1=yes)					
.49		
Age							13.95		1.28
5 or fewer years post high school (1=yes)		
.42		
SES, family characteristics, region, and religion		
Family income ($10,000s)				
Parents’ education (1=college degree)		
Reared in traditional two-parent home (1=yes)
Number of siblings (count)				
Grew up in the South (1=yes) 			
Never attended church (1=yes)			

5.81		
.20		
.63		
2.35		
.32		
.16		

4.85
1.28
-

Educational attainment. The main dependent variable was
years of educational attainment and was measured in 2006. The
mean of education for the sample is 13.65 years. Each respondent’s education was also measured as a categorical variable
splitting the sample between those who had earned a college
degree (1 = yes), compared to those who did not. By the time of
the final wave (2006) utilized in this study, 26% of the sample
had earned a college degree.
Depressive symptoms, parenting styles, and race-ethnicity. Depressive symptoms, measured in 2002, is both a main dependent variable and mediator in the analyses below. It is measured
as a five-item version of the mental health inventory (MHI-5).
The questions included how often, within the last month, the
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respondent felt: (1) “nervous”; (2) “calm or peaceful”; (3) “downhearted or blue”; (4) “happy”; and (5) “so down in the dumps
that nothing could cheer you up.” Each item ranged from 1
(none of the time) to 4 (all of the time). The mean for depressive
symptoms was 1.97, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .77.
Our measures of parenting styles and all control variables
were captured in the baseline year (1997), when the adolescent
respondents (ages 12-16) were interviewed to assess their parents’ level of supportiveness and responsiveness. Researchers at
Child Trends, an organization involved in the NLSY97 questionnaire design process, then combined the responses to produce
a parenting style variable (Moore et al., 1999). More specifically,
and in line with the relevant parenting literature, Child Trends
researchers developed two items—one measuring parental
supportiveness (i.e., responsiveness) and the other measuring
parental strictness or permissiveness (i.e., demandingness). At
baseline, when the respondents were 12 to 17 years old, they
were asked how supportive each parent was on a 3-point scale,
ranging from 1 (very supportive) to 3 (not very supportive).
Then, with appropriate description, each respondent was asked
to categorize each parent as either (1) strict or (2) permissive.
The two-level variables were then combined to yield: uninvolved
(permissive and not very or somewhat supportive), permissive
(permissive and very supportive), authoritative (strict and very
supportive), and authoritarian (strict and not very or somewhat
supportive). This measure of parenting has been validated elsewhere and utilized widely in the parenting literature (Baumrind, 1991; Maccoby & Martin, 1983). In this research, we utilize
maternal parenting styles, which were available for the vast majority of respondents. Of the 4,078 total respondents, 404 (10%)
had uninvolved parenting, 1,488 (36%) had permissive parenting, 1,710 (42%) had authoritative parenting, and 476 (12%) had
authoritarian parenting. We utilized authoritative parenting as
the reference group in all analyses below.
Race-ethnicity was a major independent variable. We created dummy variables to distinguish among African Americans
(1 = yes), Hispanics (1 = yes), and whites (1 = yes). Whites comprised 78% of the sample and were the omitted category for the
analyses. Blacks were 12% of the sample and Hispanics were
11% of the sample.
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Control variables. In the analyses below, we compared females to males (the omitted category). Household income was
measured in dollars and the mean was $58,100. For this study,
we coded income in quartiles to account for skewness in the
original measure. We then compared the highest quartile to the
three lower quartiles. Preliminary sensitivity analyses supported this decision. Further, parent’s education was included as a
dummy variable to capture whether one or both parents had a
college degree. If one parent was missing on this variable, then
only the other parent’s education was used. Of the total sample,
20% reported that their parents have a college degree.
At baseline, the average age for the total sample was 13.95
years. To aid in our estimation of educational attainment, we
also divided age using dummy variables to compare those that
were five or fewer years post high school during our final wave
in 2006. Relying on auxiliary analyses (available upon request),
this scheme was devised to account for respondents who had
an adequate amount of time to complete college. That is, because we assessed the completion of a bachelor’s degree as one
outcome, it was important to account for differences that would
make this milestone more probable for some respondents compared to others. In 2006, 42% of the total sample was five or
fewer years post high school.
The number of dependent children per household was assessed at baseline. The average number of dependent children
for the entire sample was 2.35. Utilizing census designations at
baseline, region of residence was reported as South (32%), North
Central (30%), Northeast (17%), or West (21%). In our analyses,
we compare those who live in the South to all others.
At baseline, respondents were asked how often they attended
church in the past twelve months and the responses ranged
from 1 (never) to 8 (everyday). We compare those who reported
never attending (16%) to all others. We further compared individuals who reported being reared in a traditional two-parent
home to other family structures (e.g., single parent home and
stepparent household). Sixty-three percent of our respondents
reported being raised in a two-parent household.
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Analytic Strategy
To test our hypotheses that depressive symptoms mediate the impact of parenting styles on educational attainment,
we utilize a series of regression models and proceed in four
steps. First, we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to establish that parenting styles are associated with
depressive symptoms. Second, we estimate whether parenting
styles impact both measures of educational attainment—years
of education and earned a college degree. Years of education
is estimated using an OLS regression and college degree (1 =
yes) is calculated with a logistic regression. Third, we added
depressive symptoms to the models for educational attainment
to determine whether, and the extent to which, the impact of
parenting styles is mediated. Finally, we estimated a series of
interactions by race-ethnicity and parenting styles to test our
contention that authoritarian parenting is less harmful to the
educational attainment of African Americans and Hispanics,
compared to whites.
Multivariate Findings
Table 2, Model 1 represent the regression model for depressive symptoms. Both uninvolved parenting and authoritarian
parenting were positively associated with depressive symptoms compared to authoritative parenting. Additionally, women were more likely to report higher levels of depressive symptoms, while those reared in two-parent homes reported lower
symptoms of depression.
Models 2–3 of Table 2 are the findings for years of educational attainment. Compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved,
permissive, and authoritarian parenting resulted in fewer years of
education (Table 2, Model 2). Also, African American and Hispanic youth reported fewer years of education, compared to whites.
Women in our sample reported more education. Further, those
respondents who are five or fewer years post-high school reported fewer years of education. Conversely, those in the top quarter
of high family income, those whose parents finished college, and
those who grew up in a traditional two-parent home completed
more education. Finally, respondents from a large sibling group,

Table 2. Depressive Symptoms, Education (years), Earned College Degree (1=yes) Regressed on Selected
Variables. NLSY97—1997 to 2006 (N = 4,078).

104
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Chapter
Title of Parenting Styles in Adolescence
The
Long-reach

105

those who grew up in the South, and individuals who never attended church attained fewer years of education.
In Table 2, Model 3, we added depressive symptoms to our
estimation of years of education and found that depressive
symptoms in late adolescence and early adulthood were inversely related to educational achievement. Recall that one of
the goals of this research was to test for mediation. The impact
of uninvolved parenting (Sobel t-test: -3.27, p < .001) and authoritarian parenting (Sobel t-test: -2.96, p < .001) on years of educational attainment of youth was partially mediated by depressive symptoms. Mediation for permissive parenting was not
possible because there was no association between permissive
parenting and depressive symptoms (Table 2, Model 1).
Models 4–5 of Table 2 show the results of the logistic regression analyses for the probability of earning a bachelor’s degree.
In Model 4, compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved,
permissive, and authoritarian parenting were associated with
lower odds of having completed a bachelor’s degree. Further,
African Americans and Hispanics, compared to whites, reported lower odds of earning a college degree. The young women in our sample reported higher odds of completing a bachelor degree. Age was positively associated with higher odds of
earning a bachelor’s degree, while five or fewer years post-high
school was associated with lower odds of obtaining a college
degree. Moreover, those from high income backgrounds, those
with parents who have college degrees, and those who grew up
in traditional two-parent homes had higher odds of attaining a
college degree. Respondents who reported many siblings and
those who never attended church had lower odds of completing
a bachelor’s degree.
In Table 2, Model 5, we added depressive symptoms to our
estimation of probability of earning a college degree. In late adolescence and young adulthood, depressive symptoms resulted
in lower odds of earning a bachelor’s degree. Moreover, depressive symptoms partially mediated the impact of uninvolved
(Sobel t-test: -2.34, p < .05) and authoritarian (Sobel t-test: -2.21, p
< .05) parenting on the probability of earning a college degree.
Mediation for permissive parenting was not possible because
there was no association between permissive parenting and depressive symptoms (Table 2, Model 1).
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Table 3. Education (years) and Earned College Degree (1=yes) Regressed on Selected Variables. NLSY97—1997 to 2006 (N = 4,078).

Figure 2: The joint influence of race-ethnicity and adolescent parenting styles on years of
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In Table 3, we explored whether the association between
parenting styles and educational attainment varies by race-ethnicity. We were especially interested in whether authoritarian
parenting was as harmful to the educational attainment of minority youth, compared to their white counterparts. Model 1 of
Table 3 shows that the association between parenting and years
of education was moderated by race-ethnicity. Figure 2 graphically displays these interactions. Compared to whites, authoritarian parenting had a positive impact on how many years of
education were attained by African Americans and Hispanics.
Notice in Figure 2 that the years of education was higher among
African Americans and Hispanic youth who were accustomed
to authoritarian parenting. For whites, years of education was
highest among those with authoritative parenting. Interestingly, and not predicted by us, uninvolved parenting was not
as harmful to African Americans and Hispanics as it was for
white youth. That is, compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved parenting lowered years of education more so for whites
than for racial minorities in our study. Testing for moderation
does not substantively change the other findings in the model. Respondents who were five or fewer years post-high school
attained fewer years of education, while women earned more
years of education than men. Those with high income, parent’s
with college degrees, and youth reared in a two-parent home
earned more years of education. Finally, more siblings, growing
up in the South, no church attendance, and depressive symptoms resulted in fewer years of education.
Model 2 of Table 3 shows that race-ethnicity moderated the
relationship between authoritarian parenting and the probability of earning a bachelor’s degree. Figure 3 graphically displays these interactions. Authoritarian parenting, compared to
the other styles, led to greater odds of earning a bachelor’s degree for African American and Hispanic youth. Young African
American adults with authoritarian parents were three times
more likely than their white counterparts to earn a bachelor’s
degree. Hispanic young adults with authoritarian parents were
about two and a half times more likely than their counterparts
to earn a bachelor’s degree.
Similar to our prior estimation of the probability of earning a college degree, women and older respondents had higher
odds of earning a college degree. Respondents who were five
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or fewer years post-high school had lower odds of completing
a degree. High family income in adolescence, parents with college degrees, and being reared in a traditional two-parent home
led to higher odds of earning a college degree. Growing up with
more siblings, the lack of church attendance, and depressive
symptoms resulted in lower odds of earning a college degree.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Using family social capital theory and its reliance on the
centrality of parent-child bonds for predicting youth outcomes,
we examined how parenting styles impact depressive symptoms and educational attainment for youth. Specifically, and as
Figure 1 illustrates, we tested whether depressive symptoms
mediated the relationship between parenting styles and educational attainment. Our study employed two measures of educational attainment: years of education and the odds of earning
a college degree. Further, we explored whether race-ethnicity
moderated the impact of parenting styles on educational attainment. Four hypotheses were developed to accomplish these
goals. We found support for hypotheses 1a and 1c—that uninvolved and authoritarian parenting would be positively related
to depressive symptoms. However, we did not find support for
hypothesis 1b—that permissive parenting would be associated
with depressive symptoms.
Although some authors (see e.g., Gelfand & Teti, 1990, or
LaFrenière & Dumas, 1992) have speculated that permissive
parenting leads to depressive symptomatology in children, that
finding is not supported in this research. Consistent with what
we found, Lamborn and her colleagues (Lamborn, Mounts,
Steinberg, & Dornbusch, 1991) argued that permissive parenting was not associated with depressive symptomatology initially because adolescents value self-reliance and the independent decision-making that is often associated with uninvolved
parenting (see also Steinberg, Lamborn, Darling, Mounts, &
Dornbusch, 1994). However, we cannot rule out that over time
permissive parenting may be associated with depressive symptoms as a consequence of bad decisions during adolescence and
young adulthood. Future research should extend our study
further into adulthood to more fully assess the relationship between permissive parenting and depressive symptoms.
Consistent with hypotheses 2a–c, our results indicated that,
compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved, permissive,
and authoritarian parenting were negatively related to educational attainment for youth. With respect to years of educational attainment, hypotheses 3a and 3c were supported: depressive symptoms partially mediated the relationship between
uninvolved parenting and educational attainment and the
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relationship between authoritarian parenting and educational
attainment. We did not find support for hypothesis 3b – depressive symptoms did not mediate the relationship between permissive parenting and years of education. In terms of our other
measure of educational attainment—i.e., the odds of earning a
college degree—we also found support for hypotheses 3a and
3c. Depressive symptoms did mediate the relationship between
uninvolved parenting (H3a) and college degree completion, as
well as the relationship between authoritarian parenting (H3c)
and earning a bachelor’s degree.
In our fourth hypothesis, we focused on authoritarian versus authoritative parenting and predicted that authoritarian
parenting would be less harmful to the educational attainment
of African Americans (H4a) and Hispanics (H4b). With respect
to years of education, we found support for both hypotheses.
African American and Hispanic youth who experienced authoritarian parenting attained more education than those from
authoritative homes. Conversely, whites’ education prospects
were more harmed by authoritarian parenting, with those who
were reared in authoritative homes earning significantly more
years of education. One interesting and somewhat surprising
finding was that African American and Hispanic youth who
experienced uninvolved parenting were less harmed than their
white counterparts. That is, whites who were from uninvolved
homes achieved fewer years of education than either African
Americans or Hispanics.
Hypothesis 4 also received support in our prediction of the
odds of completing a college degree. Authoritarian parenting
was less harmful to both African Americans (H4a) and Hispanics (H4b). That is, African Americans and Hispanics from
authoritarian homes had higher odds of completing a college
degree than those from authoritative homes. For whites, the
reverse was true. White youth from authoritative homes were
more likely to earn a college degree compared to those whites
who came from authoritarian families.
The findings in this study indicate that parenting styles
have an impact on youth during adolescence and continue to
have an impact into young adulthood in two ways. First, parenting styles during adolescence directly affect how much education is attained in young adulthood. Second, parenting styles
also exert influence on educational progress through mental
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health. That is, excessively strict (i.e., authoritarian) or overly
relaxed (i.e., uninvolved) parenting practices are detrimental
to the mental health of youth as they progress into their early
adult years. In turn, psychological maladjustment—depressive
symptoms, in this case—impedes educational attainment. It is
noteworthy that this pattern of mediation applies to both educational outcomes (i.e., years of education and odds of earning a
college degree) explored in this study.
Further, consistent with research that has considered the impact of parenting by race, authoritarian parenting strategies led
to more years of education and a greater probability of completing a college degree for African American and Hispanic youth,
compared to their white peers (McLeod & Shanahan, 1993). To
be clear, our results do not indicate that an authoritarian parenting style should be the preferred method of parenting for
minority children. Instead, the findings here suggest that authoritarian parenting was not as detrimental for African American and Hispanic children as it was for white children, with
respect to educational attainment. Similarly, and with respect
to the relationship between uninvolved parenting and years of
education, the educational achievement of African Americans
and Hispanics does not suffer as much as that of whites. These
findings suggest that the minority youth in our sample are better able to adapt to, and academically excel with, uninvolved
and authoritarian parents, compared to their white peers.
Although scholars have consistently argued that authoritative parenting is a superior form of parenting, the previous
research has overlooked how these experiences may vary by
race-ethnicity. The structural position (e.g., social class), as well
as the day-to-day experience of African Americans and Hispanics, may simply mean that these youth may be more adaptive
to varying parenting styles. Other related research has shown
that various forms of parenting (e.g., spanking—see e.g., Christie-Mizell et al., 2008) have different effects across the racial and
ethnic groups studied here. The typical theoretical reasoning is
that because the context of daily life differs for racial minorities
(compared to whites), research utilizing largely white, middle
class families may simply not apply to African Americans and
Hispanics (Christie-Mizell et al., 2008; Lareau, 2002). That is,
scholars should develop strategies that avoid imposing expectations developed from studies that focus on white respondents
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on racial and ethnic minorities; instead, research should continue to carefully differentiate between the consequences of parenting by race-ethnicity.
This study is not without limitations. First, only the reported parenting styles for mothers were used here. While mother-child data dominates this type of research, other studies
also show the importance of considering paternal parenting
contributions in conjunction with those of mothers (see e.g.,
Christie-Mizell et al., 2011). Second, this study may not tell the
full story for respondents who may have to take time off from
college or those that simply take longer to graduate. Recent research shows that not only are adults taking longer to complete
post-secondary degrees, but also that the factors (e.g., family
and employment obligations) shaping completion of degrees
vary as adults mature (Elman, Wray, & Xi, 2014). Third, this
research is not generalizable to other groups beyond African
Americans, Hispanics, and whites. It is quite possible the relationships among parenting, mental health, and educational
attainment vary for other groups not studied here. For example,
Chinese American parents, similar to African Americans, are
more likely to employ authoritarian parenting, but their educational outcomes and socioeconomic backgrounds are more
similar to whites (Chao, 2001; Kim, Wang, Orozco-Lapray, Shen,
& Murtuza, 2013). Therefore, the extent to which the patterns
found in this research apply to Chinese Americans—or other
groups, for that matter—is unknown.
In conclusion, future research should continue to employ
lon gitudinal data to further investigate the mechanisms that
link parenting styles early in the life course to outcomes as
youth age into adulthood. Such research elucidates how early
relationships both directly and indirectly transform educational outcomes. For instance, had we simply studied the relationship between parenting styles and educational attainment, we
would have overestimated the direct influence of parenting
styles. Instead, a focus on the mechanisms that link parenting
styles to educational progress proved fruitful and revealed that,
in addition to direct effects, part of the influence of parenting on
education flows through mental health. To the extent that the
extant literature has shown that parenting styles are linked to a
variety of adolescent outcomes (e.g., self-esteem and social competence—see e.g., Gonzales et al., 2002), other research should
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continue this pattern of exploring how other potential mediators link the experience of parenting styles in adolescence to
educational attainment in young adulthood.
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The Welfare Subject in the
“One-stop Shop”: Agency in
Troublesome Welfare Encounters
Kjetil Lundberg

Uni Research Rokkam Centre
The purpose of this article is to investigate the agency of “welfare subjects” in welfare encounters, situated in a “one-stop shop” reform context, thereby providing increased theoretical sensitivity into the field of
welfare encounters’ research. Anchored in a Norwegian reform context,
this article analyses agency related to welfare encounters, including welfare subjects’ attempts to hold NAV (the Norwegian Labour and Welfare
Administration) accountable to help them. Shifting agency positions are
located, the lines of responsibility in the welfare encounters are found
to be unclear, and there are indications that this may contribute to the
production of destructive agency positions.
Key words: activation, agency, one-stop shop reform, welfare encounters, welfare subject
One-stop shop reforms have been implemented in a number
of welfare states in recent years. Scholars of political and organizational science interpret such reforms in light of service integration and accountability aims (Askim, Fimreite, Moseley, &
Pedersen, 2011; Byrkjeflot, Christensen, & Lægreid, 2013; Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2013; Minas, 2014). Prior to and parallel to these reforms, a broad range of welfare states—liberal,
conservative and social democratic—have reshaped their language, philosophy and organization along the lines of individual responsibility, activation and participation (Berkel & Borghi,
2007; Bonvin, 2008; Gubrium, Harsløf, & Lødemel, 2014; Handler
2004; Johansson & Hvinden, 2007; Wright, 2012). As argued by
several scholars, these two trends are inherently linked: While a
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range of activation reforms in the 1990s were focused on changing policies and benefits, the ‘second wave of activation reforms’
represents a change in governance (cf. Lødemel & Moreira, 2014,
pp. 1–2). The organizational reforms aim at putting the systems
in better shape to deliver services. This is essential in order to
succeed with neo-liberal activation policies promoting self-governance, motivation and individual responsibility.
For the individual engaging in the welfare encounter, the
ability to take responsibility, and to hold the system to account,
requires rational and reflexive agency. However, people are
not necessarily in a rational and reflexive subject position at all
times. A particular body of literature pinpoints the complexities of agency related to the welfare subject as being relational,
dynamic, differentiated, interconnected, interdependent, intersubjective and interactive (Wright, 2012; see also Greener, 2002;
Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 2004). This literature holds potential for a
grounded analysis of agency in welfare encounters.
How service users targeted for activation measures are dealing with—or in—welfare encounters is a relevant aspect of social
work and social policy. Situated in the context of the Norwegian
NAV reform (labour and welfare reform), this paper analyzes
agency positions in welfare encounters, related to encounters or
sequences over some time that is attached with bureaucratic trouble or tardiness.1 The empirical analysis focuses on coordination
issues and accountability in NAV, from the standpoint of service
users, and the production of situated agency in this setting. This
article contributes to social work and policy research on welfare
encounters by outlining the shifting positions of agency for people targeted to become activated, situated within specific bureaucratic contexts of a one-stop shop reform.
In what follows, I briefly present the context of the NAV reform in light of accountability and the “responsible citizens”
discourse, and then outline a specific body of literature on agency which has been developed in the context of social policy and
social work research. After presenting the study (including data
and methods), the empirical analysis is presented in two parts
and followed by a discussion of the themes explored.
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Reform Justification, Accountability
and “Responsible Citizens”
The NAV reform was adopted by the Norwegian parliament
in 2005, and implementation began one year later, followed by
ambitious reform aims on behalf of the welfare subject and the
Norwegian employment rate, as well as major organizational
changes (Lundberg, 2012). The reform included a merger of the
employment services and the social insurance administration,
two central organizations in the Norwegian welfare state, and
the coordination of the new state-level organization with the social services on the municipal level (Andreassen & Aars, 2015).
In the political process that led to reform implementation, a specific problem representation was mobilized and gained dominance—that of the multiservice user, labelled the “shuttlecock”
(kasteball) (Syltevik, 2013). The shuttlecock was a specific kind
of welfare subject, who needed help from more than one of the
former welfare organizations at the same time.
The three welfare organizations provided different “user
logics” in the welfare encounter, and the image of the multiservice user being shuttled back and forth without getting the
required help became a powerful image for poor coordination.
The welfare services were portrayed as incapable of providing
relevant help, resulting in passivity and dependency. The solution mobilized was organizational reform through a new onestop shop in order to provide integrated, holistic and “seamless”
service provision. The reform aimed to get people back to employment and to make the services more user-friendly, holistic
and efficient (Christensen et al., 2013).
Organizational scholars evaluating one-stop shop reforms
(e.g., Askim et al., 2011; Byrkjeflot et al., 2013) see them as approaches for coordinating services and improving accountability both vertically (upwards to central government and downwards to citizens) and horizontally (to partners). Accountability
may be understood as a specific social relation: “a relationship
between an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face
consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). Sullivan (2003) states that
the more contributors there are in public decision-making, the
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more difficult it is to specify who is accountable. As Askim et
al. (2011, p. 1454) point out in relation to one-stop shop reforms:
“while creating opportunities for new forms of accountability,
[they] also pose significant challenges in terms of knowing who
to hold accountable for what.”
These points are actualized when observing the organization NAV. Behind the “shop,” there are a number of other units
and bureaus taking part in the service production, including
casework units, call centers, special units, and a number of private contractors providing job training, motivation, and educational programs. During the organizational reform process,
it became increasingly clear to authorities, welfare professions,
service users, and the general public that this new organizational structure may produce fragmentation and co-ordination
problems of its own (Christensen et al., 2013; Ekspertgruppen,
2015; Lundberg, 2012).
The one-stop shops in the welfare sector are strongly related to the implementation of activation policies, and may be
seen as a part of the second wave of activation reforms (Gubrium et al., 2014; Lødemel & Moreira, 2014; Minas, 2014). The reforms aim to activate people into employment, partly through
a range of liberal power technologies (Barnes, 2009; Mik-Meyer
& Villadsen, 2012). Indeed, through the discursive apparatus of
neo-liberalism, social policy contexts and governance reforms
have been increasingly formed by discourses such as “modernization,” “efficiency,” “empowerment,” and “individual responsibility.” The “responsible citizen” is increasingly expected to
share responsibility for delivering public policy objectives by
participating in the design, management, and governance of
services (Barnes & Prior, 2009; Newman & Clarke, 2009a, 2009b;
Patrick, 2014; Wright, 2012). These discourses influence public
debates, policy making and social work practices in Norway
and elsewhere (Jessen & Tufte, 2014; Johansson & Hvinden,
2007; Kjørstad, 2005; Nilssen, 2014; Syltevik 2013).
As stated above, for individuals to be responsible actors—
and to be able to hold the one-stop shop accountable—requires
rational and reflexive agency. In this paper, welfare subjects’
agency positions are analyzed within the context of welfare
encounters during a one-stop shop reform accompanied by
strengthened activation policies. In this regard, the concept of
agency must be revisited.
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Conceptualizing Agency
Agency is a highly contested concept within the social sciences. In the field of social welfare, many authoritative voices have put forward an understanding of agency that is more
moralistic than analytical (for an overview, see Deacon & Mann
1999, p. 423). According to Barnes (2000), social theory has
borrowed such concepts as agency and choice from everyday
discourse, where actions are characterised as voluntary rather
than caused. Agency is a concept commonly used to “characterize individuals as autonomous, purposive and creative actors,
capable of a degree of choice” (Lister, 2004, p. 125). As Lister
(2004) points out, there is a fine line between acknowledging
people’s agency, including the capacity to make mistakes and
bad decisions (as everyone does), and blaming them for their
misfortune. In focusing on agency, there is also a risk of romanticizing and idealizing. Within the research literature, the
models of agency applied can be very different. Deacon (2004)
highlights three distinct agency models: (1) choice-making in a
quasi-market (cf. Le Grand, 2003); (2) moral subjects acting as
interdependent and relational beings (cf. Hoggett, 2001; Lister,
2004); and (3) choice-making relating to welfare dependency.
For the purpose of this article, I am inspired by the related and
overlapping agency typologies developed by Lister (2004) and
Hoggett (2001), as these typologies are applicable to the context
of welfare encounters, and their understanding of agency is
carefully situated within structure.
Lister distinguishes between different types of agency,
ranging from strategic to everyday agency and from personal
to political/citizenship agency. She labels these different types
of agency (relating to poverty) as “getting by,” “getting (back)
at,” “getting out,” and “getting organized.” Hoggett distinguishes between different models of agency and warns about a
“lop-sided model of agency which is insufficiently sensitive to
the passionate, tragic and contradictory dimensions of human
experience” (Hoggett, 2001, p. 37). People do not necessarily act
rationally nor reflexively at all times. Inspired by Freud, Hoggett sees people’s self as split in multiple fractions.
In practice, then, people may have multiple selves. He presents a quadrant of four agency models (within the discussion of
welfare subjects), one of which is Giddens’ (1984) reflexive and
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successful actor (reflexive subject). Reflexivity, as Giddens sees it, is
a positive capacity that provides constructive agency. However,
people can be highly reflexive and yet still feel powerless about
their situation (reflexive objects). Hoggett also problematizes reflexivity and speculates whether all agency is reflexive, or rather
that much reflexivity actually happens post hoc, after one has
acted (non-reflexive subjects). When people’s confidence, respect or
esteem is attacked, they do not necessarily resist. The experience
of powerlessness, resulting from poverty, marginalization and
domination of various sorts may lead to depression and aggression being turned towards oneself (non-reflexive objects).
Both Hoggett (2001) and Lister (2004) underline that their
types and models of agency should be seen as continuums of
situations or events rather than personal character traits. They
also add a distinction between first-order and second-order
agency. First-order agency refers to playing the system or making
limited change for oneself; second-order agency refers to changing the system (including political agency). Hoggett encourages
a focus on second-order agency in social policy studies, while
Greener (2002, p. 703) encourages a focus on first-order agency (game playing within clear rules) in welfare encounters “in
an attempt to achieve at least some level of greater transparency and accountability in the administration of benefits.” In
this article, I am concerned with individual/first-order agency.
Nevertheless, agency should not then be seen as isolated from
structure (Barnes, 2000). People act and make choices in various
circumstances, and their actions may be grounded in a range of
different identities, moral obligations, and moralities, and may
also be constrained by external factors. It is therefore an important task for academics in the fields of welfare, social administration, and social work to produce “a more nuanced account
of agency as situational and variable, produced and negotiated
through contextualized interaction” (Wright, 2012, p. 313).

The Research
The objective of the research project was to explore service
users’ experiences of their encounters (in a broad sense) with
the new organization, NAV, during the reform process, thereby
enabling an exploration of the reforming organization through
these experiences. The research project aimed to cover insights
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from service users who were in the center of NAVs mandate,
which were targeted for activation measures and that the NAV
reform was said to better address. Interviewees were recruited with assistance from two local NAV offices in two different
municipalities which sent invitation letters to service users receiving rehabilitation allowances, sick leave benefits, and unemployment benefits, and from the NAV unit “Intro og kvalifisering” (see Lundberg 2012 for more details). I interviewed
29 people (22–66 years old) who were involved with NAV as
service users and benefit recipients, and who had wide-ranging backgrounds with regard to former employment, as well
as social and medical history. All interviewees had mixed experiences with NAV, and all interviewees had experiences that
could be related to the reform process which was ongoing at
the time of the interview. The majority of the interviewees were
receiving vocational rehabilitation allowances at the time of the
interview. This group turned out to be useful informants in the
study because of the breadth and duration of their experiences
with NAV, consisting of multiple encounters that highlighted
the situated aspects of agency.
Memory might be biased, and interviewees’ accounts may
be self-protective or self-righteous to some degree. As Hoggett
(2001) notes, much reflexivity may also happen post hoc. Individuals may or may not be able to reflect on their agency or
the lack of such agency within specific contexts. These are valid
points, but qualitative interviews are still often the most accessible way of exploring lived experience.
I began my empirical investigations by locating the problematic of the everyday world of the actors that I was interested in
studying (Smith, 1987). This is a methodological and analytical
choice that privileges the individual informant’s point of view,
and that affects my focus on the organization, which becomes
more indistinct than, for instance, in mainstream organizational research analysis (see, e.g., Askim et al., 2011). By exploring
the subjects’ experiences and points of view, fragments of the
NAV bureaucracy and how the individual has acted towards
the system are visualised.
Interview transcriptions were analyzed in several stages.
Anchored in thematic analysis, the study has resulted in publications on a number of subjects relating to welfare reform,
individual–system relations, health/illness and work ethics and
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stigmatization (see Lundberg, 2012). In this article, I particularly
focus on agency in welfare encounters. I have therefore chosen
examples from the data in which I find purposeful to illustrate
the situatedness, complexity and contextuality of agency positions. To give insights to the multiple elements of shifting and
situated agency when dealing with NAV, the illustrations in this
article are chosen from the experiences of service users who all
have experiences with former administrations (to varying degrees), have been employed for years prior to their need for services from NAV, and have faced multiple problems related to
unemployment and illness.

Navigating in a Fragmented System
The individual—NAV relationships are contextual and therefore variable, but NAV has certain ways of responding to the individual request that imply accountability issues. A general account that many of the interviewees in the study shared was the
image of NAV as being a chaotic and fragmented organization
that was challenging to navigate. Although this was a theme with
variations and nuances, one common experience concerned the
shifting of caseworkers. Jonas turned to NAV after a combination
of unemployment and a broken arm. In the process of deciding
an appropriate form of activation, he experienced five caseworker
changes. For people on benefits linked to demands for activation,
contact with caseworkers may be crucial. For Jonas, it was critical
to have an available caseworker to hold to account at this time.
Post hoc, he reflects on the responsibility relationship regarding
caseworkers and the system:
The last one didn’t have anything to apologise for because
she didn’t even know I’d been waiting. All the Post-its stuck
on top of the other Post-its saying, ‘Call him about a meeting’,
that’s where the mistake was. (Jonas, 30s)

Jonas’ experience indicates accountability issues linked to
whom to hold accountable (Askim et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2003).
However, the issue is more complex than the mere shifting of
caseworkers at the local NAV offices. Most of the informants
learned that their caseworkers were constrained by what
happened at the regional casework units. This represented an
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organizational change: In the former offices, the service users
mostly dealt directly with the very same employees who processed their cases. Ideally, this new internal division of labour
in the “seamless” NAV system should not be a concern for service users (Askim et al., 2011). However, for the individual dealing with several caseworkers at the local NAV office, as well as
several units in the system, it is often hard to know whom to
hold accountable for what.
The individual–system relationship cannot be evenly balanced. The individual welfare subject has more insights into
his/her situation and needs than does the system, while the
system has more insights into its resources and measures. In
complex cases—which those involving activation often are—
information becomes a critical resource for the individual service user. Hildegunn, a former teacher in her early 50s who
suffered from serious illness, experienced the critical issue of
poor information first hand. She was changing from sick-leave
benefits to vocational rehabilitation, but her caseworker asked
her to delay applying so that her health condition could be evaluated. Hildegunn was assured that she had time to wait, but
when she finally applied, she got a letter from the NAV casework unit informing her that the casework process would take
three months:
When I received that letter, I just felt (…). I was just irate. First,
it was just so disrespectful. I felt … how could they do such
a thing? I had done everything properly. So I called them—I
was calm and explained the situation to them. They told me
that, well, that’s the way it is, it will take approximately three
months. I asked what I should do when the sick-leave benefits ran out, as I wouldn’t have a penny to live on. Nothing.
Well, I could apply for social benefits, they said. Then, I got
so angry. I had done everything properly in order to get what
I was entitled to in time; this is not my fault, it’s their fault.
(Hildegunn, early 50s)

Hildegunn felt that she was treated with courtesy in her encounter with NAV on the phone, even though the employee at
the call center could not help her solve her problem. She was encouraged to send a “service complaint” to NAV, which she did,
although 18 months later, she still had not received a response.
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Furthermore, she was referred to a different part of the NAV
system—the social services, for immediate help.
Hildegunn was not eager to apply for social benefits, which
she felt carried stigma and humiliation. She felt a lack of options
in the situation, which was ultimately solved by way of a private
loan from a family member. This aspect of “everyday agency”
represents relational and interconnected agency (Wright, 2012),
a resource obviously not available for all service users in similar situations. Following Titterton (1992), Lister (2004, pp. 130–
131) sees personal, social and material coping resources as an
unequally distributed yet important aspect of “getting by.” By
viewing Hildegunn’s activation of family resources in this light,
one can grasp the aspect of agency in this situation, although
she described herself as being powerless in the situation.
One aspect of agency in welfare encounters relates to social goodwill from employees (Dubois, 2010). The issue of social
goodwill is interesting, as it may depend on specific individual
relationships. It also shows the negotiated and interconnected
dimension of agency between service users and case-workers
(Barnes & Prior, 2009; Wright, 2012). Aslaug, who was in her 50s,
experienced a high level of service provision in her encounter
with NAV. She even obtained the direct phone number of her
caseworker in the casework unit so that she would not have to
phone the call center if she had problems filling out her forms.
This is a service imbued with certain exclusivity. Having been
a caseworker in the public sector herself for many years, she
understood “the language of administration,” as she put it. Her
knowledge may be seen as a cultural coping resource (Lister,
2004; Titterton, 1992) that helped her in the welfare encounter.
Social goodwill from caseworkers comes in several forms.
One of the activation technologies deployed by NAV to serve
people undergoing vocational rehabilitation is a standardized
electronic “employment status form” (ESF), which service users have to submit electronically every two weeks. Einar, who
was in his 40s, received benefits because of complex personal
problems involving serious mental illness and difficulties dealing with deadlines and money, which had resulted in a difficult financial situation. In periods of serious depression, Einar
failed to manage the ESF, and so his benefits stopped. Therefore,
his caseworker began to manage the ESF for him. At one point
Einar’s caseworker was replaced. As a result, the ESF was not
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submitted during a period where he was severely depressed to
the point of rarely even getting out of bed. His benefits were cut
and his bills went unpaid. Einar explains:
Suddenly the benefits stopped. (…) The last thing they told
me was that I didn’t have to send in these forms, as I’d had
problems with that. (…) I’d gotten a new caseworker without
them letting me know, and she didn’t take care of it [administer his ESF]. And it took a while before I discovered it. (…)
It was apparently a problem with communication in the NAV
system, but I was the one who got burnt. (Einar, 40s)

Einar suffered from depression at the time. This is a condition that Hoggett (2001, p. 47) describes as a “collapse of agency.” However, his first caseworker’s goodwill enabled Einar to
be kept secure financially. This was an act with substantial consequences for Einar’s life situation at the time, and illustrates
the relational aspect of agency (Wright, 2012).

Welfare Subjects as Customers, Salesmen,
Quasi-bureaucrats and Frustrated Citizens
At the time when Jonas (introduced above) experienced frequent caseworker changes, his case was at a critical point. For
the purpose of illustrating the (sometimes) dynamic nature of
agency positions, I will here focus on the step before, when he
was granted vocational rehabilitation in the first place:
I had spent quite a bit of time online really, to check all my
rights. And I knew those things well (…). It’s really very
quick, all the consultations, but that’s because I had prepared
myself so well, and that is what they said as well. I had read
all my rights, everything I was supposed to do, up front. And
I was a very pleasant customer for them … or user. Right?
Plain and simple. And they told me so. (Jonas, 30s)

The role Jonas describes taking on is very much in line with
Hoggett’s (2001) “reflexive subject” and Lister’s (2004) “strategic
agency.” Jonas describes himself preparing for the meeting and
looking into what kind of agency he has in the situation, learning the codes of the system. Perhaps coincidentally, he even
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describes himself as a customer, a term not commonly used in
the Norwegian welfare policy context. Although not in a customer role where he can choose between different providers in
a market, his term of choice may reflect a mentality, a specific
orientation towards the public services that may have helped
him, as he does not feel any stigma, shame or embarrassment.
On the contrary, he comes with high expectations of what the
system can do for him.
While such expectations may illustrate a customer mentality, or at least an ideal actor making choices in a welfare “quasi-market” (Le Grand, 2003), his behaviour may also be seen
as taking the role of a salesman, as he explains, justifying and
selling his case to NAV in order to get access to the services
and resources he wants. This form of “making out” (Greener,
2002; Hoggett, 2001) relates to an important aspect of accountability: the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his/her
actions. Jonas expected NAV to do so. Although he faced difficulties closing the contract with NAV, he managed to get what
he wanted, namely the funding of two years of education at a
private learning institution.
Before getting the final approval from NAV regarding his
choice of education, Jonas was faced with shifting caseworkers who failed to prepare his case. In this situation, his roles as
customer and/or salesman had shortcomings. He tried asking
different units in NAV for help, including his local NAV office
and the call center. He kept calling, and kept going down to the
office, insisting on being helped. Newman and Clarke (2009b)
have shown how subversion of identities (such as service user,
consumer, activist, citizen) may be used by individuals in order
to exert their power. Jonas’ change of strategy, then, demonstrates the dynamic side of agency.
Acts of subversion in order to make the system adapt to
them and their needs took several forms in the narratives of
the participants in this research. Some interviewees told stories
that involved engaging help from actors outside the NAV system, such as their union, and in one case, a social worker at
a hospital who helped by mobilizing a doctor to write a letter
of recommendation to handle the individual’s request for vocational rehabilitation as quickly as possible (Lundberg, 2012).
These are acts of “getting by” and “playing the system” (Lister,
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2004), reminding us of the sometimes interconnected and situational dimensions of agency (Wright, 2012).
Some of the interviewees also referred to situations where
they tried to coordinate different units within the system. Caseworkers at the local NAV office might ask service users to contact the casework unit for help. At a certain point, service users
would try to make the different NAV units communicate with
each other. In this case, they were trying to coordinate different
“hands” in the system to work together. In doing so, they often
referred to NAV’s written guidelines, which require a level of
agency relating to a sense of bureaucratic competence and reflexive agency (Hoggett, 2001).
Such acts may lead to taking positions as quasi-bureaucrats.
Erna, a former teacher in her 40s, with a long career as a welfare
subject in former and current welfare organizations, exemplifies this role clearly. She had learned a whole repertoire of tricks
and skills to deal with the system, having experienced a variety
of practices, including several bureaucratic errors that had led
her into difficulties. I asked her if she thought it was difficult to
manage the bureaucratic procedures:
No, I’m totally into that stuff, that’s no problem at all. It’s repetition, repetition. However, that’s where they try to catch
you: ‘Perhaps your documentation is not in order?’ Not at all.
(Erna, 40s)

Occasionally she had experienced a delay in the processing
of her case because NAV had lost her documents. Therefore, she
started to take a copy of all the papers she handed in to NAV,
and when talking to NAV on the phone, she made notes and
asked for the names of the people to whom she was talking. In
this way, she developed a routine and acted according to the
role of a quasi-bureaucrat. This represents a particular everyday agency strategy developed from a particular bureaucratic
context of the failings of the bureaucracy.
At one point, Erna submitted a receipt to get a refund for a
tuition fee. Eventually, she went down to her local NAV office to
ask why she had not yet received her money. The employee at
NAV said that they had not received any receipt:
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I take a copy of all papers I hand in to them. When I hand it
in, I demand that they stamp it. They … (say) okay, but they
don’t like it. And I say, ‘And ideally, I’d like your name, too.’
(laughs) One time I handed in a receipt for some tuition money. (…) After a few weeks, I went down and I asked them why
the money hadn’t come. And they asked me where I handed it
in, because they couldn’t find the receipt. I handed it in here, I
said, so you must have lost it. ‘Nothing gets lost here’, she told
me. ‘Well, if you believe that, that’s fine’, I told her, ‘but you
can have a new copy from me, with the NAV stamp on it.’ You
should have seen her then. She got mad. (Erna, 40s)

This example of the welfare subject acting as a quasi-bureaucrat represents a form of agency that could be interpreted
as “getting by,” which is not too different from the reflexive subject position Jonas assumed (analyzed above). However, in this
case the welfare encounter takes place in a social context where
Erna’s actions may also be understood as “getting (back) at” the
system by beating it at its own game (Lister, 2004). The account
shows a lack of trust and negative expectations regarding the
system’s capability to manage Erna’s request, guided by experience. Her act makes NAV accountable by documenting their
errors through the same textual devices that the system itself
deploys in the management of its tasks.
As illustrated, these welfare subjects do not remain passive;
they are active actors trying to solve bureaucratic issues and
to make the system accountable to them. Some of them do this
with greater success than others, and their agency positions
may shift in different bureaucratic contexts. A number of more
or less strategic attempts to activate NAV to be accountable in
order to sort out bureaucratic errors are identified in Lundberg
(2012). One interviewee described simplifying his case so that
he would be treated more smoothly in the system, even though
he knew he might be on the edge of the law in doing so. Another interviewee reported that in order to get sympathy from his
caseworker and perhaps a quicker processing of his case when
his pension was mistakenly stopped, he lied about his current
economic situation (Lundberg, 2012). Such moves may be morally questionable, but they may represent a rational action strategy in the moment.
Einar, quoted above, felt a need to develop a relationship
with his new caseworker in order to give her insight into his
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current (variable) health situation. Unfortunately, he had trouble getting in touch with her:
I was told that I’d been assigned a new caseworker. And that
caseworker, I’ve still never actually met her. I’ve been down
(to the office) many times now; it’s been over a year. (…) I’ve
asked, I’ve called, I’ve been down there several times and told
them that I want to talk to her, I’ve sent letters and emails, I’ve
emailed her superior and referred to the attempts that I’ve
made to get in touch. And I’ve asked her to get in touch with
me and … At one point; I heard that she was moving over to
a different job, and that they thought that was why she hadn’t
contacted me. (Einar, 40s)

As indicated, these accounts, which highlight the position
of the “reflexive object,” are common in the data. Furthermore,
several interviewees tried to overrule their caseworker by asking the management at their local NAV office to assign a new
caseworker. As service users do not have a formal right to
change their caseworkers, this may or may not work, depending on the social goodwill of the management. Service users
may also use their voice by making formal complaints. At one
point, Erna sent a formal complaint to NAV’s complaint unit regarding failing casework procedures, loss of documents, and
failure to process her case on time, as well as several experiences of bad service. She sent a lengthy letter and was disappointed
with the short, formal letter she received in reply.
When welfare subjects feel that they repeatedly “hit a wall”
within the system, there is the danger that over time, they experience a “failure of recognition” and frustration, which may
lead to uncontrolled anger (Hoggett’s non-reflexive subject) or
even mental illness, such as depression (Hoggett’s non-reflexive
object). Erna sometimes struggled to control her anger:
I had high blood pressure and felt totally miserable, and I was
short of breath and short tempered. So then I started to get
back at them. I banged on tables and counters. (…) I remember
that I told them (loudly): ‘Where is the merger? Where is this
fantastic merger between you? Where is it? You’re more distant
than ever before!’ (…) You’re in a very vulnerable situation and
kind of fighting, sort of on the margins of society. I faced some
kind of opposition to getting my rights. (…) It’s horrible to say
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it, but I understand if someone goes berserk at the NAV office.
I’d go so far as to say I understand the mechanism inside the
human being when they finally… yes. (Erna, 40s)

In the interview, Erna illustrated perhaps all four of Hoggett’s (2001) types. In the account above, she reflects on the longterm consequences of suffering and “the real experiences of
powerlessness” (Hoggett, 2001) after years of fighting a system
that does not seem accountable to her. Her understanding of
the mechanisms that make people snap or lose control of their
emotions at the local NAV office indicates a painful realization
of this point.
This point is relevant when evaluating threats and violence
in welfare encounters. Since 2012, the Norwegian media and
the national management of NAV have placed the problems of
violence and threats from service users on the agenda, reporting an increase in threats and violence towards employees (e.g.,
Stavanger Aftenblad, 2013). In the summer of 2013 these issues
also took a dramatic turn as a NAV employee died after being
knife-stabbed on duty (Aftenposten, 2013). Threats and violence
represent serious work environment issues for frontline workers in work and welfare agencies. In the research literature on
welfare encounters, violence from welfare subjects is interpreted as a last resort for the underprivileged, as “the argument of
those who have run out of arguments” (Dubois 2010, p. 167).
Many of these actions also have a psychosocial dimension that
can be understood as non-rational, “bad agency” (Hoggett,
2001; Wright, 2012).

Conclusion
While the intentions of the NAV reform, one of the largest
reforms in Norwegian welfare state history, were oriented towards service integration, many service users experienced a
reproduction of dysfunctions in the new organization (see Andreassen & Aars, 2015; Ekspertgruppen, 2015; Lundberg, 2012).
Problems illustrated in this paper include shifting caseworkers
and various systemic errors related to information flows and
coordination issues. As stated in the introduction, the paper
aims to answer how service users perceive challenges with
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coordination and fragmentation, and what kinds of agency
positions are produced or required in this setting.
In the welfare subject–welfare system relationship, the individual is accountable to NAV through a range of duties, and
the system has a range of routines, techniques and resources
to sanction the individual if he/she does not carry them out.
Requests from service users are treated within the system’s administrative and institutional frameworks, technologies and
bureaucratic procedures. Service users may complain through
NAV’s internal system, or they could make their voice heard
in the media or by contacting politicians, ombudsmen or service user representatives. As shown in this article, they also
try to make the system accountable to help them by referring
to official guidelines, by acting as coordinators and quasi-bureaucrats, and by selling their case. An individual may take
different and shifting positions in different situations, and the
ability to do so is often required in order for the welfare subject
to achieve favorable outcomes. Those who manage to contribute
to constructive encounters leading to successful outcomes for
themselves demonstrate agency as reflexive subjects.
Welfare encounters may be sites for social investments for
some and sites for marginalization processes for others. As
shown in the analysis, reflexivity is also needed in order to cope
in simple in-the-moment situations in everyday welfare encounters. As I have illustrated, some of these coping strategies may
turn into resistance. As Hoggett (2001) states in his seminal paper, welfare institutions do not exist exclusively through the interaction between individuals. The individual may experience
the welfare state as a helping hand or as a closed fist. In that
regard, the institutional apparatus of the welfare state under
strengthened activation policies may contribute in producing
“bad agency.”
The analyses in this article have shown tensions being reproduced in the context of a one-stop shop reform linked to “the
second wave of activation reforms” (Lødemel & Moreira, 2014;
Minas, 2014). The empirical descriptions are in line with the
findings of a recent and thorough report on NAV and its users
(Ekspertgruppen, 2015). While the aims of providing integrated
services and getting more welfare subjects into paid employment are yet to be realized, a straightforward answer to how the
lessons from the NAV reform will influence Norwegian social
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policy in the time to come is not easy to find. On a general level
there is strong support for the Norwegian welfare model, but
organizational reforms that are unable to fulfil their goals may
clear the path for new answers to policy issues.
Recently, the lessons from the NAV reform have been mobilized by the current (right-wing) government’s announcement
of an implementation of more “flexible” labor legislation. One
of the main policies in the new legislation will allow more, and
longer, temporary employment contracts. These plans, which
mark a shift in the Norwegian model, are backed by the argument that NAV is unable to help people with disabilities into
employment (Arum, 2013). According to the proponents of the
new policies, people with disabilities and people with scarce
work experience will be able to get a foot in the door if employers can take them on temporarily, to try before they buy. In this
way, failures of the NAV reform are mobilized to usher in policy
changes in the neighboring policy field of labor legislation.
The lessons from the reform may also be used in other ways.
Policy makers and other stakeholders aiming for quick solutions
may announce welfare reforms more heavily grounded in symbolic politics of individual responsibility. This discourse, linked
to an agency model of choice-making related to welfare dependency (see Deacon, 2004), may contribute to “othering” of underprivileged groups (Lister, 2004) in order to push forward a less
inclusive-oriented and more disciplinary activation regime. This
may produce frustrated citizens and destructive agency positions. Therefore, in order to hold policy makers accountable for
their decisions, they need to be reminded that the welfare state
should function as a security net, even for those who are not capable of a rational, reflexive subject position at all times.

Endnotes
As elsewhere, the terms used to describe those targeted by welfare
organisations are shifting away from, for example, “client” and “claimant.” Currently in Norway, “user” is the politically correct term, in
what is partly an effort to avoid stigma (Lundberg, 2012, 2013). The term
“customer,” which is favored in, for example, Britain’s Jobcentre Plus,
has never dominated in Norway.
1
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Since its inception, social work has professed an abiding commitment
to social justice. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the few professions to have
maintained such an obligation. This pledge is officially inscribed in the
Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW).
This document affirms the pursuit of social justice as a core value, not
just for members of the Association, but also for social workers in general. However, what kind of social justice does the Association advocate
and how just is it? While answers to these questions are critical to the
Association’s members and broader social work community, they are,
without doubt, of vital importance to those whom social work seeks to
serve. This paper examines the nature and scope of the principles of social justice subscribed to by the NASW.
Key words: social work, equality, ethics, values, justice, rights, social justice

Is Social Justice Necessary?
We have long sought to perfect justice (Sen, 2009). The journey so far has been slow and arduous, and it is apparent that
a relatively large number of today’s pilgrims consider themselves to be comparatively no better off than their predecessors
(Chomsky, 2017). Even by contemporary standards, many in the
North, East and South would not deny that considerably more
progress could be made to expand just economic, political and
social frontiers. The promise of rights, entitlements, opportunities and resources for ordinary citizens, which were once held
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by only a small, insular elite, have fallen far short of the ideal (Piketty, 2014). Nevertheless, the last man to proclaim that
the destructive economic and political history of (il)liberalism
was at an end, Francis Fukuyama (1992), was patently wrong. In
fact, some have argued that the defense of liberal democracies
in recent times poses just as serious a threat to civil liberty and
human rights as has illiberal aggression (Grayling, 2010; Waldron, 2012). Indeed, even Fukuyama (2014) has retreated from
his earlier exuberance and conceded that political institutions
in the U.S. are in decay, and as Zygmunt Bauman (2011) contends, there is a real danger of Western nations descending into
what has been coined “liberticide” (p. 20), i.e., the gradual and
silent demise of personal freedom.
Along the path from New York through Guantanamo Bay to
Abu Graib and beyond, Westerners have become increasingly
accustomed to accepting ever-diminishing degrees of freedom
with equanimity. “We have forgotten the sad lesson learned by
Martin Niemöller, the Lutheran pastor and victim of Nazi persecution,” writes Bauman (2011):
First, they took the communists, he mused, but I was not
a communist, so I kept silent. Then they came after trade
unionists, and as I was not a trade unionist, I said nothing.
Then they came after Jews, but I was not a Jew … And after
Catholics, but I was not a Catholic … Then they came for me
… By that time there was no one left to speak up for anyone.
(pp. 20–21)

Greater justice remains an indispensable, though distant,
ambition. The fact that justice must be vigorously pursued is
a major reason for the continuing relevance of social work. In
pursuing justice, and its more recent offshoot, social justice
(Barry, 2005), a profession like social work must confront the
vexing question: What does social justice require? This paper
examines the official response of the National Association of
Social Workers (NASW), and asks: What model of social justice
does it proclaim, and is it just enough? The paper clarifies the
nature and scope of the model of social justice subscribed to by
the Association, and contends that it must be certain that it represents the most robust, comprehensive and generous scheme
possible. Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice offers such a possibility.
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To fully comprehend the gravity of the NASWs response, a cursory survey of theories of social justice is first in order.

A Sense of Social Justice
A sense of justice is, according to John Rawls (1971), an innate
capacity and natural proclivity. Nevertheless, as Marc Hauser
(2006) explains, while each of us is endowed with a moral faculty,
i.e., a capacity that enables us to automatically generate seemingly universal, albeit often unconscious, judgments concerning justice, this is subject to parametric variation in respect to
culture, circumstance and time. If this is so, then, regrettably,
our sense of justice and capacity to act on it is by no means uniform. Moreover, we can simply choose to ignore our more just
insights in the quest for personal gain (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002).
History reveals the litany of grave injustices that attest to the
powerful impulse towards the satisfaction of self rather than
mutual interests. Normative systems of social justice have been
developed to curtail the excesses inherent in idiosyncratic, i.e.,
private or privileged, schemes.

Systems of Social Justice
In essence, normative systems of social justice are based on
general rules that set out what constitutes the right thing to do
and a good life in addition to the institutional arrangements required for optimizing the attainment of these (Vanderschraaf,
2011). Despite the importance of achieving this aim, there is a
surprisingly limited range of available systems. They are to a
large extent mutually exclusive and posit organizing principles that not only vary, but may also be incompatible with each
other, in both theory and practice. There is, as a consequence,
considerable variation in the substance, scope and outcome of
social justice afforded by them. At the very least, they can be
either “thick” or “thin” (Walzer, 1994; Williams, 1995).
Thin conceptualizations are based on rudimentary and
commonplace constituents of social justice. Although they are
undeniably limited and narrow, thin forms of social justice are,
nevertheless, neither simplistic nor inconsequential. As Michael Walzer (1994) pointed out, “there isn’t much that is more
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important than ‘justice,’ minimally understood” (p. 6). Indeed,
this is justice “close to the bone” (Walzer, p. 6). Thick models of
social justice, by contrast, are more comprehensive and pluralistic. They attempt to encompass differences in subjective interest
and cultural expression.
Thinner rather than thicker schemes become most apparent
in the face of gross injustice. Deceit, murder, torture, enslavement and tyranny are paradigmatic atrocities recognized as
unjust in most, if not all, social orders, for reasons unconnected
with contrasting shades of cultural meanings or shared understandings of what is right or good. But, minimalism is not, as
Walzer (1994) made clear, foundational. “Minimalism makes for
a certain limited, though important and heartening solidarity,
but it doesn’t make for a full-blooded universal doctrine” (Walzer, 1994, p. 11). Once again, this constraint serves to narrow the
range of available options.

Thick, Thicker, and Thickest Social Justice
“To ask whether a society is just,” Michael Sandel (2010) posits:
is to ask how it distributes the things it prizes—income and
wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices
and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right
way; it gives each person his or her due. The hard questions
begin when we ask what people are due, and why. (p. 19)

There are essentially three approaches to the question of the just distribution of goods: virtue, welfare and freedom. Each of these normbased models of distributive social justice varies in thickness.
Social Justice as Virtue
Of the three ideal forms, social justice as virtue is perhaps
the thinnest. Derived from Aristotelian and Platonic origins, it
rests on the cultivation of virtues that are deemed excellent and
merit recognition, reward and emulation. Virtue-based social
justice attempts to ensure that people get what they deserve.
Just desert is virtually dependent on one’s character. Thus, a just
outcome is one in which each recipient benefits in proportion to
his or her desert.
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The notion that a just society ought to affirm particular virtues
and conceptions of a decent life based upon these, has an intuitive and, despite its antiquarian origins, popular appeal. “There
is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and
wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to virtue” (Rawls, 1971, p. 310).
The ascription of virtue to character has served as justification for discriminating those deserving access to social goods
and services from the undeserving. Few, if any, social service
programs, past or present, are devoid of eligibility criteria requiring value judgments. Workfare programs, for example,
are particularly discerning about the work ethic of the unemployed. Indeed, there are some in social work who insist on
the relevance of virtue, and by extension, merit, in ethical decision-making (Dolgoff, Harrington, & Loewenberg, 2012).
This ideal of social justice has inspired political movements
from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other. As Sandel (2010) argues, the notion of virtue is just as likely to find favor
among the Taliban as it is to the Moral Majority. However, apart
from the significant difficulty involved in distinguishing merit
from legitimate expectations, which even ardent conservatives
like Thomas Sowell (1999) admit is insurmountable, the idea of
making the distribution of social justice contingent on virtue,
however refined, would seem anathema to liberal societies, as
it risks lapsing into intolerance, coercion and blame. Social justice derived from, and dispensed on, the basis of intrinsic worth
and moral desert guarantees a maldistribution of social goods.
It privileges individual virtue and ignores institutional vice in
remedying cases of injustice (Young, 2011). Surely, virtue is, and
ought to remain, its own reward?
Social Justice as Welfare
Approaches to social justice that focus on welfare constitute
a radical departure from the narrow confines of an exemplary character. They are instrumental rather than expressive and
rely on reason and rationality as opposed to intuition and aesthetics. The most influential account of why and how welfare
ought to be maximized is utilitarianism (Sandel, 2010). Utilitarianism was founded by the eighteenth century English moral
philosopher and legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1789/1996),
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and expounded upon a century later by his successor, John Stuart Mill (1859/1979). At the core of this doctrine lies a simple and
appealing notion. Simply put, utilitarians posit that the highest
principle of justice is to maximize the overall balance of pleasure over pain and thereby the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Whereas Bentham (1789/1996) recognized no qualitative distinction among pleasures and believed they could all be measured and compared on a single scale, Mill (1861/1979) believed
it was possible to discern higher from lower pleasures—to
assess the quality, not just the quantity or intensity of desires.
However, Mill’s (1861/1979) attempt to recast utilitarianism as a
less calculating and more discriminating doctrine, carried him
well beyond the confines of the utilitarian orthodoxy, and undermined its most redeeming feature, that of impartiality. For
Bentham (1789/1996), it was presumptuous to judge some pleasures as inherently better or worse than others. Rather people’s
preferences were to be taken as given, without passing judgement on their moral worth. To do so would be to return to the
same problem posed by indeterminate virtues. Thus, all preferences count equally. Mill’s (1861/1979) attempt to refine utilitarianism and prevent it from reducing everything to a crude
calculus of pleasure and pain inevitably required a moral ideal
independent of utility itself.
The pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain has, in essence, retained its potency both as a source of motivation and
an end in itself. Utilitarianism continues to be a highly pragmatic doctrine that is entirely focused on promoting whatever proves useful for creating the greatest happiness, or welfare
in contemporary terms, for the greatest number. The means to
happiness, for today’s utilitarians, is prosperity (Sandel, 2010).
Aggregated prosperity makes people better off than they would
otherwise be as individuals, raises their standard of living and
makes the provision of social welfare affordable.
The idea of maximizing welfare by spurring economic
growth has become firmly embedded in free market societies
such ours. However, while utilitarianism has led to prosperity it has been at the expense of deep and widening immiseration. In fact, what was intended to realize the greater, common
good might be said to have resulted in its antithesis. Economic inequality, according to Lawrence, Bernstein and Allegretto
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(2006) is steeper in the United States than in any other democracy. The richest one percent of Americans possess over a third
of the nation’s wealth, more than the combined wealth of the
bottom 90 percent of American families (Lawrence, Bernstein &
Allegretto, 2006). Welfare is undoubtedly becoming less rather
than more extensive.
The fact that utilitarianism lacks moral sentiment means
that it is indiscriminate about how utility is construed. As Peter
Singer (2011) recently reaffirmed, “the classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces happiness for all affected
by it than any alternative action and wrong if it does not,” with
the qualification that “more happiness means net happiness, after deducting any suffering or misery that may also have been
caused by the action.” Hence, a utilitarian will judge lying as
bad in some circumstances and good in others, depending on
its consequences” (pp. 2-3). What is good and what is right, in
other words, is not merely coincidental, it can be contradictory.
John Rawls (1971), for instance, observed that on the utilitarian
view, “slavery, serfdom, and other infractions of liberty,” have
historically been regarded as both right and wrong, good and
bad. According to Rawls (1971):
Whether these institutions are justified is made to depend
upon whether actuarial calculations show that they yield a
higher balance of happiness. To this the utilitarian replies
that the nature of society is such that these calculations are
normally against such denials of liberty. Utilitarians seek to
account for the claims of liberty and equality by making certain standard assumptions. Thus they suppose that persons
have similar utility functions which satisfy the condition of
diminishing marginal utility. (pp. 158–159)

Thus, the rejection of institutional “infractions of liberty and
equality,” should they be recognized as such, are made on utilitarian, and not humanitarian, grounds. According to utilitarian
logic, then, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with torture.
Any objection to it must show that the consequences of practising it, will, taken as a whole, cause more harm than good.
The same turn of logic could also be called upon to support
a radical redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. With
so many having so little and so few possessing so much more
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such a transfer might be calculated to create more happiness
overall. However, utilitarians can simply invoke the Benthamite maxim that “everybody is to count for one, nobody for more
than one” (Mill, 1861/1979), in defense of any qualms about
manifest disparities, and hence, need to redistribute. What matters most in utilitarianism is to maximize, not equalize, the net
distribution of welfare. Thus, the principle of utility licenses
some to forego greater life prospects for the sake of others, particularly among those who are already less favorably situated,
without considering this an injustice.
Social Justice as Freedom
Like social justice as virtue and welfare, social justice as freedom takes the worth of the individual as its starting point. However, it represents a substantial departure from the former in positing that each person has an innate right to freedom, irrespective
of virtue or utility that a just society is bound to respect. However, they are deeply divided over the depth of the entitlement and
value of the liberty conferred. At one extreme are the advocates
of an unfettered right to freedom known as libertarians.
Libertarians insist that a precondition for the exercise of
free agency is the abolition, or at the very least, minimization,
of anything which might contravene the boundaries of personal
entitlement and discretion. They are particularly sensitive to intrusions into private affairs for the purpose of providing public
welfare, and are bitterly opposed to the taxation and redistribution of income and wealth earned through individual thrift,
industry and prudence, to finance it.
Robert Nozick (1974) ranks amongst the most widely known
and influential of libertarian thinkers. Nozick (1974) began his
seminal defence of libertarianism in Anarchy, State and Utopia,
by declaring that “individuals have rights that are so strong and
far-reaching that there are things no person or group, including
the state and its officials, can or may do to them, without violating these rights” (p. ix). He concluded that “a minimal state,
limited to the narrow functions of protection against force,
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified”
(Nozick, 1974, p. ix). Anything more, including being taxed to
help others, is completely unjust; in fact it “is on a par with
forced labour” (p. 169). State services, including enforcement
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and protection, are derived from private contributions. Little
wonder that Nozick (1974) added that “many persons will reject
our conclusions instantly, knowing they don’t want to believe
anything so apparently callous towards the needs and suffering
of others” (p. ix).
Yet, critics have been no more acerbic about the tenets of
libertarianism than Nozick himself. In fact, Nozick (1974) felt
obliged to acknowledge that “many people who take a similar
position are narrow and rigid, and filled paradoxically, with resentment at other freer ways of being” (p. x). He realized that
his kinship with these people placed him in some “bad company” (Nozick, 1974, p. x). Indeed, it put him in the same company
as Milton and Rose Friedman (1980), Friedrich Hayek (1960) and
Ayn Rand (1961). As “bad” as these views are, they have been
taken seriously as ideals of socially just states both at home and
abroad. Indeed, the drive towards realizing pro-market, antigovernment ambitions based on them remains strong.
Fortunately, there is an alternative to the austerity of libertarianism that retains the primacy of liberty tempered by a
sense of fairness. Just states, according to those of a more egalitarian persuasion, John Rawls (1971) being the most prominent
among them, are required to redistribute wealth in order to preserve the basic endowment of liberty. While libertarians consider inequality, unfairness and injustice as the simple facts of
life and urge us to accept and, indeed, take advantage of them,
even if only indirectly, Rawls (1971) reminds us of an equally
unassailable fact, i.e., that the way things are now does not determine the way they may yet be. He added that:
We should reject the contention that the ordering of institutions is always defective because the distribution of natural
talents and the contingencies of social circumstances are unjust, and this injustice must inevitably carry over to human arrangements. Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse
for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal to acquiesce to injustice
is on a par with being unable to accept death. The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons
are born into society at some particular position. These are
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the ways that
institutions deal with these facts. (Rawls, 1971, p. 102)
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Rawls (1971) maintained that given a genuinely equal
chance to decide for themselves, people would consent to principles of social justice that offered the most extensive, equal liberty for all and mitigated impediments, both random and systematic, that proved most decisive in utilizing it, especially for
those most hard done by. Rawls (1971) sought to operationalize
Kant’s (1785/2002) categorical imperative that no one can ever
be used as a means to another’s ends, even for a greater good,
but must always be treated as an end in oneself, and for reasons
that run deeper than it is an inalienable right to self-possession
and interest. For Rawls (1971), as for Kant (1785/2002), freedom,
or more precisely autonomy, was as much a moral as legal right.
Another distinguishing feature of Rawlsian social justice,
based again on Kantian philosophy, is that what is right takes
priority over what is good. This is an essential precedent, since
conceptions of the good can be expected to vary in ways that
right cannot. As Rawls (1971) observed, “it is, in general, a good
thing that individuals’ conception of their good should differ in
significant ways, whereas this is not so for conceptions of right”
(p. 447). In the absence of any common agreement about what
is right, people will have no recourse when things go wrong
in pursuit of their good, as in cases where one’s good is maintained at others’ expense (libertarianism) or is sacrificed for the
common good (utilitarianism).
Nevertheless, social justice as fairness is not without its critics. The most frequent criticism is that Rawls’ (1971) “difference”
principle does not eliminate inequality. Disparity can occur one
way (favoring the worst off) or another (advantaging the better
off) (Dworkin, 2011). However, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice
was not premised on “flat equality” (Dworkin, 2011, p. 346).
Rather, it aimed to ensure that primary goods were distributed
fairly, not squarely, and that the outcome would be to the benefit, rather than detriment, of the least well off.
Others have been more derisive in their criticism. John
Kekes (2007) certainly ranks amongst the harshest of critics. According to Kekes’ (2007):
What Rawls calls justice, denies that people should get what
they deserve, ignores their responsibility for their actions
and economic condition, discounts their efforts, … and …
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systematically deprives people of their legitimately earned income in order to give it to those who have not earned it. (p. 52)

However, Kekes (2007) simply highlights what Rawls (1971) tried
to remedy, i.e., an unequal concern for all individuals. The antipathy of anti-egalitarians like Kekes (2007) to proposals for redistributive schemes of even more modest scope than Rawls’ has already been noted. Whereas Kekes (2007) focuses on the wisdom
or folly of individual choices, Rawls (1971) is concerned about the
interpenetration of choice and circumstance in determining just
outcomes. As Rawls’ (1971) cogently argued, the basic economic, political and social structure that people find themselves in
influences their life prospects as much as their individual transactions. It is important to maintain a focus on the overlap, especially in view of the general shift towards viewing the causes of,
and responsibility for contending with, inequality and injustice
as personal rather than political, in recent times (Young, 2011).
Rawls (1971) attempted to reassert those terms and conditions of
the social contract that the traditional welfare state set out to honor, i.e., fairness, equity and justice for one and all.
Nevertheless, Amartya Sen (2009) claims that Rawls was
only concerned to describe ideally just institutions and was
therefore of no use in guiding the comparative judgments that
need to be made to curb injustice in the real and very imperfect world. Sen (2009) proposed “capabilities,” i.e., things people
can do and be with some assistance (see pp. 18-19) as a more
useful, down-to-Earth alternative. These capabilities are life,
bodily health and integrity, sense, imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, play, control over one’s environment and other species (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). On close
inspection, however, capabilities turn out to be far more elusive
and of less practical value than anything Rawls suggested. Indeed, Sen (2009) concedes:
even in terms of the Rawlsian characterization of distinct
problems of justice, capability is a rival only to the use of primary goods (i.e., ‘rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and above all self-respect’ [Rawls,
1971] p. 62)]) in judging relative advantages … and that leaves
out other issues, including the place of personal freedom and
the need for fair procedures. (p. 297)
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Contrary to Sen (2009), Rawls’ (1971) principles of justice were
tailor made for comparative “real world” judgments. Indeed,
there is a burgeoning literature describing various applications
of Rawls’ theory to actual concrete political controversies. (Simply type “Rawls” and a qualifier into a Google search for a sample of these.)
Even sympathizers of Rawls’ justice as fairness complain
about the shortcomings of his theory of justice. A common complaint is that Rawls’ theory is insufficiently egalitarian. They
declare that it is better that everyone has the same wealth, and
so share a common fate, even if that meant less material wealth
all round (Dworkin, 2011). Rawls (1971) certainly advocated a
complex, as opposed to simple, form of equality in the distribution of primary goods. However, these were to be divided evenly unless an unequal difference in the distribution of any one,
or all, of these goods was to everyone’s advantage. Although
his vision remains hypothetical, it is arguably the thickest and
most practical conception of redistributive social justice currently vying for our collective attention.

Social Work and Social Justice
The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) considers social justice to be a core value. Challenging social injustice
is one of a number of principles listed in the NASWs original
(1996) and revised (2008) Code of Ethics. The NASW (1996/2008)
makes it clear that the Code is relevant to all students and practitioners of social work regardless of function, context or clientele
(NASW, 1996/2008). Although it is not listed in lexical order, the
NASW does not rank the significance of social justice above or
below other core values. In fact, the Association points out that
it is reasonable to expect that the place of social justice will alter
in the face of value conflicts. Of course, the trade-off between
social justice and other values makes knowing what may be lost
and gained as a consequence of the particular approach taken
to it all the more imperative.
The NASW (1996/2008) states that in challenging social injustice:
Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on
behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups
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of people. Social workers’ social change efforts are focused
primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek
to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression
and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers strive to ensure access to needed information, services, and resources;
equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in decision making for all people (p. 8).

The statement of principle is not definitive about the type of
social justice that social workers are encouraged to pursue. This
is a critical omission in light of the relative “thickness” of various approaches. While accessibility, partnership, publicity, and
diversity in challenging a lack of social and political capital are
alluded to in the statement, none of these values is precluded
from conceptions of social justice as thin as libertarianism. Even
the notion of “social change” has limited application insofar as
it seeks to achieve more awareness of oppression and pluralism
generally. A conspicuous omission is any explicit mention of redistribution. The inclusion of this distinguishing feature would
certainly reduce any ambiguity. In any event, despite its relative
significance, no further statement is made about the principle of
social justice. One is, therefore, compelled to look at the imbrication of other values and parts of the Code to supplement this
meagre description.
According to the Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics, the “principles and standards must be applied by individuals of good
character who discern moral questions and, in good faith, seek
to make reliable ethical judgments”(p. 7) One might infer from
this statement that the Association subscribes to a conception of
social justice that is virtue based. However, this must simply remain a possibility since nothing more is said about “character.”
The Code lists four other values alongside social justice. These
are Service limiting workers’ self-interests (p. 8), the importance
of human relationships emphasising partnerships (p. 9), integrity urging fidelity and ethical conduct, competence focusing on
professional development (p. 9), and the dignity and worth of the
person encouraging mindfulness of, and respect for, difference
and diversity (p. 8). The latter also asks social workers to enhance client self-determination (NASW, 1996/2008, p. 10). However, workers are advised that clients’ capacity and prospects for
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self-determination are subject to compromise. Such advice begins to chart the direction of social justice. The status accorded
personal freedom in the principle of self-determination is consistent with formulations of social justice that regard liberty as
negotiable. Only libertarians hold liberty to be sacrosanct.
The standard of ethical behavior expected of social workers
help to further illuminate the nature of social justice (NASW,
1996/2008, p. 20). These standards refer to social workers’ ethical
responsibilities as professionals, in practice settings, to clients,
colleagues and the profession. The notion of rights is a prominent feature. The standards make it clear that social workers
have a responsibility to protect and promote clients’ individual,
legal rights. Rights figure in all but virtue-based theories of social justice. However, according to the Code, respect for rights,
like liberty, can be tempered. Once again, only libertarians consider rights to be inviolable. There are, nevertheless, two notable
points of distinction. Social workers ought to advocate “within
and outside their agencies for adequate resources to meet clients’ needs, and allocation procedures that are open and fair …
and based on appropriate and consistently applied principles”
(NASW, 1996/2008 ss. 3.07a & b respectively). They “should also
engage in social and political action to ensure that all people
have equal access to the resources, employment, services, and
opportunities they require to meet their basic human needs
and to develop fully” (NASW, 1996/2008, s. 6.04). Both points
are, at the very least, compatible with conceptions of social justice based on redistribution. However, reliance on fairness and
equal access as distributive principles distinguish this from
utilitarian forms of social justice. Nevertheless, they still fall
short of such egalitarian schemes as Rawls’. Access to resources
is not synonymous with provision, and equality, as has been
argued, is neither practical nor desirable. In fact, as Rawls (1971)
and others (Dworkin, 2011 and Young, 2011, in particular) have
cogently argued, equality rivals fairness in profoundly unjust
ways. What, then, does social justice require?

Which Social Justice?
If social work is troubled about falling into bad company,
and seeks to defy current convention, then it is obliged to pursue the thickest form of social justice available. Social work
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would do worse than attempt to operationalize Rawls’ theory of
justice. Rawls’ (1971) model of social justice is one of a very few
with sufficient substance and promise to be capable of mounting a serious challenge to the minimization of state responsibility for individual freedom and public welfare. It is, nonetheless,
still not perfect.
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Will We Build A Wall?
Fear of Mexican/Latino Immigration
in U.S. History
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A presidential election was won on the strength of a nativist philosophy
which asserts that the U.S. must build a wall of separation with its closest neighbor to the South. The current president has voiced not only his
frustration and prejudices but the nativist sentiments of the public. The
emphasis on “building the wall” and the antagonism expressed towards
Mexico have deepened the centuries-old sense of fear and separation felt
by members of the Mexican/Latino immigrant group. Can we look at
history in search of plausible explanations? This paper examines past
and contemporary reasons that might explain the observable antagonism
to the Mexican/Latino population in the U.S. today.    
Key words: immigration, U.S. Mexicans, nativism, ethnocentrism, historical discrimination, civil rights
A presidential election has just been won on the strength of
a nativist philosophy that asserts that the U.S. must build a wall
of separation with its closest neighbor to the South. President
Trump’s anti-Mexican statements during the campaign and after the inauguration have been amply chronicled by the television and the press in 2017. The dangers of President Trump’s
rhetoric and performance are clearer after one year of his presidency than they were before. As he himself states, he has not
“evolved” in understandings (Sullivan, Haberman, & Davis,
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2018). When his Chief of Staff attempted to soften some of his
prior statements, the president responded to his political base:
“the wall is the wall, it has never changed or evolved from the
first time I conceived of it … The wall will be paid for directly
or indirectly … by Mexico…” (Sullivan et al., 2018, para. 4). He
was relentless in his contradiction of his Chief of Staff, who had
said that “a 50 foot wall from sea to shining sea isn’t what we’re
going to build” (Sullivan et al., 2018, para. 14). The President was
giving voice to his frustration and prejudices as he captured
what many citizens still wanted to hear. Given these feelings
among the public—that many liberals may have thought had
been overcome—the time is ripe for looking at history in search
of plausible explanations for such an ingrained anti-Mexican
sentiment. This paper will examine past and contemporary reasons that might explain the observable antipathy to the Mexican/Latino population in the U.S. today.

The Historical Roots of Anti-Mexican Attitudes
Many people associate anxiety about Mexican/Latino immigration in the U.S. exclusively with very recent Mexican and
Latin American migrations. This is not the case. In the 15th Century, at the same time that the Spanish were settling in Mexico
and other parts of North America, the British, the Dutch and
the French were also trying to compete for lands in the continent. The Black Legend about the Spanish “race” as a “brutal,
sanguinary and sadistic” group of abusers was being propagated and taking root (Fuentes, 1992, p. 132). Even decades later, in
the colonial territories, those who were moving inland, heirs
to the Puritan thinking about the Spanish influence, sensed according to De León (1987) “an ‘errand into the wilderness’ and
felt a compelling need to control all that was beastly—sexuality,
vice, nature, and colored peoples [sic]” (p. 1).
Order and discipline had to be rescued from the wilds in the
name of civilization and Christianity. Moving westward with
this mission uppermost in their minds, whites psychologically needed to subdue the external world—forests, beasts, and
other peoples—for the rational had to be ever in command.
(De León, 1987, p. 1)
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Today, the anxiety and fear of Mexicans persists after centuries
and many waves of migrants.

The Spanish Legacy: A Long-focus-lens View
Spanish explorers were “the first Europeans to traverse
much of the United States” (Daniels, 1990, p. 96) before the frequently described arrival of the Pilgrims to Plymouth Rock in
1569. After his ship wrecked in 1536, Cabeza de Vaca walked
across what is now the western country from Galveston, Texas
to Culiacan in Mexico. From the city of Santa Barbara in Mexico,
the Spanish explorers and missionaries were lured north into
what are today New Mexico and Arizona. New Mexico was settled in 1598 (in fact, before the founding of Jamestown in Massachusetts in 1610). From Santa Barbara in Mexico, “Spain hurried
to lay claim to Texas” for at least two reasons: to resist threats
from the French and to Christianize the Caddo Indians in the
“kingdom of Teja,” ca, 1680s (Iber & De León, 2006, p. 57. See
also Stewart & De León, 1993).
The founding of St. Augustine by Pedro Menéndez de
Avilés in 1565 provided an entry for Spain to respond militarily to French Huguenot settlement in South Carolina (Daniels,
1990). Florida was in Spanish hands for over two centuries from
1565 to 1819. At the same time the Spanish were settling in Mexico and other parts of North America, the British, the Dutch and
the French were also trying to compete for lands in the continent. The Spaniards had established themselves in Cuba, where
“encomiendas” had been developing. Bartolomé de las Casas,
who had been an “encomendero,” began speaking out against
the treatment that representatives of the Spanish Crown were
giving Indians. De las Casas became a Dominican Friar and
moved to Mexico, where he continued to speak out indicting
the Spaniards for their behavior. His indictments quickly became the bases for a broadly encompassing Black Legend about
the Spanish “race.”
In 1769, Junípero Serra founded twenty-one missions in California and the accompanying regiment to his expedition established a fort in San Diego (Daniels, 1990). And these locations
were only the most significant ones. Except for Florida, New
Mexico, Arizona, California, parts of Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma and Kansas remained part of Mexico until 1848
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when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo annexed them after the
U.S. War with Mexico. Florida was acquired after many years
of disputes and negotiations in 1819. In the west and southwest
of the U.S., the Spanish/Mexican population was not, for a very
long time, an immigrant population but rather an autochthonous one.
An atmosphere permeated very early that transferred the
sentiments towards the Spaniards to the Spanish/Mexicans
once the first had left. The cruelty ascribed to the Spanish colonists also existed among other colonists but the fears that the
Black Legend had spread among Anglos fueled attitudes specifically about Mexicans, which were different from the attitudes
about other foreign nationals arriving in the U.S. Rosales (1997)
describes this entrenched Anglo attitude:
Anglo-Americans held negative views even before confronting Mexicans on New Spain frontiers where the encounter
itself deepened prejudices and provided at least one important rationale for ‘Manifest Destiny.’ The violence of the Texas
Rebellion and the Mexican War further fueled the antipathy.
(Rosales, 1997, p. 5)

Additionally, with the arrival of African slaves to the new
world, racism took complete hold of the minds and hearts of the
White population. Racist attitudes in the U.S. persisted from the
antebellum South until the Civil Rights movement and beyond.
Even today, we can easily identify them in many policies, if not
federal, passed by state legislatures. Racist attitudes and policies
colored immigration in the U.S. from the start as illustrated by
the “yellow peril” legend forbidding Chinese immigrants and
by the internment of Japanese American citizens during WWII.
Texas played an important role in shaping the attitudes
of Anglos toward Mexicans. In 1821 the Mexican government
granted the Missourian entrepreneur Moses Austin colonization rights in Texas. He and his son Stephen and hundreds of
followers moved into Texan territory. Austin’s ambitions included “his sole and only desire … to redeem it from the wilderness—to settle it with an intelligent, honorable and enterprising people” (Stephen Austin, quoted by de León, 1987, p. 3).
De León further comments that it was clear that Austin’s and
other politicians’ desire was to Americanize Texas, “settled by
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a population that will harmonize with their neighbors on the
East, in language, political principles, common origin, sympathy, and even interest” (de León, 1987, p. 3). In other words, the
Americanization of Texas did not have room for native Mexicans who were deemed neither civilized nor capable of being
anything other than field hands. However, current scholarship
shows that Mexicans were never peripheral to their history, particularly in Texas, where they participated actively in state and
local government and “undertook a conscious effort to modernize the society of Texas” after the Texas war for independence in
1836 (Stewart & de León, 1993, p. 99).
In looking for historical explanations of the disdain with
which Mexican immigrants are regarded, one cannot ignore
the early religious clashes between Roman Catholicism (Spain
and its colonies being the main inheritors) and Henry VIII. The
English saw the Spanish as heartless, and Spanish and Spanish Americans as the embodiment of racial impurity, exemplified by mestizaje with the Moors and the Indians. In Protestant
Christianity they saw native Catholicism as pagan and demonic. Although the anti-Catholic feelings in colonial America were
to some extent rhetorical because few members of the public
had ever seen a Catholic, they persisted with unusual strength.
By the end of the colonial period in the Eastern border, there
were “only about 25,000 practicing Catholics … and almost all
of those in Pennsylvania and Maryland” (Daniels, 1990, p. 109).
Another major factor that persisted far beyond the colonial
period, and can even be detected today, is hostility to the language. The maintenance of the English language became a much
stronger issue in the new nation. After the annexation of the
various Spanish territories in the Southwest, Spanish remained
predominant in many areas. For example, Rosales (1997) states
that Texan local politicians delivered speeches in both English
and Spanish well into the early 20th century, and of course the
New Mexican legislature conducted business in Spanish until they became a state. Part of the statehood discussions as to
whether New Mexico and Arizona could be joined pivoted on
language and what the Arizonians called “racial differences.”
Arizonian’s fears were summarized in a protest presented to
Congress in 1906, which suggested that any amalgamation
with New Mexico had little chance of success. Finally, by 1912,
after a long and protracted debate over language in Congress,
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President Taft signed the New Mexico Statehood Proclamation.
This proclamation settled, at least temporarily, the language issue, as it recognized the state’s constitution, which stated: “For
the first twenty years after this constitution goes into effect all
laws passed by the legislature shall be published in both the English and Spanish languages” (State of New Mexico, 1911/2017,
Art. XX–12).

Nativism and Flooding Immigration
The financial panic of 1873 began an anti-immigrant period
that was to last almost until WWII. Labor strikes, unemployment and overall financial distress were serious problems. In
1894, a group of Harvard graduates formed the Immigration
Restriction League, a pressure group that argued for fundamental changes in the immigration policies.
According to one of its founders, Prescott F. Hall, the question for Americans to decide was whether they wanted their
country ‘to be peopled by British, German and Scandinavian
stock, historically free, energetic, progressive, or by Slav, Latin and Asiatic races historically downtrodden, atavistic and
stagnant.’ (Daniels, 1990, p. 276)

Within the spirit of restricting immigration, a large number of
bills made their way through Congress (1895, 1897,1913,1915),
sometimes getting to the presidents, who typically vetoed them,
until 1917. These bills had a common theme, which was literacy.
Presidents Grover Cleveland, Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson
stated, as many do today, that the U.S needed labor and that the
immigrants were here to do work Americans did not want to do.
(Yet, as we well know today, factual labor needs do not overcome
the assumptions of loss of even undesired employment opportunities experienced by many in the native populations.) A bill was
finally passed in 1917, but by then, European immigration had
decreased due to the war in Europe. The 1917 law was in essence
a literacy bill that was eventually proven not to have had the desired effect of restricting immigration. (Daniels, 1990; Lukens,
2012; U.S. Immigration Legislation Online, n.d.).
In 1910 the Mexican Revolution erupted, and in 1914 WWI
was declared. American soldiers fighting in the War created a
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labor shortage in the U.S. and Mexicans that had been coming to
this country as a consequence of the Mexican Revolution were
encouraged to work in the USA. The restrictive 1917 Immigration
Law did not fundamentally affect residents of some countries of
the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America because, in
spite of the literacy restrictions in the bill, waivers were given
for temporary agricultural and railroad workers. However, the
restrictive measures emboldened the nativist spirit that continued to prevail. In 1921, the Emergency Immigration Restriction
Act established an immigration system based on quotas related
to the percentage of the population who had originated in given
countries. However, it provided a loophole for many Europeans
who moved to Western Hemisphere non-quota countries before
coming to the U.S. This led to the laws of 1921 and finally to the
Act of 1924 which related quotas and birthplace (McSeveney,
1987). The way quotas were determined favored the Northern
European countries that had been represented in the U.S. population for a long time. In a recent New York Times article, Stapinski
(2017) vividly discusses the consequences of the 1924 immigration Act that closed doors for the poorest and neediest Italians.
As we have just seen, during the peak of the Nativist debate, Mexican laborers had been granted temporary entry to
work primarily, but not exclusively, in the fields. However, after
1924, the Immigration and Naturalization Service tightened the
enforcement of border crossings, and Mexicans were often deported without due process. The 1929 Immigration Act was a
victory of nativists and resulted in the deportation not only of
Mexican nationals but of many native Mexican-Americans from
industrial cities like Chicago where they had been working in
the car industries. As the economic situation deteriorated, the
popular imagery and the political talk often referred to “halfbreeds” and many other racial epithets and criticized their inability to become citizens.
Between 1929 and 1936, at least six hundred thousand Mexican
nationals and their children, many of whom were born in the
U.S., returned to Mexico—this represented about one third of
the U.S. Mexican population. Economic downturns had been
a constant factor in their lives, but nothing compared to the
suffering created by this crisis. (Rosales, 1997, p. 49)
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The Bracero Program
Between 1942 and 1965, a very important development took
place. Given the scarcity of labor created by WWII, the U.S. and
Mexican governments signed a formal agreement for the recruitment of workers. There were two types of workers recruited by the so called Bracero Agreement. Part of the agreement
was for agricultural workers. As part of the agreement, 4.6 million contracts were issued between 1943 and 1965. The second
part of the agreement related to railroad maintenance workers,
and 69,000 authorizations were issued between 1943 and 1945
(Alarcón, 2011). The important thing to remember in relation
to this government-to-government agreement is that both the
U.S and Mexico promised to apply the protections of the law
(labor laws, public health, fair treatment, etc.) to the “bracero”
workers. The governments also agreed to withdraw a certain
amount of savings (about 10%) from the workers’ salaries. These
monies would be returned to the workers at the end of the contract, generally by the Mexican government. However, no savings were initially returned and the controversy over the issue
continued until a settlement was reached in a California court
in 2008 (Belluck, 2008). The final blow to the Bracero Agreement
was dealt by the U.S and the Mexican governments when, in
1947, they targeted for return undocumented immigrants from
California and Texas. Finally, in 1954, through Operation Wetback, more than one million workers from the West Coast were
deported. Many other laws and mass deportations followed in
the 1950s, targeting undocumented workers, but the impact of
the “braceros” became indelibly registered in the public psyche.
Another important variable which was a determinant of the
historical discrimination towards Mexicans, and to some extent of their self-perception, was the conflicting messages sent
by the Bureau of the Census in its counting practices and the
equally conflicting messages sent by some of the early Latino
organizations in relation to race among Mexican Americans.
The first time the Census identified Mexicans in its population
counts was in 1930. Until 1920, the Census had not identified
Mexicans; however, the enumerators tended to note the presence of Spanish surnamed “mulatos” in the Western States
(Ortiz & Telles, 2012, p. 4). The 1930 Census provided specific
instructions for the counting of Mexicans, identifying them as
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a very mixed group belonging primarily, if not totally, to the
laboring classes. According to Ortiz and Telles (2012), the use of
‘laborers’ in the first line of the Census instructions “suggests
that class may have played a role into the use of Mexican in
that laborers might have been classified as Mexican but higher
status Mexicans might have been classified as White” (Ortiz &
Telles, 2012, p. 4). This caused the Mexican government and the
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) to protest
about using Mexican as a racial category, and from there on, until the 1980 Census which allowed for self-identification, Mexicans who may have marked “other” in the Census form were
classified as White. In looking at the LULAC advocacy effort,
one may say that it was based more on pragmatic rather than
unprejudiced considerations.
An interesting significant event, which involved a number
of well-known civil rights attorneys and LULAC in the post
WWII period, addressed race/class classification in a criminal
case which made it to the Supreme Court. The case, Hernandez
v. the State of Texas, was about a migrant cotton picker accused
of murder in a small town in Jackson County, Texas. The lead
defense attorney, Gustavo Garcia,
envisioned the Hernandez case as a challenge to the systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican origin from all types of
jury duty in at least seventy counties in Texas. It was not surprising to him when Hernandez was found guilty and the
decision was upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
(Allsup, 2010, para. 1)

When the Supreme Court finally heard the case in January, 1954,
under Chief Justice Warren, the defense attorney, Garcia, argued
that the 14th Amendment guaranteed protection not only on
the basis of race but of class. The State of Texas contended that
the 14th Amendment covered only race, Whites and Blacks, not
class, and that Mexican Americans were White—at least at that
moment. However, the Supreme Court, ordering the reversal of
conviction, “accepted [recognized] the concept of distinction by
class, that is, between white and Hispanic, and found that when
laws produced unreasonable and different treatment on such
basis [class differences], the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection is violated” (Allsup, 2010, para. 2). This was a great
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triumph for the concept of “other white” applied to Mexicans, a
concept that persisted until the 1970s.
These changing classifications fueled Mexicans’ own problematic definition of self and influenced the public images of the
group. Given the complex intersection of race, ethnicity, class,
gender, and other dimensions in the modern world, it is not surprising to find that members of many groups find themselves
confused by the Census and sometimes the courts, which, by
default, required until very recently single classifications. The
question of any individual’s racial classification among Hispanics is left to the individual. “What am I?” a person would ask.
The answer could be Hispanic and White, for example, or Hispanic and Black, etc.

Does History Explain the Continued Disdain
and Fear of the Mexican Immigrant?
Although the history of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. has
been characterized by complicated policies since there was a
border, the history of other groups can be said to be similarly
complex. However, disdain appears to have remained unabated
for Mexicans even though, in many cases, they had been fluidly
moving across the diffused southern border of the U.S. since
1848. It must be recognized that Filipinos, Chinese and Japanese Americans were also victims of discrimination and repatriation, but after WWII, and after the Civil Rights efforts, their
situation was much improved.
After WWII, Mexicans and Latinos had continued their
struggle, primarily in the area of land rights and the labor front,
struggle that gave rise the most significant Chicano civil rights
movement of contemporary times. The 1960s was a time of civil rights struggle. The movement involved many leaders and
many goals, ranging from the struggle for the rights of workers
(led by César Chávez) to the return of land in New Mexico (led
by Reies Lopez Tijerina). Reies Tijerina took a bold approach
with the Alianza Federal de las Mercedes that proposed separatism and militancy on the bases of lost land and language. César
Chavez, the icon of today, a Ghandi-like leader, focused on the
defense of the work place. Strikes and unionization, which had
not been the tools of migrant workers before, became the call

Chapter
Will
We Title
Build A Wall?

167

of Chávez’ resistance. For César Chávez, the Braceros, who
continued to enter the U.S. providing cheap labor for the agricultural fields, represented an unrelenting impediment to the
improvement of the living and working conditions of the Chicanos already living here. Iber and De León (2006) state that “for
millions of ordinary Americans, mostly oblivious to the terrible
plight of migrant workers, the activities and efforts of the late
César Chávez (and, ultimately, those of the United Farm Workers, the UFW) served as an introduction to the Chicano/a movement” (pp. 266–267). Chicanos had entered the public discourse.
As long as there were unorganized Mexicans who followed the
crops in the West, there was plenty of room for disdain, disempowerment and rejection. The harsh living conditions in which
these workers lived and labored insured the perpetuation of
poverty, poor education, isolation, bad health conditions, etc.,
all of which created a caste-like group, a target of unjustifiable
rejection. Today, in spite of progress and changing public attitudes, many examples of continued rejection are endorsed from
the highest levels of government.
Alarcón (2011) suggests a circular migration pattern for
undocumented workers across a porous border. The flow of
temporary workers continued even after Operation Wetback
in 1954. It was clear that the border was porous and that any
control of immigration would require legislation. Up to 1968,
Mexicans were able to enter the U.S. without numerical restriction (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002). However, in 1968, the
Western Hemisphere cap of 120,000 was applied, and Mexicans
had to compete for a limited number of visas. But Massey et al.
(2002) also suggest that the hemispheric limitations coincided
with the end of the Bracero program that had provided temporary opportunities to many agricultural workers. Thus, the
limitations imposed on Mexicans were felt very keenly, and illegality became a real (and perhaps the only) option for a country
with a long history of labor exchanges with the U.S.
Many other important pieces of legislation followed the
1968 measures and restricted the number of legal entries from
Mexico and Latin America (e.g., the 1976 country-based quotas;
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, IRCA, and many
others). No one expected the dire repercussions of these policies. Scholars comment on the paradoxical nature of the U.S.
immigration policies which were not intended “to create a large
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undocumented Latino population living north of the border,”
but which unleashed a chain of events with compounding dire
effects through a succession of positive and negative measures
(Massey & Pren, 2012, p. 6). The exponential growth of the Latino population between 1970 and 2010 was often ascribed only
to the undocumented, and that situation caused tremendous
damage to the legality of Mexican/Latino immigrants.
César Chávez’s explanation still provides a valid rationale
for the negativism experienced by the immigrant Mexican today: as long as there is heavy movement of people across the
border who can be easily exploited for their labor, it will continue to be possible to devalue natives, old-time residents, and
recent arrivals.

The Latino Threat Narrative
The large and continued number of Mexicans and other
Latin Americans entering the U.S, often undocumented, had
become a preoccupation of the public even before 2001. The September 11, 2001 attack, although not related to Latinos, brought
about the reappearance of overt anti-immigrant sentiments
that, while focusing on the Muslim population, quickly spread
to all immigrants. Immigration problems became recurrent in
the public narrative. In 2008, the economic crisis intensified anti-immigrant public feelings. Mexicans and Hispanics were associated primarily with labor areas where unemployment was
high (construction, hospitality industries, service professions,
and others). This aggravated the hostility of low paid native
workers. Yet, the immigrant population, particularly of illegals
from Mexico and Latin America, continued to grow, and by
2010, reached 50.5 million. Rather than attempting to find real
solutions, a demonization of the Hispanic population generally (not exclusively the Mexican) emerged in very public ways.
These sentiments were exploited to garner political support and
agency resources, as examples for border security and control.
The result was a self-perpetuating cycle in which rising border apprehensions were manipulated to produce a conservative reaction that demanded more enforcement measures,
which in turn produced more apprehensions, which then
produced more conservatism and even harsher enforcement
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measures, which generated more apprehensions (Massey &
Pren, 2012, p. 6).

But as we have discussed, it was not hard to blame Hispanics, whether Mexican or others. Their very presence fueled
old notions of criminals, sex offenders, drug dealers and other
people living outside the law. Specific cases of a criminal act
were reported, and the public clamored for radical measures
to be taken against this “despised” group which was living in
the midst of white America. For example, in August 2016, Time
Magazine reported Trump stating that “When Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best … . They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems [to] us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime.
They’re rapists.” And, attempting to soften the statements, he
added: “And some, I assume, are good people” (Reilly, 2016,
pp. 3, 7). The narrative was intense and journalists spoke of a
drowning of the culture, alien hordes, and the flooding of the
U.S. (Andreas, 2000; Chávez, 2001). Massey and Pren (2012) have
suggested that it is not easy to document the rise of xenophobia
because it is not asked in surveys, but they trace it to the rise of
border apprehensions and the rise of conservatism in the U.S.,
which are reliably measured. Reporting the results of a recent
Gallup survey, McCarthy (2015) suggests that “the treatment of
Hispanics, particularly of immigrants, takes on special significance as the nation continues to debate immigration reform” (p.
4). Very pointedly, he reports on the gravity of the issue which
has been highlighted by Donald Trump, not only during his
presidential election campaign, but also as his presidency began and executive measures were implemented.

The Current Situation in the U.S.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2011), the number of
immigrants annually leaving Mexico for the U.S. declined by
60% between 2006 and 2010. A decline was also reported by the
Migration Policy Institute in 2016, which stated:
In the last decade and a half, the Mexican share among all
immigrants dropped from 29.5% in 2000 to 27.6% in 2014 …
Mexico is no longer the top origin country among the most
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recent immigrants to the U.S. In 2013, China and India overtook Mexico as the most common countries of origin of immigrants who have resided in the U.S. for one year or less.
Furthermore, more Mexican immigrants have returned to
Mexico than have migrated to the U.S. since the end of the
2007–2009 Great Recession. (Zong & Batalova, 2016, pp. 1–2)

This decline, however, did not alter the anti-immigrant public
discourse brought about by the political campaigns since 2012.
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA 20072012) was the immigration policy that allowed some minors
who entered the country with their undocumented parents to
receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from
deportation and to be eligible for work, study or service in
the armed forces. The cause of these “dreamers,” as they were
known, was highlighted during and after President Obama’s
re-election campaign in 2012. These events activated the same
nativism that had historically plagued the U.S.
In July 2016, a document from the Migration Policy Institute
Transatlantic Council on Migration suggested that anti-immigrant sentiment all over the world is not necessarily changed by
the reality of numbers. Nothing could have been truer for the
status of the Mexican immigrant in the U.S.
Anti-immigrant sentiment does not reliably correspond to an
increase in the volume of newcomers, either in absolute or
relative terms. Sharp reaction—such as significant legislative
changes, symbolic signs of exclusion (e.g., banning minarets),
and (in extreme instances) anti-immigrant violence—have
occurred in places without large or sudden increases in the
immigrant population. Meanwhile, several countries and regions that have recently received sizeable unexpected inflows
have not experienced social disorder. (Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 6)

During the 2016 presidential campaign, the fear and anxiety
about Mexican and Latin American immigrants reached peak
expression in the language of Donald Trump, who aspired to
tailor his message to large numbers of displaced workers whose
situation had deteriorated in the past decade. A 2016 MPI report suggested that “economic concerns that lead to the perception of immigrants as competition for scarce resources and

Chapter
Will
We Title
Build A Wall?

171

opportunities … can be particularly acute in areas less accustomed to migration and where segments of the native population are experiencing economic hardship” (Papademetriou
& Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 1). This clearly played out in the
election in 2016, as Trump’s message appeared to make an impact upon his intended target audience.
The nativist discourse of the current President of the U.S.
is frequently offensive to American citizens’ values, but crowd
approval of many aggrieved workers fuels his slogans. The anti-immigrant and pointedly anti-Latino views were evident in
his comments on former candidate Jeb Bush, whom Trump said
had to “like the Mexican illegals because of his wife” (Kaplan,
2015, para. 2). Unfortunately, Trump’s constant harping on the
border wall and his apparent conviction that Mexico would pay
for it continued to ignite the nativist flames of his followers. But
beyond personal insults, even before Trump’s election, Mexico
was the target of inaccurate public speech intended to humiliate. Mexican immigrants were framed as usurpers of American
jobs, even though the business community attempted to correct
the record, suggesting that immigrants were doing jobs that
Americans would not or could not do.
Another point to which we have referred in the historical
narrative was that the American public at large had never fundamentally acknowledged the contributions of Latinos, particularly Mexicans immigrants and their descendants, to the
culture and fiber of the U.S. (Fuentes, 1992; Griswold del Castillo & de León, 1996; Sheridan, 1986). As César Chávez feared,
the Mexican immigrant, unlike the European, had been seen
as a laborer (a bracero) and little else (Rosales, 1997). Even today, Mexican immigrants are seldom the object of admiration
in the way that other immigrants are recognized when “pulling themselves up by their bootstraps.” Some efforts of Latino
actors are recognized and gain a level of popular support and
understanding (e.g., Edward J. Olmos’s Films, such as Stand and
Deliver [Labunka, Law, & Muska, 1998]) but they are often popular because of the actor’s stardom. Even the “dreamers” who
have become well-known because of their accomplishments
now worry about their future. The issue of ending the protections of DACA reached unforeseen proportions with the “shutting down of the government” in January 2018.
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Various Forms of Remediation Were Attempted
During the Civil Rights period, the issue of broadening the
basis of the Chicano movement beyond the plight of the agricultural workers had been pursued by Reies Tijerina with the
Alianza Federal de las Mercedes (1963–1970). The aliancistas had always been more openly combative in pursuits beyond the rights
of workers. They wanted lands returned and had some success
when El Chamizal, the disputed border area of the Rio Grande,
was returned to Mexico in 1963 through a treaty signed by Presidents Kennedy and Lopez Mateo. Chávez had looked towards
the unions as support for the field workers and looked to peaceful means to solve the problems of workers. On the other hand,
some members of the Alianza, Tijerina in particular, upholding a
strong sense of entitlement, believed that confrontation might get
them further afield. The aliancistas projected self-assurance and
did not shy away from confrontation. But they quickly became
associated with violence in the minds of the authorities and the
public tended to reject the perceived strength of their movement.
LULAC (1929—today), the oldest of the Latino organizations, was committed to a more legalistic agenda and weighed
in, as we have seen in the Hernandez case, in civil rights cases.
LULAC attempted to develop a cooperative relationship among
the various Latino, Black and white groups, to develop an agenda for all Latinos and to respond to challenges through a wellthought out platform of political and legal action that has often
been compared to the NAACP. In fact, the cooperation between
LULAC and the NAACP and a number of California attorneys
advanced greatly the cause of school desegregation which had
begun with the well-known California case of Mendez v. Westminster. In a recent book about this little known and successful
case before the CA Supreme Court in 1947, Strum (2010) writes:
All parties agreed that Mexican ancestry, not race … was the
crux of the matter. But counsel for the many parents who
joined in the suit laid the groundwork for a far broader assault on arbitrary classifications and discrimination against
one people because they happened to share a heritage. The
heritage was not only Mexican; it was also Spanish-speaking. For school boards, assumptions about language skills,
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cleanliness, ability to learn, and “Americanness” were code
words for long-established anti-Latin-American prejudices.
Mendez exposed these to the light of social science and law
and found them wanting. (Strum, 2010, p. IX)

What the variety of approaches and philosophies that have been
involved in the long struggle for Mexican recognition shows is
that in spite of the efforts and successes, the Mexican-immigrant
and even the Mexican-American remained more marginalized
and disparaged than other immigrant groups.
While many Latinos were relieved that the 2001 terrorist
attack did not involve any immigrants from the Americas, the
term “immigrant” began to escalate public suspicion. The situation of the Mexican immigrant became further aggravated
with the economic downturn of 2008. Immigrants became the
obvious target of hatred, and Mexicans being the closest, most
numerous and poorest, fitted the public search for a scapegoat.
The building of a wall announced during the 2016 Presidential campaign became a rallying cry for those who had harbored
not just populist philosophies but xenophobic and chauvinistic
points of view. Steve Bannon, until recently one of Trump’s most
influential advisors and driving force behind right wing Breitbart
News, made no bones about banning all immigrants; his ties to
the KKK were never hidden, receiving endorsement by its leader, David Duke. In spite of hopes that Trump’s election would
extinguish the racist fires, now President Trump’s rhetoric and
anti-Hispanic actions could continue unobstructed.
From a post-election vantage point, it has become clear that
candidate Trump’s campaign views about Judge Gonzalo Curiel
of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of California,
or his views on DACA, or the Wall, or for all matters related
to Hispanics, did not necessarily change after his election. His
views about a whole cultural and linguistic tradition continued
to be made explicit in almost daily behavior.
The racism at the core of Trump’s agenda was laid bare when
he pardoned former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was
awaiting a prison sentence for defying a court order that
barred him from racially profiling Latinos. As a result of the
August 25 pardon, Arpaio, who rose to national prominence
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for his anti-immigrant tactics in Maricopa County, will never
be held accountable for his years of unconstitutional conduct.
(Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2018, “Promoting a
racist agenda,” para. 10)

Concluding Comments
Researchers have looked into linguistic differences, religious beliefs, perceived threats to norms and values of the receiving society and many elements that can hinder openness
to immigrants. The general consensus is that no single factor
can be directly correlated to outbreaks of public dissatisfaction
with new arrivals of any immigrant group (Papademetriou &
Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016). And yet, each of those factors appears
with frequency and is used often as explanation for why a particular group is not fitting into the nucleus of a specific society. What the research literature shows is that a predilection for
groups that blend easily into the host society has been a historical and sociological fact.
Nativist and xenophobic dialogues have ebbed and flowed
in the public discourse in the U.S., with different groups being
targets at different historical periods. These historical periods
usually were the result of, or predicted, global crises. For example, the strength of movements such as the KKK or the Know
Nothing Party at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th
Century was a result of primarily southerners losing their grip
on slavery at the same time that they were overwhelmed by
outsiders--Catholics and foreigners, all people deemed different. The sequelae of slavery and the unabated fear of Blacks
has always been a factor that, by extension, served to continue
anti-Mexican sentiments and behaviors. Mexicans were darker
and were viewed as a threat to the expectations of the community. Spikes or “perceived spikes” of undocumented immigrants
can “harden attitudes toward immigration … particularly when
substantial shares … of flow originate from the same country or
sub region” (Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 9), in
this case, Mexico and Latin America.
One can continue to search for explanations of how and
why the negative perceptions about Mexican immigrants have
survived with such persistence. We have shown how Mexicans
in particular have been a targeted immigrant group in the U.S.
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In spite of the fact that, as the popular saying goes, “they did
not really cross the border but the border crossed them,” the
massive size and economic power of the North was a magnet
that caused large numbers of immigrants to arrive to fill labor
needs throughout the decades. The constant flow was made up
of both documented and undocumented persons. Mexico was,
as Porfirio Diáz, controversial seven-term President of Mexico,
is reputed to have said, “too far from God and too close to the
United States.” Mexicans were a constant presence in the host
country and never appeared to gain stability or to blend with
the natives.
Mexicans/Latinos were not helped to identify as Americans
with ease. It was not until second and third generations had
served in the military and received schooling that made them
feel less separate from peer groups that they claimed more
readily their American identity. It would appear that Mexicans/
Latinos, if not fully despised, were certainly not highly regarded, desirable or fully appreciated as a community. Recently, the
current emphasis on “building the wall” and the antagonism
expressed towards Mexico and its leadership have deepened
the sense of fear and separation felt by the members of the Latino immigrant group. Thus, it can be said, that the ghost of the
Black Legend has risen again. Linguistic, religious and social
differences that fueled animosity and contributed to the distancing of the early immigrant groups continue today, feeding
mutual suspicion. The current political leadership and its xenophobic inclinations fuel sentiments that may have been dormant in the general public.
It is sad to recognize that there are no complete explanations
for the prejudicial sentiments which U.S. citizens have exhibited
towards Mexican and Latino immigrants. Changes in attitudes
will require a profound cultural transformation. However, on a
more hopeful note, there has been a significant increase in the
educational, political and business gains made by earlier Latino immigrants and their children. Once the current xenophobic wave passes, this may significantly weaken the historical
animosity toward the group. The level of political leadership
exercised by Hispanics today is significant, and combined with
demographic changes, cannot be ignored.
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Book Reviews
Heather Jacobson, Labor of Love: Gestational Surrogacy and the
Work of Making Babies. Rutgers University Press (2016), 201
pages, $19.99 (paperback).
The practice of surrogacy is not new in human history. Given the needs of parental hopefuls combined with developments
of new medical procedures, gestational surrogacy as compensated labor is an emerging reality in the United States. It is the
exchange of money between surrogates and intended parents
that has made gestational surrogacy much more complicated
and much more controversial. Important questions now arise as
gestational surrogacy becomes a commercial enterprise. What is
the proper way to view surrogates, intended parents, surrogacy
professionals and their role in society as a whole in relation to
the work of surrogacy? There is a shortage of empirical research
to assist us in understanding this phenomenon, especially from
the perspective of surrogates and their families.
Heather Jacobson’s book, as the first ethnographic study of
gestational surrogacy in the U.S., begins to fill this important
gap in the literature. Jacobson collected data from 2009 to 2015,
by interviewing surrogates and their family members, intended
parents, and surrogacy professionals in Texas and California.
This was supplemented by disciplined examination of surrogacy websites, forums, and blogs. Through her extensive fieldwork
and rigorous analysis, this book, in six well-written chapters, illustrates the American commercial surrogacy market, presents
illustrative sketches of surrogates and their families, and further
examines surrogacy as a shadowy workforce in the U.S.
The first chapter introduces fundamental concepts in gestational surrogacy by illustrating the story of a surrogate named
Molly. This chapter provides some background to understand
commercial gestational surrogates from a social and cultural perspective, and further lays the foundations for examining research questions based on surrogates’ stories. Jacobson
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179

180

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

reviews the history of surrogacy and describes the emergence
of commercial surrogacy in the second chapter. Here Jacobson
also documents the surrogacy rules for intended parents, surrogates, and surrogacy professionals. The rules for each party
involved in the process demonstrate a mixture of altruistic and
profit-driven motives and work.
The third chapter further examines whether and how surrogates perceive surrogacy as work by asking these women
how they think of their work, how they interact with others,
and how they confront negative cultural assumptions about
surrogacy. Jacobson well captures the inspirations and motivations of American women to work in this highly contentious
field. Her research suggests that they are primarily driven by
altruistic motivation and their own personal enjoyment of being pregnant. These motives far outweigh the lure of monetary
benefits. This also goes a long way in helping us understand
why most surrogates are quite reluctant to characterize surrogacy as hired employment or work.
The author explores the relationships between surrogates and
intended parents from the initial contact to postpartum in the
fourth chapter. Surrogates expect a close, authentic, supportive,
and respectful relationship between themselves and intended
parents. However, these relationship expectations, which often
feel more like friendship, also obscure the reality of surrogacy as
a paid occupation. If the relationships between surrogates and
intended parents lack warmth and mutual respect, surrogates
are more likely to feel like unskilled paid laborers.
The fifth chapter looks at the experiences of the spouses and
children of surrogates and the effect gestational surrogacy has
on the daily life of surrogate families. Benefits to spouses and
children include compensation and happiness of childbearing.
Although families receive monetary and emotional benefits,
family members have concerns about surrogates’ health and
safety issues. As Jacobson suggests, gestational surrogacy is a
family contract among surrogates, partners, children, and intended parents. The family contract indicates that surrogacy as
a form of paid work rests heavily on family members’ active
involvement and significant sacrifices. Yet these very features
of surrogacy also work to limit the recognition of gestational
surrogacy as a form of employment.
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The last chapter introduces the rules associated with money in the surrogacy market. Surrogates are trained and socialized to accept surrogacy as paid work. However, they are not
allowed to frame it as reproductive work primarily for the purpose of profit or monetary reward. This contradiction makes
surrogates invisible among the scope of traditional occupations.
Surrogacy is a rapidly growing occupation in recent years,
and acknowledgement of this type of work as an occupation
still has social, ethical, religious, and legal strictures in American society. This book documents the processes, relationships,
and structures of American gestational surrogacy and provides
original and thoughtful insights into the world of contemporary
reproduction. Overall, this a book of very readable research,
accessible to anyone interested in understanding more about
the gestational surrogacy. This book should become a valuable
reference for policymakers to reconsider strengths, challenges,
and future of surrogacy in the U.S., as well as the rights of surrogates and other relevant parties.
Yanfeng Xu
The School of Social Work
University of Maryland, Baltimore
E. J. Dionne, Jr., Norman J. Ornstein, and Thomas E. Mann, One
Nation After Trump: A Guide for the Perplexed, the Disillusioned,
the Desperate, and the Not-Yet Deported. St. Martin’s Press
(2017), 344 pages, $25.99 (hardback).
The contention of this book is that Donald Trump’s rise to
the American presidency produced a crisis so profound that
the reaction in its wake could be a harbinger of democratic renewal. Stated this way, especially if it had come from a group
of lesser lights, this would easily strike the reader as partisan
wishful thinking at best, to be dismissed as some sort of naïve
neo-Hegelian political negative dialectic. But this particular
group of writers is hardly partisan; they span from center-left to
center-right, and they all are easily counted among the top ten
of current American public intellectuals. So without a doubt,
when they speak with one voice on matters of social policy,
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even in a consciously non-academic, though well-documented
forum, such as this book, they do command our attention.
The Trump phenomenon, they write, did not come out of
the blue yonder, but has been brewing piecemeal in the Republican party for decades. If Trump himself represents anything
of note, it is in his ability to gather together many of the disparate but increasingly radicalized strands of ideological voices
presented in one form or another in the Republican coalition.
These include voices of populist religion, nationalism, nativism and economic protectionism. Over the past few decades,
the Republican establishment has been relatively successful in
playing each of these factions off against one another, with each
feeling itself heard just enough to remain within the Republican umbrella. Trump reveals the long-term instability of this
coalition; the Republican establishment has been increasingly
preparing for its own demise. Trump exposes the Republican
establishment’s unwillingness to really push the agenda of any
of these factions to conclusion, while he, Donald J. Trump, is the
standard bearer for actually doing so.
In the demise of the Republican establishment, these writers
see a great opportunity for a new era of democratic renewal. But
for this to happen, there must be a clear vision set forth of compelling and practical ideas and policies that can rally the support
not only of those who voted against Trump in the 2016 election,
but also of that significantly large faction of voters who did vote
for Trump but are now quite dissatisfied with the results.
The first and longest part of the book is devoted to analysis of how the ground was prepared for Trump throughout the
post-War period, but especially since the rise of Ronald Reagan.
Chapters devoted to the dog whistles of race and class offer significant insights into veins of resentment and discontent stoked
by political and media culture warriors for many years, largely
under the radar of those not tuned in to it directly. Alternative
media sources on the right continuously eroded the respect
and authority for the norms of social reporting based on deep
research and garnering of factual data. This coincided with a
growing sense that “minority rule” was not only legitimate but
even inevitable in the complex world of modern America.
This aspect of “minority rule” deserves special attention,
as it has a long history in the American republic. Although we
Americans think of ourselves as a democracy, and democracy
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means rule by majority, there have always been compromises to
this principle. Our sacred Bill of Rights, as well as other amendments to the U.S. Constitution, can be seen in many ways as
anti-democratic in spirit. That is to say, they are explicitly constituted to put limits on rule by majority. Likewise, many of the
compromises allowing for a United States to emerge at all are
explicitly tuned to give smaller and less populated states outsized power in relation to larger and more populated states.
An obvious example of this is simply the fact that every
state has two senators. Thus Wyoming has one U.S. Senator
representing approximately 290,000 citizens (half of the state
population) while California has one U.S. Senator representing
approximately 19 million citizens. In other words, in terms of
representative power in the federal legislature, a Wyoming citizen has something like 65 times that of a California citizen.
Similarly lopsided power distribution favoring minority rule
is found in many areas of government, most notably for the
Trump election, in the Electoral College. It needs to be emphasized that while Republicans and conservatives of late have been
very effective in efforts to increase their minority ruling power
through highly gerrymandered voting districts and partisan
purging of voter registration lists, it has been Democrats and
liberals who for decades reflexively moved to bypass majoritarian political solutions to social policy in favor of judicial solutions. The point here is not to pose questionable equivalencies,
but simply to underline that the drift we have seen away from
the slow process of consensus building and toward the notion
that a legislative faction of 50% plus one is a sufficient mandate
to authorize imposition of an even radical social policy agenda
has been brewing for decades and has been utilized across the
political spectrum. Trumpism would be unimaginable if these
practices were not already firmly in place.
Part Two of this book looks at what can be done in the arena of social policy to create new democratic norms and values
in the near and more distant future in America. These authors
contend that the absolute bottom line for a way forward is a reassessment of our economic system, the distribution of costs and
rewards within that system, and a strong and steady move away
from “winner takes all” policies and toward policies facilitating
more economic equality. We must assume that once we get into
the weeds, Dionne, Ornstein and Mann would have substantive
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disagreements on the details. Yet the very fact that this basic demand for curbing current practices is agreed upon by writers
representing the Brookings, American Enterprise and Manhattan Institutions respectively, is itself an important fact.
In further chapters, these authors outline ideas for reviving
an understanding of patriotism based on mutual respect among
citizens rather than jingoistic nativism, and on reviving and
expanding more traditional norms of behavior in the political
sphere. This latter point is quite interesting because, as is shown
throughout this book, much of what we value most about the
American social and political system is based not in laws per se
but rather in the implicit behavioral norms we expect from politicians. While these norms have certainly been tested at various
times in our history, appeals to these norms (basic honesty, civility toward and respect for the integrity of opponents) also have
carried strong authority in the face of violations. Think, for example, of Joseph Welch’s public challenge to Joe McCarthy—“Have
you after all no sense of decency, sir?”—which historians of the
era often cite as the turning point in McCarthy’s communist
witch-hunting. Beginning at least with Republican Newt Gingrich’s skillful use of C-Span cameras to launch his “back bench”
campaign against leading House Democrats, and then on to the
founding of the so-called Tea Party and Freedom Caucus groups
among Republicans, it has become an explicit tactic to loudly violate these “norms of decency” in relation to political opponents.
Violation of these norms is not illegal, and thus respect for these
norms cannot be legislated. Trump has been the master at such
norm violation, turning it not only against Democrats but against
the Republican establishment itself. At the same time, Trump’s
flaunting and flagrant violations drive home the point that restoration of norms is an essential component of a post-Trump revival of democracy and a civil society.
While I highly recommend this book, especially for those in
our profession who, even as we speak, are giving serious thought
to those elements we need to include in future policy discussions,
I have to say that the phrase going through my mind most often
while reading this book was “that’s a lot easier said than done!”
I tend to agree with these authors’ contention that a heavily
skewed economy lays at the root of our current situation. If that
means anything, it is that our current situation is contoured by
decades of neo-liberal exaltation of money as the highest good.
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According to neoliberal logic then, those who have money and
wealth will utilize it with increasing precision to create for themselves even more money and wealth. This being the case, we are
not now simply in need of better social and economic policies.
We are in need of a rather thoroughgoing spiritual revolution, a
broadly cultural change in values throughout our entire society
away from neoliberal exaltation of money, profits and wealth display. Frankly, I don’t see anything nearly so fundamental coming from these authors. They seem confident that the reward of
a future sustainable and pleasantly civil society shared by all is
sufficient to maintain allegiance to their vision. I am much less
confident. It is a replay of the old commons dilemma, in which
the common good of all is pitted against the selfish good of individuals. The results when such games are played out in human
history are not usually very encouraging.
Nevertheless, we do need to be thinking in terms of common good social policies, and this book is at least one potent
starting point for diagnosing our current problems and pointing a finger in a positive direction forward.
Daniel Liechty
The School of Social Work
Illinois State University
Geoffrey L. Greif and Michael E. Woolley, Adult Sibling Relationships. Columbia University Press (2016), 301 pages, $29.99
(paperback).
Whether approaching this book as a family therapist, social
work educator, policy analyst or simply as a sibling, this presentation of adult sibling relationships is a highly readable and
accessible contribution to the literature on family relationships.
The book shares key findings and in-depth case studies gleaned
from interviews and questionnaire data from 262 siblings aged
forty and older, with at least one living sibling.
The authors provide a comprehensive contextualization of
the study of sibling relationships, long overlooked in favor of parent-child and spousal interactions within the family, taking the
reader through a review of relevant studies on family relationships ranging from biology to history, social sciences to culture,
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and fast-forwarding to families in popular culture. The overarching framework spotlights themes of affection, ambivalence, and
ambiguity, which are viewed as intrinsic to adult sibling interactions. Additionally, these interactions are examined through
a life course perspective in which family history can be seen to
repeat itself in subsequent generations, and within a theoretical
perspective focusing on families as systems applying concepts
borrowed from Bowen’s family systems, Minuchin’s structural
family therapy, and Satir’s experiential family therapy.
Key lessons are drawn from the author’s wide-ranging review of the literature on family relationships. These include
the importance of sibling relationships as sources of affection
and support that enhance well-being from middle through late
adulthood; the need of older siblings to seek reciprocal relationships with younger siblings, and the desire of younger siblings
to seek comfort and support from older siblings; the impact of
parental favoritism on both the favored and unfavored child
and its lasting impact on sibling relationships across the lifespan; the need to create a positive bond between siblings when
one lives with or faces a significant life challenge (e.g., health,
disability), as well as a recognition by professionals of the needs
of siblings serving in a caregiving role; the lasting impact and
grief resulting from the loss of a sibling at an early age, even
in instances when the death preceded the surviving sibling’s
birth; and the greater emotional connection of sisters, which
creates an opportunity for professionals to develop such capacity among brothers.
The author’s findings support ambivalence as an important
characteristic describing adult sibling relationships from middle to late adulthood, pointing to a need to further study the
“components of closeness” (p. 72) to include feelings, behaviors,
and expectations in an age-informed context. Insights for potential child-rearing best practices were shared, with a nuanced
understanding of the need for all things in moderation when
it comes to both children’s behaviors and parental practices.
The generational context of strained sibling relationships is addressed, ranging along a continuum from the desire to reconnect or to maintain distance, and to feelings of ambivalence in
between. While opportunities to improve connections later in
life may occur as a result of an important event in the life of the
family was noted, it may be necessary for siblings to learn to
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accept current circumstances and adjust their expectations. The
experience of siblings in blended families was also addressed,
with a suggestion for use of genograms and family maps to facilitate identification of and changes to historical patterns.
The book concludes with a review of practice approaches
suggested by research findings on adult sibling relationships,
including contributions from practitioners and advice from
siblings. Practitioners described processes seen while treating
siblings in emergency situations and over time. A smaller number recommend therapy for improving boundaries when other
efforts fail.
Siblings focused on the importance of communication, forgiveness and acceptance, as well as the importance of personal
effort generally in improving and maintaining positive adult
sibling relationships. While sensitive to and seeking to avoid
overgeneralization of cultural considerations, the authors do
address the level of culture. An in-depth, culturally grounded
approach would provide important contributions to the literature on adult sibling relationships.
Noteworthy were the voices of adult siblings, through case
studies and quotations, as well as analysis of qualitative data.
According to adult siblings in the study, improving challenging sibling relationships ultimately requires a willingness to be
vulnerable, acceptance that each sibling has a point of view, and
a sense of “hope that, with effort, a better relationship can be
achieved” (p. 243).
Teri Kennedy
The School of Social Work
Arizona State University
Adam Gaffney, To Heal Humankind: The Right to Health in History.
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group (2017), 240 pages, $36.00
(paperback).
My interest in healthcare had brought me to this book by
Adam Gaffney. I wanted to learn more about how the modern-day health care laws and rights evolved. The book starts
in the early 1700s and ends at the start of the Trump administration in 2017. The debates over whether healthcare is a right
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or a commodity and whether private or public healthcare is
better are discussed throughout the book. These debates have
persisted throughout health care’s history. Although this book
does not answer these pressing questions, Gaffney provides detailed historic evidence explaining the concepts and ideas related to these issues. The detail and evidence, such as treaties,
revolutions and laws, give the reader a greater understanding
of healthcare, laws, social movements and health organizations.
Gaffney is an advocate of human rights and healthcare and it
shines through this book.
Gaffney has written this book in seven chapters. Each chapter goes into a comprehensive understanding about healthcare and the right to health during a historical period. Gaffney writes about historic evidence from all around the world
including Chile, China, and the Soviet Union. He discusses
each era using evidence and facts. Beginning with a helpful
introduction bringing the reader insight about the book’s topic, the subsequent chapters are written in chronological order
beginning with the 18th century. The book’s central concern
is the meaning of human rights as it relates to healthcare, and
the origins and progression of our ideas about this. He explores
this topic through both sociological and historical lenses up
to and including the modern day. As the idea of human rights
evolved, there is a clear emergence of discussion as to whether
healthcare should be seen as a right or as a commodity. How
this question is answered in turn, leads into whether healthcare
is best served as a public or a private system. The book provides
insight on why healthcare is being fought for and what it means
to the economy.
The first chapter discusses the ancient world with perspectives from Plato and Aristotle. Gaffney examines hospitals from
different eras and countries regarding ethics, rights, and healthcare. Does religion play a role in how healthcare is perceived?
Gaffney makes useful observations on the ways Buddhism has
played in a role in Chinese hospitals and health care rights, as
well as how Christianity played a role in health care rights in
other parts of the world. These religions are seen as acting creatively in the idea of charitable medical care, natural rights, the
right to health, and universal healthcare.
The right to healthcare and human rights is explored in chapter two. Gaffney gives insight on what this concept has meant
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in particular times and places, such as France in the late 1700s,
from which came the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.
This document states “Men are born and remain free and equal
in rights” (p. 42). The French Revolution also advanced the ideal
of the rights universal of human beings, including a right to
healthcare.
Chapter three touches on the debate between public versus
private healthcare, and the impact of each system on those in
poverty. The traditional poor laws were the public system of
poor relief and were seen by many to be inadequate for those
in poverty in industrialized Britain. Therefore, a New Poor Law
was created, but was left woefully under funded, under staffed,
and with limited resources. This is largely the system of relief
that made its way into the twentieth century.
Meanwhile, a revolution started in Germany about medical reform and the emergence of social medicine. There we see
the development of public health insurance, which only subsequently influenced programs in Britain and the United States.
A chapter focusing specifically on the United States delineates
the progression of healthcare thinking and policies as these
developed after World War II. Here again we see the influence
of the term “human rights,” as it was affected by the war and
war relief efforts. The 1948 adoption in the United Nations of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDRH) in many ways
frames our thinking about healthcare.
Gaffney uses the concept of first, second and third worlds
to categorize ideas about healthcare provision. He explains people in the first world are seen as having “a de facto legal right
to healthcare …” (p. 118). Examples of this are given from the
United States and Great Britain. The second world is seen as
illustrating “the mixed legacy of communism with regard to
advancing a right to healthcare …” (p.118), and here examples
included stem from China and the Soviet Union. Finally, third
world examples stem from Latin America, Cuba, and Chile.
Gaffney suggests that in relation to the third world, “the tides of
global political change affected the emergence and/or rollback
of health rights” (p.118). Gaffney compares and thoroughly explains the healthcare system in each “world” and its effects on
the population there.
The final chapter examines the era of neoliberalism. The information in this chapter gives the reader a better understanding

190

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

of where we stand today in relation to healthcare policy. Topics
discussed in this chapter include the HIV and AIDS epidemics
in America, shock therapy in Russia, and the Affordable Care
Act (Obamacare). Once again the issue of universal healthcare
and the continuance of private versus single-payer healthcare is
raised. Gaffney compares different countries which have both
types of systems, along with the pros and cons for individuals within each system. The book wraps up with the presidential election of 2016. Gaffney discusses the candidate views on
healthcare, giving special attention to accessibility and affordability. He ends with questions of whether the nation will continue to fund Obamacare or see some sort of “Trumpcare” as
the future of healthcare. This review is being written nearly a
year into the Trump administration, and quite frankly Gaffney’s
questions are still to be answered, with solid evidence pointing
in opposite directions!
For much the same reason, this book is not outdated, even
though it was written before the 2016 election. The issues remain alive, and Gaffney’s book helps us all understand why
certain healthcare systems have worked well, why some have
failed, and what can be done to improve all systems of healthcare. The evidence and data in this book gives us hope that we
will not simply repeat a history of failure, but rather that, even
in the Trump administration, we might learn from that history.
Lydia Douglas
The School of Social Work
Illinois State University
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